Privatized coercion: from mercenarism to private military companies - Historique des versions

Arthur : /* The transnationalist discourse */

2022-07-19T20:22:35Z

The transnationalist discourse

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	#This is the basis for decision-making about the use of force: even if the state will set rules, on the ground things are not going to be really clear about the rules of engagement. We enter a fuzzy terrain where we do not know how actors that we do not necessarily control are going to have room for manoeuvre. Companies, unlike states, have their own rules of operation with their own directives raising other problems. On the very central issue of the use of force, with the PMCs we enter a grey zone creating spaces where they can make decisions more freely than the military because the chains of command are distended.		#This is the basis for decision-making about the use of force: even if the state will set rules, on the ground things are not going to be really clear about the rules of engagement. We enter a fuzzy terrain where we do not know how actors that we do not necessarily control are going to have room for manoeuvre. Companies, unlike states, have their own rules of operation with their own directives raising other problems. On the very central issue of the use of force, with the PMCs we enter a grey zone creating spaces where they can make decisions more freely than the military because the chains of command are distended.

	The question that arises is the regulation of PMCs. War in general was a means of regulating violence. In a private logic where the market is supposed to impose its rules, the question of regulation is quite representative of this vagueness. There are two types of ~~process~~, on the one hand:		The question that arises is the regulation of PMCs. War in general was a means of regulating violence. In a private logic where the market is supposed to impose its rules, the question of regulation is quite representative of this vagueness. There are two types of processes, on the one hand:
	*agreements between States, these States impose binding regulations and legal frameworks to regulate the framework in which these companies operate. An interesting initiative is the Montreux process. Since 2008, this process has been the culmination of discussions initiated in Switzerland with the ICRC, including 17 states that have agreed to regulate these activities and, in particular, to ensure that they comply with humanitarian law. At the same time, this Montreux process aims to establish a code of conduct to develop "good practices". In a logic of market logic, we are in a change of rationality, entering into a logic of self-regulation as is the case with fair trade. This refers to the social responsibility of players, which calls for the ethical dimension of market regulation. Most of the States associated with the Montreux Process, which aims both to have non-binding international regulation and to develop a code of conduct, are not inclined to address this issue within the framework of the UN.		*agreements between States, these States impose binding regulations and legal frameworks to regulate the framework in which these companies operate. An interesting initiative is the Montreux process. Since 2008, this process has been the culmination of discussions initiated in Switzerland with the ICRC, including 17 states that have agreed to regulate these activities and, in particular, to ensure that they comply with humanitarian law. At the same time, this Montreux process aims to establish a code of conduct to develop "good practices". In a logic of market logic, we are in a change of rationality, entering into a logic of self-regulation as is the case with fair trade. This refers to the social responsibility of players, which calls for the ethical dimension of market regulation. Most of the States associated with the Montreux Process, which aims both to have non-binding international regulation and to develop a code of conduct, are not inclined to address this issue within the framework of the UN.
	*companies are not opposed to this self-regulatory logic. An International Stability Operations Association treaty is a grouping of private military companies that aims to establish a code of good conduct with the idea of presenting private military companies for one day meeting the standards of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in the 1990s.		*companies are not opposed to this self-regulatory logic. An International Stability Operations Association treaty is a grouping of private military companies that aims to establish a code of good conduct with the idea of presenting private military companies for one day meeting the standards of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in the 1990s.

Arthur le 20 juillet 2021 à 15:49

2021-07-20T15:49:24Z

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	\| fr = La coercition privatisée : du mercenariat aux compagnies militaires privées		\| fr = La coercition privatisée : du mercenariat aux compagnies militaires privées
	\| es = Coacción privatizada: del mercenarismo a las empresas militares privadas		\| es = Coacción privatizada: del mercenarismo a las empresas militares privadas
			\| lt = Privatizuota prievarta: nuo samdinių iki privačių karinių bendrovių
	}}		}}

Arthur le 11 février 2018 à 14:38

2018-02-11T14:38:57Z

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	\| assistants =		\| assistants =
	\| enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015]		\| enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015]
	\| cours = [[~~La violence politique et la pratique de la sécurité~~]]		\| cours = [[Political Violence and Security Practices]]
	\| lectures =		\| lectures =
	*[[Political violence and the practice of security]]		*[[Political violence and the practice of security]]

Arthur le 11 février 2018 à 14:34

2018-02-11T14:34:51Z

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			{{Infobox Lecture
			\| image =
			\| image_caption =
			\| faculté =
			\| département =
			\| professeurs = [[Stephan Davidshofer]]<ref>[[http://unige.academia.edu/StephanDavidshofer\|Stephan Davidshofer \| University of Geneva]] - Academia.edu</ref><ref>[http://www.cairn.info/publications-de-Davidshofer-Stephan--56940.htm Publications de Stephan Davidshofer] \| Cairn.info</ref><ref>Davidshofer, Stephan. “[http://www.theses.fr/2009IEPP0047 La Gestion De Crise Européenne Ou Quand L'Europe Rencontre La Sécurité : Modalités Pratiques Et Symboliques D'une Autonomisation].” Http://Www.theses.fr/, Paris, Institut D'études Politiques, 1 Jan. 2009</ref> <br> [[Christian Olsson]]<ref>[http://philoscsoc.ulb.be/fr/users/colsson Page personnelle de Christian Olsson sur le site de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles]</ref><ref>[http://ulb.academia.edu/COlsson Page de Christian Olsson sur Academia.edu]</ref><ref>[https://fr.linkedin.com/in/christian-olsson-2ba437b Profile Linkedin de Christian Olsson]</ref>
			\| assistants =
			\| assistants =
			\| enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015]
			\| cours = [[La violence politique et la pratique de la sécurité]]
			\| lectures =
			*[[Political violence and the practice of security]]
			*[[The birth of modern warfare: war-making and state-making from a Western perspective]]
			*[[Transformations of war and violence in Europe]]
			*[[War beyond the West: is the modern state a Western invention?]]
			*[[What is non-state violence? The Case of Afghan Conflict]]
			*[[Intervention: Reinventing war?]]
			*[[Security professionals: bureaucratization, institutionalization, professionalization and differentiation]]
			*[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: between war and global policing?]]
			*[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: the logic of risk]]
			*[[Privatized coercion: from mercenarism to private military companies]]
			*[[Intelligence and Surveillance]]
			}}

	Generally speaking, the question of privatization is something that systematically revolves around the notion of the State. Privatisation is a central issue in our contemporary societies and is part of our daily lives. For a long time, when we talked about security, we had the impression that this was the last bastion of the exclusive monopoly of the State, it was easier to liberalize the telecommunications sector than the field of violence. For a long time, the monopoly on violence has been fundamental to the structuring of Western states. One of the fundamental reasons why we have functional states in the West is because we have had the mechanism that Tilly calls "war making - state making" where the monopoly of violence has allowed state building. Erosion of the monopoly through privatisation is central. Talking about the privatization of violence, the erosion of the state monopoly on the management of violence is something that was not given until recently. Today, this question must be approached through the prism of questioning this monopoly with a view to practices and private companies.		Generally speaking, the question of privatization is something that systematically revolves around the notion of the State. Privatisation is a central issue in our contemporary societies and is part of our daily lives. For a long time, when we talked about security, we had the impression that this was the last bastion of the exclusive monopoly of the State, it was easier to liberalize the telecommunications sector than the field of violence. For a long time, the monopoly on violence has been fundamental to the structuring of Western states. One of the fundamental reasons why we have functional states in the West is because we have had the mechanism that Tilly calls "war making - state making" where the monopoly of violence has allowed state building. Erosion of the monopoly through privatisation is central. Talking about the privatization of violence, the erosion of the state monopoly on the management of violence is something that was not given until recently. Today, this question must be approached through the prism of questioning this monopoly with a view to practices and private companies.

Arthur le 9 février 2018 à 16:20

2018-02-09T16:20:58Z

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	The involvement of CACI and TITAN in the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004 gives an idea of the extent and variety of PMC activities. Two of the people involved in this scandal were working for private companies raising the fact that the practice of torture can be outsourced to private companies. The legal framework behind the deployment of these private companies and one of the security stakes.		The involvement of CACI and TITAN in the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004 gives an idea of the extent and variety of PMC activities. Two of the people involved in this scandal were working for private companies raising the fact that the practice of torture can be outsourced to private companies. The legal framework behind the deployment of these private companies and one of the security stakes.

			{{Translations
			\| fr = La coercition privatisée : du mercenariat aux compagnies militaires privées
			\| es = Coacción privatizada: del mercenarismo a las empresas militares privadas
			}}

	= Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations =		= Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations =

Arthur : /* References */

2018-02-08T23:03:08Z

References

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	<references/>		<references/>

	[[Category:science~~-politique~~]] [[Category:relations ~~internationales~~]]		[[Category:political science]]
			[[Category:international relations]]
			[[Category:Stephan Davidshofer]]
			[[Category:Christian Olsson]]
			[[Category:security]]
			[[Category:2014]]

Arthur le 8 février 2018 à 22:41

2018-02-08T22:41:26Z

Voir les modifications

Arthur : /* Conclusion */

2018-02-08T22:40:17Z

Conclusion

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	= Conclusion =		= Conclusion =

	~~On assiste à une logique de symbiose entre l’État et les~~ entrepreneurs ~~de guerre~~. ~~Il y~~ a ~~plutôt une~~ transformation ~~au sein de l’État sans forcément remettre en~~ question ~~l’État lui-même puisqu’aucune logique n’échappe à l’État~~. La perspective ~~sociohistorique permet de voir que la privatisation n’est pas quelque chose de nouveau~~, ~~qu’on~~ a ~~assisté au XIXème siècle à une sorte de parenthèse avec un État influent sur l’exercice du monopole de la~~ violence ~~même si on pourrait dire que ce monopole n’a jamais été~~ total. ~~On assiste aujourd’hui peut-être à la fin de cette parenthèse~~, ~~on assisterait à un retour~~. ~~Pourquoi un retour du phénomène~~ ? ~~On devrait établir la~~ distinction ~~entre les États plus fort et plus faible~~, ~~c’est-à-dire que tous les États ne sont pas égaux face à la privatisation du monopole de la~~ violence. ~~La privatisation~~, ~~si elle est rendue~~ possible ~~et vient principalement de l’État du nord~~, ~~il y aurait derrière une raison impériale~~, ~~cela serait moins grave pour un État du nord de privatiser un pan de son appareil sécuritaire~~, ~~c’est parce qu’il peut se le permettre~~. ~~Il est~~ possible ~~pour certains États et la privatisation a des conséquences dans d’autres États~~.		There is a logic of symbiosis between the State and war entrepreneurs. Instead, there is a transformation within the State without necessarily calling into question the State itself, since no logic escapes the State. The sociohistorical perspective makes it possible to see that privatization is not something new, that in the 19th century there was a kind of parenthesis with a state influencing the exercise of the monopoly of violence, even if one could say that this monopoly was never total. We are now perhaps witnessing the end of this parenthesis, we would see a return. Why a return of the phenomenon? A distinction should be made between stronger and weaker states, i. e. not all states are equal in the privatization of the monopoly of violence. Privatisation, if it is made possible and comes mainly from the northern state, there would be an imperial reason behind it, it would be less serious for a northern state to privatise part of its security apparatus, because it can afford it. It is possible for some States and privatization has consequences in other States.

	= Bibliography =		= Bibliography =

Arthur : /* Les SMP en pratique : les effets de la relation entre professionnels de la politique et de la sécurité */

2018-02-08T22:39:59Z

Les SMP en pratique : les effets de la relation entre professionnels de la politique et de la sécurité

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	The SMPs are part of a legal no-mans's land in Iraq with Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The employees of these companies were not subject to Iraqi law, it is an extremely grey area. Since 2007, employees of these companies have been subject to the United States Unified Military Justice Code. In Afghanistan, former President Karzai wanted to regulate the presence of private military companies by making them subject to Afghan law. The reaction of these companies was to threaten the merger to break their contract because this clause was not included. There is no taking over of local judicial systems, their status is weak because they are not military. Despite the fact that they were tried to be associated with a military code, de facto, this highlights the fact that there was very little control and no punishment for abuse.		The SMPs are part of a legal no-mans's land in Iraq with Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The employees of these companies were not subject to Iraqi law, it is an extremely grey area. Since 2007, employees of these companies have been subject to the United States Unified Military Justice Code. In Afghanistan, former President Karzai wanted to regulate the presence of private military companies by making them subject to Afghan law. The reaction of these companies was to threaten the merger to break their contract because this clause was not included. There is no taking over of local judicial systems, their status is weak because they are not military. Despite the fact that they were tried to be associated with a military code, de facto, this highlights the fact that there was very little control and no punishment for abuse.

	= ~~Les SMP en pratique~~ : ~~les effets de la relation entre professionnels de la politique et de la sécurité~~ =		= SMPs in Practice: The Effects of the Relationship Between Politics and Security Professionals =

	~~Comment ce phénomène de privatisation influe les~~ relations ~~entre les différents acteurs et métiers impliqués~~ ? ~~Il faut parler de continuités entre acteurs étatiques et privés dans le cadre d’une analyse en termes de réseaux~~. ~~Ces réseaux sont transversaux au~~-~~delà de la~~ distinction ~~privé – public~~. ~~Ces réseaux n’affaiblissent pas unilatéralement les acteurs étatiques~~, ~~mais ils transforment certainement les~~ relations ~~de pouvoir au sein des États~~.		How does this phenomenon of privatization affect relations between the different actors and professions involved? Continuity between state and private actors must be discussed in a network analysis. These networks are cross-sectional beyond the private - public distinction. These networks do not unilaterally weaken state actors, but they certainly transform power relations within states.

	== ~~Politiciens et bureaucraties ministérielles~~ ==		== Politicians and ministerial bureaucracies ==

	~~Au niveau de la~~ transformation ~~des pratiques~~, ~~nous allons regarder une série de cas pratiques de comment l’arrivée des SMP va transformer le rapport entre certains acteurs~~.		With regard to the transformation of practices, we will look at a series of practical cases of how the arrival of SMPs will transform the relationship between certain actors.

	En 2003, ~~lors de l’intervention en Irak~~, il y avait un désaccord au sein du Pentagone entre les civils et les militaires à savoir la question des néoconservateurs et la privatisation militaire dans le contexte de l’opposition militaire aux opérations militaires extérieures. ~~Les militaires n’étaient pas très enthousiastes à l’idée de la guerre en Irak~~. ~~Un rapport de~~ 2002 ~~disait que les militaires estimaient qu’envoyer des militaires en Irak n’était pas compliqué~~, ~~mais en termes de gestion cela était très compliqué alors que les néo~~-~~conservateurs étaient en faveur d’une~~ intervention. ~~Dans ce~~ type ~~d’opposition~~, ~~avec l’avènement d’acteur de~~ SMP, ~~comment cela amène une~~ transformation. ~~Le fait que les SMP sont une~~ solution ~~viable va faire que cela donne plus d’options au civil rendant les militaires moins importants~~. ~~La bureaucratie civile avait plus d’options~~.		In 2003, during the intervention in Iraq, there was a disagreement within the Pentagon between civilians and the military, namely the issue of neo-conservatives and military privatization in the context of military opposition to military operations abroad. The military was not very enthusiastic about the war in Iraq. A 2002 report said that the military felt that sending troops to Iraq was not complicated, but in terms of management it was very complicated when the neo-conservatives were in favour of intervention. In this type of opposition, with the advent of SMP actor, how does this lead to a transformation. The fact that SMPs are a viable solution is going to make it give more options for civilians, making the military less important. Civil bureaucracy had more options.

	~~Un cas est la manière dont les politiques contournent leurs alliés avec l’exemple de la lutte antidrogue en~~ Afghanistan. ~~L’appel à une société privée~~ a ~~permis de contourner un sujet de politique traditionnel entre alliés~~. ~~Ce que la privatisation peut changer est aussi de contourner l’opposition parlementaire~~. ~~Le plan~~ Colombia ~~s’inscrivait dans la continuité contre le trafic de drogue en Colombie~~. Ce plan ~~en plusieurs phases visait à s’attaquer à la culture de la drogue qui permettait d’affaiblir la guérilla sur place par l’éradication de la culture de la~~ coca. ~~Le Congrès n’était pas « pour » ayant peur que ne s’enclenche une opération d’escalade~~. ~~L’administration~~ Clinton ~~a fait largement appel à des compagnies privées notamment pour éradiquer les cultures de~~ coca.		One case is the way politicians bypass their allies with the example of counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. The call for a private company has bypassed a traditional allied political issue. What privatization can change is also to bypass the parliamentary opposition. Plan Colombia was part of the continuity against drug trafficking in Colombia. The multi-phased plan aimed to tackle drug cultivation, which weakened the guerrillas on the ground by eradicating coca cultivation. Congress was not "for" fearing that an escalation operation would be launched. The Clinton administration has made extensive use of private companies, particularly to eradicate coca cultivation.

	~~Une façon de décrire le rapport des bureaucraties ministérielles aux SMP est le principe de « déni~~ plausible ». En 2007 ~~a eu lieu la « fusillade de la~~ place ~~Nissour »~~. ~~Des employés de~~ Black Water ~~qui devaient protéger un convoi diplomatique et ont été amenés à tirer dans la foule faisant une vingtaine de morts~~. ~~Le déni~~ plausible ~~est que le secrétaire d’État américain à l’époque ne pouvait pas de manière plausible dire qu’il ne contrôlait pas vraiment ces gens~~, ~~que même s’ils leur ont donné des~~ instructions, ~~le fait d’avoir tiré dans la foule n’était pas de la responsabilité totale des américains~~. ~~Il reste le flou sur la façon dont cette compagnie à interpréter les~~ directives ~~américaines~~. ~~Le terme de « déni~~ plausible ~~» revient souvent pour illustrer la marge de manœuvre que peut laisser l’appel aux sociétés militaires~~.		One way of describing the relationship between departmental bureaucracies and the MPS is the principle of "plausible denial". In 2007, the "Nissour Square shooting" took place. Black Water employees who were supposed to protect a diplomatic convoy and were forced to shoot into the crowd killing about 20 people. The plausible denial is that the U. S. secretary of state at the time could not plausibly say that he did not really control these people, that even though they gave them instructions, shooting in the crowd was not the total responsibility of the Americans. It remains unclear how this company interprets the American directives. The term "plausible denial" is often used to illustrate the room for manoeuvre that can be left by appealing to military societies.

	== ~~Militaires et~~ services ~~de renseignement~~ ==		== Military and intelligence services ==

	~~Leur travail a été largement transformé par des sociétés privées~~. ~~Pour les militaires~~, ~~il y a l’avantage assez évident qui est celui de se concentrer sur les~~ missions ~~essentielles de l’armée~~. ~~L’avantage de la délégation à des SMP pour les militaires est qu’ils peuvent se concentrer sur les~~ missions ~~essentielles dans un contexte de dotation en troupes limitées permettant d’augmenter le~~ tooth-to-tail ratio. ~~Pour les militaires~~, ~~il y a un avantage que dans une armée relativement réduite en nombre d’hommes~~, ~~si les tâches les moins glorieuses sont laissées à des sociétés privées~~, on ~~se concentre d’avantage sur les~~ aspects ~~essentiels de l’activité milliaire~~.		Their work has been largely transformed by private companies. For the military, there is the obvious advantage of focusing on the essential missions of the army. The advantage of delegation to SMPs for the military is that they can focus on core missions in a limited troop-staffing context, which increases the tooth-to-tail ratio. For the military, there is an advantage that in an army relatively small in number of men, if the less glorious tasks are left to private companies, one focuses more on the essential aspects of the milestone activity.

	~~Mais les militaires perdent parfois certaines prérogatives puisque de nombreuses choses ont été externalisées~~. ~~Le fait de laisser tomber certaines prérogatives fait que les militaires peuvent aussi en perdre d’assez importantes~~. ~~Le fait que les moyens à disposition sont d’ordre privé~~, ~~veut dire qu’au sein de la bureaucratie~~, ~~d’autres~~ aspects ~~dédiés aux militaires vont profiter à des sociétés privées~~. ~~Aujourd’hui~~, la CIA ~~n’a pas besoin de faire recours à des moyens militaires pour faire une frappe ciblée en~~ Afghanistan ~~réduisant les prérogatives des militaires~~. ~~Les militaires ont moins de contrôle sur les~~ aspects ~~logistiques laissant une marge de manœuvre plus large à d’autres acteurs~~.		But the military sometimes loses certain prerogatives because many things have been outsourced. Leaving some prerogatives aside means that the military can also lose quite significant prerogatives. The fact that the resources available are private means that, within the bureaucracy, other aspects dedicated to the military will benefit private companies. Today, the CIA does not need to use military means to make a targeted strike in Afghanistan that reduces military prerogatives. The military has less control over logistical aspects, leaving more room for manoeuvre for other actors.

	== ~~Élite locales~~ ==		== Local elite ==

	~~L’augmentation de la présence des SMP, au sein de l’État redéfinit et réagence les rapports avec le politique~~. ~~L’intérêt que représente les SMP pour les élites locales dans des pays en développement en guerre comme l’Afghanistan ou l’Irak peut être purement économique~~. En Afghanistan, ~~les SMP représentent pour les élites locales un intérêt purement économique~~. ~~De payer certaines milices sur place et leur donner le paravent d’être des SMP~~, ~~fini par avoir une~~ influence ~~dans le jeu~~ local. ~~Si le régime en place veut avoir un appareil de sécurité publique appartenant à l’État afghan~~,~~beaucoup de milices peuvent voir les SMP comme des~~ forces ~~subversives~~. ~~On voit à quel point la privatisation de la sécurité peut avoir un~~ impact ~~sur le processus même de construction de l’État et de l’acquisition d’un monopole de l’État sur son territoire~~. Le Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups(DIAG) ~~serait un échec n’ayant pas permis de désarmer ces milices~~, ~~à savoir les enlever de l’équation de la construction de l’État en~~ Afghanistan ~~après~~ 2001.		The increasing presence of SMPs within the State redefines and reacts with the relations with politics. The interest of SMPs for local elites in war-torn developing countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq may be purely economic. In Afghanistan, SMPs represent a purely economic interest for local elites. To pay some militias on the spot and give them the screen to be SMPs, eventually having an influence in the local game. If the regime wants to have an Afghan state-owned public security apparatus, many militias can see the SMPs as subversive forces. We see how the privatization of security can have an impact on the very process of state building and the acquisition of a state monopoly on its territory. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) reportedly failed to disarm these militias, removing them from the equation of state building in Afghanistan after 2001.

	= Conclusion =		= Conclusion =

Arthur : /* Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations */

2018-02-08T22:38:42Z

Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations