Version du 22 mai 2023 à 10:13

Theories of violence in political science

Données clés
Faculté	Faculté des sciences de la société
Département	Département de science politique et relations internationales
Professeur(s)	Rémi Baudoui
Cours	Introduction to Political Science

Lectures

The study of violence in political science is a field of research that examines the different forms of violence, their origin, causes and consequences in the political context. Violence can take many forms, such as physical violence, symbolic violence, structural violence, political violence, etc. Understanding these different forms of violence and their role in politics is essential for analysing conflicts, social movements, governance and international relations.

Classical theories of violence are important to study for several reasons. First, they provide the theoretical foundations for our understanding of violence in the social sciences. They have established the concepts and analytical frameworks used in the contemporary study of violence. By understanding these classical theories, we have a solid basis for addressing issues of violence in a broader context. In addition, these classical theories offer a historical perspective on the problems of violence. They emerged at different times in the history of social and political thought, and thus allow us to understand how ideas about violence have evolved over time and have shaped current approaches. The concepts and terminology introduced by classical theories of violence are also essential to study. For example, the distinction between direct and structural violence proposed by Johan Galtung is fundamental to understanding different forms of violence and their impacts. By studying these theories, we gain an in-depth knowledge of these concepts and their application in the analysis of contemporary violence. It is also important to critically examine classical theories of violence. By studying them, we are able to question their assumptions and limitations. This critical approach fosters the development of new theories and perspectives on violence, thus contributing to the evolution of knowledge in this field. Finally, classical theories of violence remain relevant today. Although some of them may seem dated, many of the concepts and ideas they developed are still useful for understanding the dynamics of contemporary violence. By studying these theories, we can make connections between the ideas of the past and the realities of the present, which in turn allows us to better understand contemporary issues related to violence.

The study of classical theories of violence is essential to gain a thorough understanding of this complex phenomenon. They provide the theoretical foundations, historical perspective, key concepts and analytical frameworks necessary to understand the nature and implications of violence in different contexts. In addition, they play an important role in the development of new knowledge and new approaches to prevent and solve problems of violence.

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Etymology of the word 'violence'

Etymology, the study of the origin and evolution of words, can shed light on political science thinking about the concept of violence. By examining the etymological roots and meanings of terms related to violence, we can better understand the different conceptions and interpretations of this complex phenomenon.

For example, the word 'violence' itself derives from the Latin 'violentia', meaning 'excessive force' or 'violence'. This root highlights the idea of violent action that goes beyond acceptable limits. The etymology of the term thus suggests a notion of excessive force or coercion. Similarly, the etymology of some of the other words associated with violence may also offer interesting insights. For example, the word 'aggression' comes from the Latin 'aggressio', which means 'attack'. This emphasises the idea of an offensive action or attack against another person. By studying the etymology of the word, we can better understand the intentional and offensive nature of some violent behaviour. Etymology can also reveal nuances in the different forms of violence. For example, the term 'symbolic violence', popularised by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, highlights the symbolic or non-physical dimension of some forms of violence. The etymology of the word 'symbol' refers to the idea of 'putting together', thus underlining the importance of symbols, representations and cultural practices in the perpetuation of social and political violence. By studying the etymology of words related to violence, political scientists can therefore deepen their understanding of the conceptions and implications of this phenomenon. This can help them to analyse political discourses, to decode implicit meanings and to examine the different dimensions of violence, be they physical, symbolic, structural or political. Ultimately, etymology can contribute to a better understanding of violence in the field of political science by shedding light on the origins and deeper meanings of the terms used to describe it.

The etymology of the word 'violence' can be traced back to the Latin word 'violentia' meaning 'excessive force' or 'violence'. However, it is also relevant to note that the French word "violence" is closely related to the word "violer" which appeared in the 11th century and is derived from the Latin "violare". The word "violate" implies the idea of an attack on the integrity of a person, whether physically, morally or in their very being. This connotation of violating integrity reinforces the notion of violence as an act that transgresses acceptable limits and harms others. It highlights the deeper dimension of violence, which goes beyond the mere notion of excessive physical force to include moral, psychological and existential aspects. This underlines the importance of considering violence as an attack on the whole person, affecting his or her dignity, safety and well-being. By examining the etymology of the word "violence" and its relationship to the word "rape", we gain a better understanding of the seriousness and profound impact of violence on individuals and societies. It also reinforces the importance of analysing the different forms of violence and their multidimensional consequences in the field of political science.

Over time, the meaning of the term has expanded to encompass not only assaults on personal integrity, but also abuses of force and actions contrary to norms and good conventions. In the 13th century, the term 'violence' began to be associated with the abuse of force. This means that violence is no longer limited to the use of excessive force, but also includes the use of force for purposes that are contrary to norms and good conventions. This highlights the normative aspect of violence, emphasising that certain violent actions are perceived to be in contradiction with the ethical, moral or legal principles of society. This extension of the meaning of the word 'violence' to include actions that are contrary to good conventions highlights the importance of the social and cultural context in understanding violence. Norms and conventions vary from society to society, and what may be considered violent in one culture may not be in another. This evolution of the meaning of violence is relevant. It highlights the importance of considering social norms, values and conventions in the analysis of political violence. Actions that are perceived as violent may vary according to societal expectations and established political norms.

The introduction of the verb 'to violate' from 1342 onwards reinforces the idea that violence implies an intentional action. The verb 'to violate' indicates that there is an action in progress, thus emphasising the active dimension of violence. It emphasises that violence is the result of a deliberate intention to act abruptly and immediately towards another person. This notion of intentionality emphasises that violence is not simply the product of chance or accidental circumstances, but is the result of a deliberate intention to harm, dominate or coerce others. It implies aggressiveness in action, with a desire to achieve immediate and often coercive results. The appearance of the adjective "violently" and the expression "do violence" further confirms that violence is associated with a specific action. The adjective "violently" qualifies an action performed with force and intensity. It underlines the idea of a brutal, rapid and intense action, characteristic of violence. The use of this adjective reinforces the dynamic and powerful aspect of violence. The phrase "to do violence" emphasises that violence involves deliberate and intentional action. The use of the verb "to do" emphasises the active aspect of violence, indicating that it is the result of action taken in a determined manner. It also emphasises that violence is an action that is imposed on others, an action that goes against the will or interests of the person concerned. Thus, the emergence of the adjective "violently" and the expression "to do violence" in language reinforces the idea that violence is an intentional and dynamic action. This emphasises the active dimension of violence, characterised by the deliberate use of force or coercion.

In the field of political science, this intentional dimension of violence is crucial for understanding the motivations and objectives of political actors who resort to violence. It allows us to distinguish violence from accidents or unintentional events, and to analyse it as a deliberate strategy used to achieve specific political ends. This highlights the need to consider the motivations, intentions and dynamics of action behind violent behaviour in the political context.

Violence is inseparable from human action and intentionality. It implies an intention to act and to cause harm or coerce others. The component of force is central to violence, whether physical, moral, psychological or otherwise. It is important to recognise that violence is not limited to physical acts of aggression. It can also take non-physical forms, such as moral or psychological violence. Emotional abuse can take the form of intimidation, devaluation, manipulation or emotional abuse that is intended to harm a person's dignity and psychological well-being. Psychological violence encompasses forms of abuse or coercion that act on the individual's psyche, which may include acts of manipulation, emotional blackmail, threats, emotional deprivation, etc. These forms of violence can have profound consequences for the mental health, emotional well-being and social relationships of individuals. It is essential to understand that violence is not only the physical manifestation of force, but can also take subtle and insidious forms that affect the integrity, dignity and well-being of individuals. In the field of political science, this understanding of violence in its different dimensions is crucial for analysing power relations, political conflicts, social dynamics and the political consequences of violence. This allows the various forms of violence to be taken into account and more holistic and effective strategies for conflict prevention and resolution to be developed.

Violence is intrinsically linked to action and involves intentionality. It often manifests itself through the use of force and coercion, which may result in a change in a person's position, situation or behaviour because of the harm inflicted. When a person inflicts violence on another person, he or she seeks to impose his or her will by force or coercion, thereby causing the person targeted to change his or her position or behaviour. This can occur in a variety of contexts, such as interpersonal relationships, power relations, political or social conflicts. Coercion through violence can be physical, for example when a person is physically assaulted or subjected to acts of force. It can also be psychological, social or political, where the person is forced or coerced to conform to certain norms, requirements or demands under threat of negative consequences. It is important to note that the use of force and coercion are not the only ways in which violence is expressed. As mentioned earlier, violence can take other forms such as moral, psychological, symbolic or structural violence, which can also have negative effects on individuals and societies.

Hannah Arendt, a twentieth century political philosopher, has made an important contribution to the reflection on violence and power. She argued that violence should be distinguished from power and might, because violence requires specific instruments, while power is more directly related to the ability to act and influence. Arendt argues that violence is associated with the use of physical force or coercive means to impose one's will. It is often characterised by the destruction, submission or domination of the other. To exercise violence, one needs instruments, weapons or tangible means to impose one's will by force. In contrast, Arendt makes a distinction between violence and power, which she describes as more directly instrumental. Power, she argues, is the ability to act collectively, to come together and to make political decisions. It is based on cooperation, consent and the active participation of individuals. Unlike violence, power does not necessarily require the use of physical force or coercive means. Arendt emphasises that power is a more sustainable and legitimate force than violence. Power relies on the ability of individuals to come together and act in a concerted manner, whereas violence is often used to overcome obstacles or resistance to power. She also highlights the dangers inherent in using violence to achieve political goals, as it can lead to a spiral of violence and the destruction of political and social relations. In her work, Arendt examines the different forms of expression of violence, particularly in the context of totalitarianism, where violence is used systematically to control and oppress individuals. She explores the political and ethical implications of violence and power, seeking to understand how individuals can preserve their dignity and freedom in the face of violent and oppressive forces.

Scientific fields of reflection

The term "cognitivist" generally refers to a type of psychologist who focuses on how people perceive, think, remember, learn and solve problems. Cognitivists are primarily interested in incoming information and how it is processed by the brain. They study violence in terms of how it is perceived and processed by the brain. Over the past thirty years or so, cognitivists have approached the issue of violence from a scientific point of view. Their work has highlighted certain cognitive processes that can lead to violence. For example, they have studied how cognitive biases (such as dichotomous thinking, where everything is perceived as good or bad, without nuance) can lead to violence. They have also studied how dysfunctional thinking patterns (such as rumination, where a person gets stuck on negative thoughts) can increase the risk of violent behaviour. Research has also shown that people with a tendency to violence often have a reduced ability to recognise and understand the emotions of others, a phenomenon known as alexithymia. They may also have difficulty regulating their own emotions, particularly anger. This research has important implications for the prevention and treatment of violence. For example, it suggests that interventions aimed at improving emotion regulation and changing dysfunctional thinking patterns may be effective in reducing violence. In addition, by understanding the cognitive processes that underlie violence, we may be better able to identify people at risk and help them before they become violent. However, it is important to note that violence is a complex phenomenon that is influenced by many factors, including but not limited to social, economic and environmental factors.

Konrad Lorenz was an Austrian ethologist who contributed greatly to our understanding of animal behaviour, including aggression. In his 1963 book "On Aggression", Lorenz presented the theory that aggression is an innate instinct in animals and humans. Lorenz defines aggression as a driving force that drives the individual to fight. For him, aggression is not necessarily destructive or antisocial, but can be essential for the survival and evolution of species. For example, aggression can promote competition, which in turn can promote adaptation and survival. Lorenz also believes that aggression is linked to specific neurobiological processes and is triggered by specific stimuli, which he calls "fixed trigger signals". These signals can vary from species to species, and in humans they can be very complex. For humanity, Lorenz suggests that our innate aggression may be exacerbated by certain aspects of modern society. He argues that traditional societies had ways to channel aggression productively and minimise violent conflict, but that these mechanisms may be absent or dysfunctional in modern society.

Some researchers, including Lorenz, have suggested that aggression is a common feature of all species, and perhaps even a basic biological instinct. This does not mean that all beings are constantly aggressive, but rather that all have the capacity to express aggressive behaviour under certain circumstances. In the animal world, aggression can play an important role in different situations, such as defending territory, accessing food resources, or establishing dominance within a group. Some of these behaviours can be observed in the human species as well. However, it should be noted that human aggression has unique characteristics that distinguish it from aggression in other animals. For example, humans are capable of symbolic and indirect aggression (such as humiliation or social rejection), and they are also capable of large-scale violence, such as war. Furthermore, although biology and instinct may play a role in aggression, many researchers also stress the importance of environmental and social factors. For example, factors such as poverty, stress, substance abuse, exposure to media violence, and lack of conflict resolution skills can all increase the risk of aggressive behaviour. It is also important to emphasise that although aggression may be a common characteristic of all species, this does not mean that it is inevitable or irreversible. A great deal of research shows that aggression can be modified by appropriate interventions, such as education, therapy, and changes in the social and physical environment.

Aggression can also be understood as a mode of expression and action. It may be a response to a perceived threatening or stressful environment, and may represent an attempt to defend resources that are perceived to be at risk, whether these are physical or psychological resources. Aggression may also be a way of expressing feelings of frustration, anger, anxiety or fear. This does not necessarily justify aggression, but helps to understand why it may occur. Understanding aggression as a mode of expression can also help to develop more effective ways of managing and preventing aggression. For example, learning to express feelings more constructively, or to resolve conflicts in a non-violent way, can be helpful. It is also important to note that aggression is not the only way to express these feelings or to react to these situations. Many people and cultures have developed non-aggressive ways of dealing with conflict, adversity and negative emotions. Thus, although aggression may be an instinctive response to certain situations, it is not the only possible response, and it can often be modified or controlled through learning and practice. However, it is also crucial to distinguish between aggression and assertiveness. Whereas aggression often involves intimidation, domination or violation of the rights of others, assertiveness is a way of expressing oneself that respects the rights and feelings of others while effectively defending one's own rights and needs.

Issues of violence and aggression transcend disciplines and involve a wide range of factors, from individual biological and cognitive aspects to socio-cultural and political influences. At the individual level, cognitive psychology and neuroscience have contributed much to our understanding of the brain and cognitive mechanisms that can lead to violence or aggression. For example, research has shown that certain types of cognitive biases, dysfunctions in information processing or difficulties in emotion regulation can increase the risk of aggressive behaviour. However, it is also essential to understand that violence and aggression are deeply influenced by socio-cultural and political factors. Culture can influence how violence is perceived, accepted or sanctioned, and it can provide models for violent or non-violent behaviour. For example, a culture that values domination or aggression may encourage violent behaviour, while a culture that values cooperation or peaceful conflict resolution may encourage non-violent behaviour. Similarly, politics can influence violence at all levels, from government policies that can promote or deter violence (for example, through gun control laws or education policies) to the way political conflict or inequality can lead to large-scale violence, such as wars or revolutions.

Violence and aggression are multidimensional phenomena that are influenced by a multitude of factors. It is therefore necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to fully understand them. These disciplines include biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, criminology, political science and others.

Biology and psychology often focus on the individual factors that can lead to violence, such as neurological processes, cognitive biases, personality disorders, emotional regulation, etc.
Sociology and anthropology often examine how social and cultural factors can influence violence, for example, how social structure, cultural norms, gender roles, inequalities, etc., can promote or deter violence.
Criminology focuses on the factors that can lead to criminal violence, including individual, social, economic and environmental factors.
Political science often examines violence at a more macroscopic level, for example, how political conflict, government policies, terrorism, war, etc., can lead to large-scale violence.

These and other disciplines provide unique and important perspectives on violence and aggression. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of these phenomena requires an interdisciplinary approach that integrates the perspectives of all these disciplines.

Aggression can certainly be a form of expression, and in some cases it can be used to express individuality. For example, a person may use aggression to assert autonomy, to resist a perceived oppressive authority, or to distinguish him or herself from others. The expression of individuality is intrinsically linked to communication. Whether expressed through art, speech, behaviour, style of dress or other means, it serves to convey information about oneself to others. It is a way of expressing one's feelings, thoughts, values, interests and unique personality. Moreover, the expression of individuality is not only a one-way communication - it is also a way of interacting with others and participating in social life. For example, when you express your individuality, you can inspire others, challenge them, invite them to get to know you better, or simply share a part of yourself with them. This is a fundamental aspect of human communication.

To fully understand violence and aggression, it is crucial to consider several dimensions. These dimensions include biological factors, individual personality traits and social interaction.

Biological factors: It is well established that biological factors can influence the propensity to violence and aggression. For example, chemical imbalances in the brain, genetic abnormalities or brain damage can increase the risk of violent or aggressive behaviour.
Personality traits: Individual personality traits can also play an important role. For example, personality traits such as impulsivity, poor self-control, or a tendency to be irritable may increase the risk of aggression. Similarly, certain psychological conditions, such as anti-social personality disorder, are also associated with a greater propensity to violence.
Social interaction: Socialisation plays a key role in the development of aggressive or violent behaviour. Children who are insufficiently socialised, or who grow up in environments where violence is common or accepted, may be more likely to resort to aggression. In addition, people who have difficulty managing social relationships or understanding and responding to social cues may also be more likely to act aggressively.

These three dimensions are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For example, biological factors can influence personality traits, which in turn can influence how a person interacts with others. Similarly, social experiences can affect both a person's personality traits and biology. It is therefore necessary to take all three dimensions into account to fully understand violence and aggression and to develop effective interventions to prevent or manage these behaviours. These interventions can involve biological (such as medication), psychological (such as behavioural therapy) and social strategies (such as education for peaceful conflict resolution or the creation of safer and more inclusive social environments).

Environmental control is a key factor in limiting aggression and violence. This can be understood in several ways. Firstly, the ability to control the physical aspects of one's environment can help reduce aggression. For example, a person who is able to create a safe and comfortable living environment may be less likely to experience the stress and frustration that can lead to aggression. Secondly, control of the social environment may also be important. A person who has good social skills and is able to navigate relationships with others effectively may be less likely to resort to aggression as a means of resolving conflict. Third, control of the inner emotional environment is also crucial. A person who has developed effective emotion regulation and stress resilience skills may be better equipped to handle situations that might otherwise lead to aggression. Finally, environmental control can also mean the ability to change one's environment when necessary. For example, a person who is able to leave a violent environment or avoid creating one may be less likely to resort to violence themselves. To develop this environmental literacy, it may be useful to adopt a holistic approach that includes mental health promotion, education in non-violent conflict resolution, social skills development, improvement of living conditions, and other similar strategies.

Emotion plays a central role in aggression and violence. Intense emotions, such as anger, frustration or fear, can often trigger aggressive behaviour. In addition, the way we perceive and interpret our emotions can also influence our propensity to be aggressive. For example, if we interpret our angry emotions as an indication that we have been treated unfairly, this may prompt us to act aggressively to restore what we perceive as a fair balance. Similarly, if we find it difficult to manage or express our emotions in a healthy way, this can make us more likely to resort to aggression as a means of expression. This is why emotional regulation - the ability to understand, manage and respond appropriately to our emotions - is often a key element in preventing aggression and violence. Emotional regulation strategies can include things like becoming aware of one's own emotions, learning relaxation or stress reduction techniques, practising assertive communication, developing problem-solving skills, and other similar techniques. It is also important to note that our perception of what constitutes 'aggression' can vary greatly from person to person and from culture to culture. What is perceived as aggression by one person may be perceived as a neutral or even positive action by another. This means that understanding and addressing these differences in perception can be crucial in preventing aggression and violence.

Aggressiveness is a term that refers to the capacity of a situation to provoke or encourage aggressive behaviour, and this capacity is often determined by the three dimensions mentioned above: biological factors, personality traits, and social interactions. Perception plays a key role in aggressiveness. For example, if a person perceives a situation as threatening, unfair, or frustrating, he or she may be more likely to respond aggressively. Similarly, if a person has a biological or personal propensity to perceive situations negatively, or if they have been socialised in an environment where aggression is considered an appropriate response, they may be more likely to find situations aggressogenic. It is also important to note that aggressive situations are not necessarily inherently aggressive. For example, a heated discussion or intense debate may be perceived as aggressive by one person, but not by another. This means that the way we interpret and react to situations can have a major impact on their aggressiveness. This is why it is crucial to develop skills in emotional regulation, conflict resolution, and assertive communication. These skills can help us to navigate more healthily and effectively through aggressive situations, and turn them into opportunities for growth and mutual understanding.

Political science, as a discipline, is very interested in violence. Violence, especially political violence, is a fundamental aspect of the organisation of human societies, and its understanding can help to shed light on many aspects of politics, such as state formation, ethnic and religious conflict, revolution, terrorism, war and peace, among others. In political science, violence is generally considered a form of political action. That is, violence is often used as a means to achieve political goals, whether to gain power, defend rights, resist oppression, promote social change, or other similar goals. However, it is important to note that, although violence is one form of action, it is not the only, nor necessarily the best, way to achieve these goals. There are many other forms of political action, such as activism, negotiation, dialogue, education, and other non-violent strategies, which can often be more effective and less destructive. With regard to the assumption that 'violence is action', this could serve as a starting point for theorising about the conditions under which violence becomes an acceptable or preferred form of political action. For example, such a theory could explore questions such as: What are the factors that lead individuals or groups to choose violence as a means of political action? How do political, economic and social structures influence this decision? What are the impacts of violence on politics and society, and how can they be managed or minimised?

Contextual theory plays an essential role in understanding violence, especially in the field of political science. By focusing on the relationship between the individual and the collective, we can examine how the social, economic and political context influences violent behaviour. The collective dimension of violence manifests itself in several ways. For example, groups of individuals may engage in violence together, as in riots or wars. In these cases, group dynamics can reinforce violence, as individuals often feel less responsible for their actions when acting in groups. In addition, violence can be used as a means to assert group identity or defend group interests. For example, ethnic, religious or political groups may use violence to fight discrimination or oppression, or to claim power. However, it is important to note that the collective dimension of violence is not only a matter of group dynamics. Wider social, economic and political structures also play a major role in facilitating or limiting violence. For example, strong and equitable political institutions can help prevent violence by resolving conflicts peacefully, while economic inequality or social discrimination can encourage violence by creating frustrations and tensions. Therefore, understanding the collective dimension of violence requires an analysis of the context in which violence occurs, including social norms, political institutions, economic conditions, and other similar factors. This is where contextual theory can be particularly useful.

Moving from an individual fact to a collective fact implies a thorough analysis of the mechanisms of socialisation and group formation. Individual behaviours only become collective phenomena when they are adopted and repeated by a group of people. This process can be influenced by a variety of factors, such as social norms, political institutions, education, media, and other cultural influences. In the case of violence, a violent act may become a collective phenomenon when violence is perceived as an acceptable or necessary means of resolving conflicts, asserting group identity, defending rights, or achieving other social or political goals. For example, if a society is marked by armed conflict, violence may become an accepted or even expected social behaviour. Violence can be described as a societal fact when it becomes a widespread and accepted phenomenon in a society. This can happen when violence is institutionalised, as in the case of state violence, or when violence is culturally accepted, as in the case of some forms of domestic violence or gender violence. The political management of violence is a key issue as it affects how violence is perceived, managed and prevented in a society. Public policies can help prevent violence by promoting education, improving living conditions, putting in place measures to prevent and punish violence, and promoting peaceful conflict resolution.

Classical Theories of Violence

Hobbes (1588 - 1979) and the theory of violence as social utility

Thomas Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes, a 17th century English political philosopher, is well known for his theory of the state of nature and the social contract, which has important implications for our understanding of violence. In his most famous work, "The Leviathan", Hobbes describes the state of nature as a state of "war of all against all" where violence is omnipresent. According to Hobbes, in the absence of a central authority (a "Leviathan") to impose order, individuals are in constant competition for resources, leading to a constant state of fear and violence. However, Hobbes considers that individuals are rational and seek to avoid this brutal condition of life. Therefore, they decide to enter into a social contract, giving up some of their freedom in exchange for the protection offered by a state or central authority. The state, in return, has the duty to maintain order and protect citizens from violence. In Hobbes' perspective, therefore, violence has a certain 'social utility' in that it serves as a motivation for the creation of the state and the establishment of the social contract. The fear of violence in the state of nature motivates individuals to unite and create an organised society to ensure their collective security. It is important to note, however, that although Hobbes recognises this 'utility' of violence in the creation of the state, he does not promote violence per se. On the contrary, the purpose of statehood is precisely to eliminate violence from the daily lives of individuals. For Hobbes, therefore, violence is not a desirable feature of society, but rather an evil to be avoided.

Thomas Hobbes detailed three possible levels of violence in his writings:

Inter-individual relations in the state of nature: Hobbes depicted the state of nature as a place of brutal violence, where there is no authority to protect individuals from each other. In this state, Hobbes said, man's life is "solitary, poor, brutish, and short". Individuals are in constant conflict over limited resources, leading to a state of "war of all against all".
International warfare: Hobbes saw international relations as existing in a similar state of nature, where each state is sovereign and there is no global authority to regulate their interactions. This can lead to international wars, where each state acts in its own interests and uses force to achieve its goals.
War between the ruler and rebels: Hobbes also discussed the violence that can occur within a state, particularly between the ruler and rebels. For Hobbes, any rebellion against the ruler is illegitimate because it violates the social contract and can cause society to revert to the state of nature. However, he accepts that if the sovereign fails to fulfil his obligations (in particular to protect the citizens), then the citizens have the right to defend themselves.

Each of these levels of violence illustrates a different aspect of Hobbes' political theory. They highlight his view that violence is an inevitable consequence of the state of nature and that the state and the social contract are necessary to maintain peace and order.

In his book "Leviathan", Hobbes identified three main causes of conflict in the state of nature, which lead to violence:

Rivalry: According to Hobbes, rivalry is caused by competition for limited resources. In the state of nature, individuals are in constant competition for resources necessary for survival, such as food, water and shelter. This competition can lead to conflict and violence.
Distrust: Distrust can also lead to violence, because in the state of nature individuals cannot trust others to respect their rights or property. In such a state, individuals may resort to violence to protect themselves or their property as a precaution, even if there is no immediate threat.
Pride (or Fame): Hobbes also considered that the desire for fame or reputation can lead to violence. Individuals may fight to preserve their honour, to gain the respect of others or to secure their place in the social hierarchy.

These causes of conflict and violence portray the state of nature as a place of fear and insecurity, where individuals are constantly on guard and ready to fight for their survival. Therefore, according to Hobbes, individuals have a rational interest in leaving this state of nature and establishing a social contract, to create a state that can ensure peace and security.

According to Hobbes' theory, these three main causes of conflict (rivalry, distrust and pride) can lead to war and conflict. Without a central authority to maintain order, impose rules and regulate behaviour, individuals are likely to fight over limited resources, to protect themselves as a precautionary measure due to mistrust, and to seek to assert their reputation or place in the social hierarchy. In the state of nature described by Hobbes, these conflicts are unregulated and can easily escalate into widespread violence or war. This is why Hobbes supported the idea of the creation of a "Leviathan", or a powerful state, which could control violence and maintain order. Moreover, these concepts can be extrapolated to the international level. States, just like individuals in the state of nature, may find themselves in conflict over resources, mutual distrust, or national pride. These tensions can lead to international war or conflict. Although Hobbes described a potentially violent state of nature, his aim was not to promote violence, but rather to stress the importance of central authority (the state) in maintaining peace and order.

Level of inter-individual relations in the state of nature

In Hobbes' philosophy, violence is associated with a lack of reason and is often linked to unbridled passions. For Hobbes, rational individuals would seek to avoid violence because it leads to insecurity and instability. This is one of Hobbes' main arguments for why individuals decide to form a state via a social contract: to escape the violence and uncertainty of the state of nature. However, Hobbes does not see violence as totally irrational. Rather, he sees it as the inevitable product of the rational pursuit of interests in a situation where there is no authority to regulate the behaviour of individuals. In other words, in the state of nature, it may be rational for an individual to resort to violence to ensure survival or to protect property.

This is one of the central paradoxes in Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy: violence, although often triggered by unreasonable passions, drives rational action to avoid such conflicts in the future. In the state of nature, where mistrust, rivalry and the pursuit of glory prevail, individuals may be driven to act violently to ensure their own safety and interests. However, life in this state of perpetual warfare is dangerous and unstable, and according to Hobbes, individuals are rational and naturally seek to avoid these brutal living conditions. It is therefore the prospect of this violence that prompts individuals to enter into a social contract and create a state. This shift from unreasonable violence to rational action to prevent it illustrates the paradox at the heart of Hobbes' philosophy. The desire to avoid violence, despite its passionate and unreasonable nature, motivates the creation of a rational and orderly political and social structure. Although Hobbes offers this theory as an explanation for the development of society and the state, he does not suggest that violence is a necessary or desirable prerequisite for this process. The ultimate goal, according to Hobbes, is to establish a state that can maintain peace and security, thus minimising the possibility of violence.

It is possible to establish a conceptual chain linking 'opposition' to 'unreason', then 'passion' and finally 'anarchy'. This can be interpreted in the context of political philosophy as follows:

Opposition: This could refer to the competition or struggle for resources in the state of nature, as described by Hobbes. Without an authority to impose order, individuals find themselves in opposition to each other to ensure their survival.
Unreasonableness: The constant opposition and struggle for survival can lead to unreasonable behaviour, such as violence. Without regulation or protection, individuals may act impulsively or irrationally to ensure their own safety.
Passion: Hobbes saw human passions as a major cause of conflict and violence. In the state of nature, without rules to moderate these passions, they can lead to unreason and violence.
Anarchy: If human passions are not regulated by authority, the state of nature can turn into anarchy. Hobbes described this state as a "war of all against all", where there is no law or order, and violence is rampant.

Hobbes saw this chain of events as potential, not inevitable. He argued that by recognising the possibility of this sequence of events, individuals could choose to form a social contract and create a state, to prevent unreason, moderate passions and avoid anarchy.

The question of the rationality of action is a central issue in philosophy and social science. Most theories of action assume that individuals act rationally, i.e. they choose the most effective means to achieve their goals, given their beliefs and values. However, the idea that all action is rational can be challenged. For example, we know that people can act on emotion, impulse, or cognitive constraints that prevent them from making perfectly rational choices. Furthermore, what we consider 'rational' may vary according to cultural or personal context. With regard to violence, it may be difficult to consider violent acts as 'rational'. However, from the actor's perspective, violence may appear to be a rational response to a perceived threatening situation. Moreover, in some circumstances, violence can be used as a strategic means to achieve specific goals. In Hobbes' theory, for example, violence in the state of nature can be seen as a rational response to a situation of insecurity and competition for resources. However, Hobbes himself recognises that this violence is harmful and destabilising, and argues that the most rational solution is to create a state that can provide peace and security.

Level of international warfare

The concept of the Westphalian state refers to a certain type of international order that emerged as a result of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe. These treaties established the idea of state sovereignty, according to which each state has exclusive and unquestionable authority over its territory and population. The Westphalian order is thus characterised by an international system of sovereign states that recognise no higher authority than their own.

In such a system, states may come into conflict or war for various reasons, such as rivalry for power or resources, territorial disputes, or ideological differences. In this context, war can be seen as an extension of politics by other means, to use Carl von Clausewitz's famous formula.

Hobbes' theory of the state of nature and the state of war can be applied on an international scale in the Westphalian system. In the absence of a higher global authority to regulate relations between states, states may find themselves in a situation similar to the state of nature described by Hobbes, where conflict is constant and security is always under threat. Similarly, like individuals in the state of nature, states may choose to form alliances or international organisations to ensure their security and promote their interests.

The state, driven by an intrinsic desire to accumulate power, often finds itself in competition or conflict with other states for additional resources. This can lead to a latent state of war, where each state seeks to maximise its relative power. However, for the state to function effectively and ensure the well-being of its citizens, it must also be able to manage and regulate its own violence, both internal and external. This task is usually performed by the ruler and various public institutions, which are responsible for maintaining order and peace both within and outside the state's borders.

This hypothesis refers to essential elements of the international system of states, and reasons why states may come into conflict.

Desire for accumulation: The idea that states seek to increase their power is fundamental to international relations. Power can mean control of more territory, resources, political or economic influence, etc. This quest for accumulation can lead to conflict. This quest for accumulation can lead to tensions or conflicts with other states.
State of war: From a Hobbesian perspective, the international situation without a supranational authority can resemble a 'state of war' where states must constantly prepare to defend themselves against possible threats.
The role of the sovereign and public institutions: In this context, the sovereign and public institutions play an essential role in guaranteeing security and managing the resources of the state.
Managing violence: A crucial aspect of state power is the ability to manage and control violence. This includes not only defence against external threats, but also the maintenance of order and peace within the state's borders. In the Westphalian system, the ability to control violence is an essential attribute of sovereignty.

These elements highlight the complexity of relations between states and how violence and war can be understood in an international context.

In Hobbes' theory, the state has a dual function. It must defend itself against external threats, but also against internal violence. For Hobbes, the state is a means of containing the violence inherent in human nature. In his work "Leviathan", he postulates that without a central authority to impose order, society would be in a "state of war of all against all". Thus, the state, as "Leviathan", must exercise absolute power to maintain peace and prevent violence. This task includes not only defence against external threats, but also the prevention and management of violence within the state. It must be able to enforce laws and rules to avoid internal conflicts and maintain social cohesion. For Hobbes, this power of the state should not be used arbitrarily, but should always be aimed at the welfare and security of the citizens.

For Hobbes, violence is an inherent characteristic of the human state of nature. Therefore, although the state, as a sovereign entity, can channel and control this violence, it can never completely eliminate it. One of the main roles of the state, according to Hobbes, is to prevent the potential self-destruction of society by regulating internal violence. However, he also recognises that violence can emanate from conflict between states themselves, often motivated by competing desires for power and resources. This tension between the desire to accumulate power (and potentially generate violence) and the need to maintain peace and stability is a central dynamic in his theory. Thus, even if the state is able to contain internal violence to some degree, the possibility of violence - whether at the individual, collective or interstate level - still persists in Hobbes' thought.

Level of war between sovereign and rebel

In Hobbes' theory, war between the ruler and rebels is a major threat to the stability of the state. This form of violence is of particular concern because it destabilises the authority of the sovereign and can potentially lead to anarchy and the disintegration of the state. According to Hobbes, society is built on a 'social contract' where individuals agree to submit to the authority of a sovereign in exchange for protection and security. However, if certain individuals or groups (the 'rebels') choose to reject the authority of the ruler and take up arms against him, this jeopardises the social order and the state of peace that the ruler is supposed to maintain. Rebellion can be motivated by a variety of factors, such as dissatisfaction with the sovereign's policies, socio-economic inequalities, ideological or religious differences, etc. For Hobbes, rebellion is a form of 'return to the state of nature' that must be avoided at all costs, as it can lead to a state of war of all against all.

Hobbes does not see violence as something that can be completely eliminated from society or human nature. On the contrary, he sees violence as a constant, a fundamental aspect of the human condition. For Hobbes, violence is an inherent part of the human state of nature, and although the creation of the state and the establishment of sovereign authority may help to control and regulate this violence, it never disappears entirely.

This perspective can be interpreted as rather bleak, but it also has a realistic dimension. Hobbes recognises that violence, in one form or another, is always present in human and political interactions. Therefore, in his theory, the main objective of the state is to control and minimise this violence as much as possible in order to preserve social order, rather than to try to eliminate it completely.

George Sorel (1847 - 1922) and protest violence

Georges Sorel.

Georges Sorel, a French philosopher and sociologist, has a very different perspective on violence than Hobbes. For Sorel, violence is not only a threat to the social order, but can also be a powerful tool for social and political transformation. In his most famous work, "Reflections on Violence" (1908), Sorel develops a theory of protest violence. According to Sorel, violence can be a legitimate expression of class struggle and a necessary means for workers to overthrow the capitalist order. He rejects the idea that violence is always destructive or harmful, and argues that revolutionary violence can be creative and liberating. Violence, according to Sorel, is necessary to shake up social inertia and bring about radical change. He argues that general strikes, an example of protest violence, are not simply negotiating tactics, but can be revolutionary acts that disrupt the established order and pave the way for a new society. Sorel does not approve of all forms of violence. He distinguishes between proletarian violence, which serves a revolutionary purpose, and criminal violence, which he sees as counterproductive and anti-social.

Indeed, Georges Sorel's political thought is complex and has gone through many phases and transformations over time. Initially, Sorel was a socialist and a Marxist who believed in the class struggle and the need for a revolution to establish a socialist society. He was also a fervent trade unionist, believing that trade unions were the instrument by which workers could free themselves from capitalist oppression. However, over time, Sorel moved further and further away from traditional Marxism and developed his own, sometimes controversial, ideas about the role of violence and mythology in politics. Some of these ideas have been recuperated by far-right movements, leading some to associate Sorel with the far right. It is important to note, however, that Sorel himself never adhered to far-right ideology. Towards the end of his life, he even expressed criticism of some of the extreme right-wing movements of his time. Nevertheless, the interpretation of his ideas by some extreme right-wing groups has contributed to a certain ambiguity around his figure. Although Sorel began his career as a socialist and Marxist, his thought evolved in complex and sometimes contradictory ways, and was used and interpreted in different ways by various political movements after his death.

In "Reflections on Violence" (1906), Sorel defends the idea that violence is not only an individual act, but can also be a collective force. For Sorel, violence can be a means for a group, especially the working class, to assert itself in the face of oppression and to initiate social change. He puts forward the notion of the general strike, which, in his view, is a form of collective protest violence. A general strike, for Sorel, is not only a bargaining tool to improve working conditions, but is a means by which workers can demonstrate their power, disrupt the social order and eventually catalyse a revolutionary social transformation. Thus, Sorel places violence in a broader social and political context, seeing it as an act that can have meaning and impact beyond the individual act. He argues that violence can serve to reveal and challenge existing power structures, and can be an effective tool for social change when used collectively.

The structure of the chapters in "Reflections on Violence" illustrates Sorel's main ideas and his understanding of violence as a complex social and political phenomenon. Here is an overview of each chapter:

Class Struggle and Violence: Sorel examines how violence plays a role in the class struggle. He argues that violence is an inevitable part of this struggle and that, far from being a threat to the social order, it can be a tool of liberation for the working class.
Bourgeois decadence and violence: Sorel criticises the bourgeoisie and argues that its moral and spiritual decadence has contributed to social violence.
Prejudices against violence: Sorel examines and challenges some of the common prejudices against violence, notably the idea that it is always destructive or harmful.
The proletarian strike: Sorel defends the idea that strikes can be a revolutionary act and not just a negotiating tactic.
The productive general strike: Sorel develops his vision of the general strike as a powerful tool for social change.
The morality of violence: Sorel explores the moral aspects of violence. He argues that violence is not necessarily immoral and can be justified in certain circumstances.
The morality of the producers: Sorel explores the idea of the morality of the producers, or the working class, and how this morality may influence their use of violence.

Overall, Sorel presents a view of violence that deconstructs common prejudices and examines how violence can be used productively and morally to bring about social and political change.

Sorel's idea is that violence, when used by the working class to fight oppression and exploitation, can be considered morally justified. According to him, violence can serve as a means to challenge and transform the unjust and unequal power relations that exist in a capitalist society. He sees violence as a tool that the working class can use to free itself from bourgeois exploitation and oppression. It is in this context that he speaks of the "morality of violence". It should be noted, however, that these views are controversial and have been criticised for their potentiation of violence. Although Sorel sees violence as a potential means to achieve social change, it is important to consider the ethical implications and possible consequences of using violence for these purposes.

In Sorel's perspective, class struggle is indeed a means of disrupting and challenging existing power structures in society. He sees violence as a potentially emancipatory force that the working class can use to assert itself and press for social and economic change. He sees the general strike as a key example of this kind of 'positive' violence. For Sorel, a general strike is not only a means of negotiating better working conditions, but also a way for workers to demonstrate their power, to disrupt the existing social and economic order, and to force the ruling classes to recognise and respond to their demands.

In the context of radical or extremist political movements, the theorisation of violence as a legitimate and moral tool can lead to abuses, escalation of violence, and even acts of terrorism. This logic has been used by some anarchist, revolutionary or extremist movements to justify violent actions against those they perceive as their oppressors. This underlines the danger inherent in seeing violence as a legitimate tool for social change. While this may seem attractive in the context of the struggle against oppression and injustice, it is important to bear in mind the potentially devastating consequences of violence. It can escalate tensions and conflicts, cause significant suffering and damage, and in extreme cases lead to acts of terrorism.

Some extremist movements may justify their use of violence by arguing that it is necessary to fight oppression, which can lead to an escalation of violence and to extremely dangerous situations. This logic can be found in some strands of anarchism, but also in various other radical or extremist movements. Anarchism, as a political philosophy, is actually quite diverse and not all anarchists advocate the use of violence. Some currents, such as anarcho-pacifism, explicitly reject violence. Others may see violence as a necessary evil or as a tool of self-defence against oppression. Nevertheless, when individuals or groups adopt violence as a primary strategy of resistance or revolt, this can lead to acts of terrorism or situations of violent and prolonged conflict. These situations are often counterproductive, causing massive suffering and destruction, without necessarily bringing real progress towards justice or equality.

The debate on morality and violence is inseparable from political discussions and our understanding of what politics is. Politics is often seen as the art of negotiation and compromise, where the goal is to reach a solution that, while not necessarily perfect for all participants, is acceptable to the majority. However, in situations where one party feels systematically excluded or oppressed, or when traditional political mechanisms seem unable to solve the problems, some may turn to violence as a form of political communication or as the only way to make their voices heard. The debate about the morality of violence in such contexts is complex and often polarised. Some argue that violence is always immoral, regardless of the circumstances, while others may see it as a necessary evil or even a moral act in certain situations of oppression.

René Girard (1923 - 2015) and sacrificial violence

René Girard.

René Girard was a French philosopher, anthropologist, historian and literary critic. His work focused on violence, mimetic desire and sacrifice in human culture. He developed a theory that human desire is fundamentally mimetic, that is, people desire what others desire, which creates rivalry and can lead to violence. According to Girard, this mimetic violence is so destructive that it threatens the survival of the community. To avoid self-destruction, communities find a scapegoat to blame and punish. This victim, who is often chosen because he or she is different or marginalised, is then sacrificed to restore harmony within the community. This theory of the scapegoat is one of Girard's major contributions to the understanding of violence in human societies. Girard also developed the theory of mimetic desire to explain the role of violence in religion. According to him, religions are systems that have evolved to channel and control mimetic violence. The central role of sacrifice in many religions is, according to Girard, a manifestation of this function of controlling violence. René Girard's ideas have been influential in many fields, including literature, philosophy, theology, psychology, anthropology and gender studies. However, as with all theories, they have also been criticised and debated.

René Girard devoted much of his life to exploring issues of philosophy, religion and ethics. His contributions have greatly influenced these fields, notably through his ideas on violence, mimetic desire and sacrifice. He has been a professor at several prestigious universities in the United States, including Johns Hopkins University, the University at Buffalo, and Stanford University. He was elected to the French Academy in 2005, an honour that recognises his considerable contribution to French thought. He has written many influential books, including "Violence and the Sacred" (1972), "Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World" (1978), and "The Scapegoat" (1982). These books present innovative perspectives on how violence is generated and managed within human societies. Girard has also been interested in how the mechanisms of violence and sacrifice are reflected in literature, analysing the works of great writers such as Dostoyevsky, Proust, and Shakespeare to illustrate his theories. His work, while profound and often complex, offers valuable insights into the nature of violence and the ways in which societies attempt to contain and manage it.

René Girard's works, "Violence and the Sacred" (1972), "The Scapegoat" (1982), and "I See Satan Falling Like Lightning" (1999), in which he discusses sacrifice, are indeed essential to understanding his thinking. In "Violence and the Sacred", Girard develops his theory of mimetic desire. According to him, human desire is not innate but acquired. Men desire objects, statuses, ideas, not for their intrinsic value, but because they are desired by others. This mechanism creates envy, rivalry, and ultimately violence within societies. To prevent the escalation of violence, societies then develop the scapegoat mechanism: the community gets rid of its internal tensions by projecting them onto a person or a group, which is then sacrificed. This mechanism is both violent and sacred because it restores social peace, and is therefore considered sacred by the community. In "The Scapegoat", Girard takes his analysis further by showing how this mechanism is present in many myths and religious texts, and how it structures human societies. Girard neither justifies nor idealizes violence; he seeks to explain it. By better understanding the mechanisms that generate violence, he hopes we can find ways to prevent it.

For René Girard, violence must be understood as a societal and not just an individual phenomenon. He introduced the concept of "mimetic violence" to explain how violence spreads in a society. According to him, human beings tend to copy or "imitate" the behaviour of others, including violent behaviour. Thus, one violent act can provoke others, creating a spiral of violence. It is therefore not simply a question of violent individuals, but of a social process of propagation of violence. In addition, Girard also theorised the 'scapegoat' mechanism, whereby a society may attempt to resolve its internal tensions by attacking an individual or group, who is then persecuted. This is another way in which violence can manifest itself collectively, not just individually.

Mimicry refers to an inherent human tendency to copy the desires, behaviour and attitudes of others. It is both an unconscious and automatic process that plays a crucial role in social learning and identity formation. According to Girard, mimicry leads to rivalry and violence because individuals begin to compete for the same desires and goals. For example, if two people want the same thing, they become rivals and enter into conflict. In Girard's scapegoat theory, mimetic violence is also important. When a group is faced with an escalation of mimetic violence, it often seeks a way to offload this violence onto a scapegoat - a person or group who is then persecuted or eliminated, temporarily restoring peace in the community. However, since mimicry and desire are still present, the cycle of violence is likely to begin again. It is a theory that offers a fascinating insight into how violence can spread and perpetuate itself in a society, and how societies seek to manage this violence.

Girard's theory argues that all cultures are founded on an original act of violence, which is often mythologised and ritualised through sacrificial practices. Violence, in this sense, is not only an aberration or deviation from the social norm, but is central to the formation and maintenance of human societies. It is this violence that, according to Girard, leads to the emergence of culture, social norms and moral order. Furthermore, Girard emphasises the importance of sacrifice as a means of channelling and controlling violence within society. Sacrifice acts as a defence mechanism against the escalation of violence by directing collective violence towards a scapegoat, who is often a marginal figure or an outsider. The scapegoat absorbs the collective violence, allowing society to maintain peace and order, at least temporarily. This view of violence highlights the inherent tension between our desire to live in peaceful societies and our historical reliance on violence as a means to maintain social order. It is a tension that Girard argues continues to play out in modern societies.

Girard argues that violence, as part of the social structure, is embedded in the myths, rituals and sacrificial practices of all societies. Myths are the stories that societies tell about themselves, their origins and their values. They often serve to legitimise the existing social order and explain why things are the way they are. In many myths, violence plays a crucial role, often as a destructive force that must be controlled for the good of society. Rituals, on the other hand, are repetitive symbolic actions that serve to reinforce social norms and values. Rituals can often involve acts of symbolic violence, such as the sacrifice of animals or, in some societies, humans. Finally, the practice of sacrifice, as mentioned earlier, is a means of channelling collective violence. By focusing on the scapegoat, society is able to release its violence in a controlled way, thus avoiding the escalation of uncontrolled violence. In all these instances, violence is not only accepted, but is even considered necessary to maintain social order. This is a disturbing idea, but one that is essential to understanding how societies deal with the violence inherent in the human condition.

René Girard's scapegoat theory is a mechanism by which a society channels and manages its inherent violence. According to this theory, when tensions and conflicts within a community reach a certain level, the community turns to a specific individual or group (the scapegoat) on whom it projects all its collective violence. This scapegoat is often someone who is already marginalised or seen as different. The act of blaming the scapegoat and directing the collective violence towards him or her serves to restore balance and unity in the community. After the act, peace is restored, but this peace is precarious because it is based on violence directed at the scapegoat. Girard argued that this practice of scapegoating is central to many cultures and religions, and has played a key role in the formation of human societies. However, he also noted that this method of dealing with violence has limitations, as it does not address the root causes of violence and can actually perpetuate the cycle of violence if the underlying conditions that generate violence are not addressed.

René Girard has worked extensively on myths to understand how violence is embedded in our societies. According to him, myths are not simply narratives, but representations of social violence and how it is managed by societies. For Girard, myth functions by concealing the real violence that occurs in society. It reinterprets this violence as something necessary, even sacred. In this sense, myth operates as a kind of defence mechanism that helps society deal with the reality of its own violence. Take the example of the sacrificial myth, which is common to many cultures. In these myths, an individual or an animal is often sacrificed to appease the gods or for the good of the community. This sacrifice is seen as necessary to maintain social order and prevent further violence or chaos. Girard's theory of sacrifice suggests that this type of myth has an important function in channelling collective violence and reintegrating this violence into the social order. In other words, the myth of sacrifice provides a means of expressing violence in a controlled and symbolic way that maintains social order and prevents an escalation of violence. However, Girard also pointed out that this way of dealing with violence has its limits and can perpetuate violence by justifying it and making it acceptable. Therefore, he argued for an awareness of the nature of violence and its role in our societies.

According to Girard, every society has to deal with its own inherent violence, and this is often done through rituals and myths. These rituals and myths serve as safety valves for society, allowing a controlled expression of violence that might otherwise threaten to tear the social structure apart. One of the key concepts in Girard's thinking is the 'scapegoat mechanism'. In many societies, when tension or conflict reaches a certain level, society turns to an individual or group (the scapegoat) to take the blame. By persecuting the scapegoat, society discharges its violent tension in a way that preserves social order. However, although this 'controlled violence' may temporarily ease tensions, it does not resolve the underlying conflicts. On the contrary, it may perpetuate a cycle of violence by justifying aggression against the scapegoat. This unresolved tension may resurface later, requiring another scapegoat to temporarily restore peace. For Girard, understanding this process is crucial to breaking the cycle of violence and seeking more peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.

René Girard proposes a revolutionary understanding of sacrifice as a social mechanism and religious ritual. In this view, sacrifice is a kind of technique for managing communal violence. In Girard's scapegoat theory, sacrifice is a means of directing the violence inherent in the community towards a specific target (the sacrificial victim) in order to prevent this violence from spreading and leading to generalised conflict. The act of sacrifice is often wrapped up in religious language and symbolism, giving the impression that it is an act demanded by the gods to maintain the order of the world. In reality, it is a societal act to maintain the internal order of the community. Individuals in the community may not be aware of the true role violence plays in this process.

Girard's theory proposes that sacrificial violence is a form of substitute violence. It is implemented to ease tensions and latent violence within a community by directing this violence towards a sacrificial victim, often called the 'scapegoat'. In this process, the intrinsic violence of the community is transferred to this victim, who bears the burden and is ultimately destroyed or excluded from the community. This sacrificial violence is often presented as a necessary and just act, required by a deity or for the good of the community. This practice allows collective violence to be vented without triggering wider internal conflict. By identifying a scapegoat, the community redirects its internal violence and tensions, thus preventing the emergence of destructive conflicts.

According to René Girard's theory, sacrifice plays a fundamental role in the management of internal tensions and conflicts in a society. Through sacrifice, the violence and frustrations accumulated within the group are transferred to a substitute victim, the scapegoat, who is then sacrificed to restore harmony and peace. The designation of the scapegoat is a collective process that prevents violence from breaking out within the group, which could threaten its cohesion and even its survival. Sacrifice thus becomes a structuring ritual that makes it possible to manage the violence intrinsic to society. This ritual of sacrifice has a powerful symbolism. It represents the collective expiation of faults, tensions and conflicts, and the restoration of social order. However, it is important to note that this process is based on a certain form of injustice, as the scapegoat is often arbitrarily chosen and sacrificed for faults that he or she has not necessarily committed.

René Girard's theory of the scapegoat is based on this idea of the transfer of collective violence to a specific individual or group, chosen as a sacrificial victim. This scapegoat is symbolically charged with all the sins, tensions and frustrations of the community, and his or her sacrifice restores peace and harmony within the group. This process prevents the escalation of violence within the society. Indeed, if collective violence were not channelled in this way, it could lead to more serious conflicts or even to the self-destruction of the group. This is what gives sacrifice its regulating and calming function.

According to René Girard's theory, the scapegoat is a fundamental figure in all societies, as it plays an essential role in the regulation of collective violence. By transferring this violence to the scapegoat, society can avoid an escalation of violence that could threaten its survival. The scapegoat is thus sacrificed for the good of the community. However, this mechanism is based on a paradox: in order to control violence, society must itself resort to violence, in a ritualised and symbolic form. This violence is justified by the myth of the scapegoat, who is blamed for all the ills of society and sacrificed to ease collective tensions. Moreover, as you point out, the scapegoating is not based on objective rationality. The individual or group chosen as a scapegoat is often designated arbitrarily, without any real proof of guilt. The scapegoat is used primarily to channel collective violence, rather than to achieve justice. This theory has important implications for our understanding of social phenomena such as stigma, exclusion and collective violence. It also suggests that any attempt to create a totally non-violent society may be doomed to failure, as violence plays a fundamental role in the regulation of social relations.

According to Girard, the scapegoat rite allows society to maintain or restore its cohesion. In moments of crisis, when tension and violence increase, the designation and sacrifice of a scapegoat provides a form of collective resolution. Violence is channelled to a specific target, thus avoiding its anarchic spread in society, which could threaten its unity and stability. Through the sacrifice of the scapegoat, society hopes to restore order and harmony, reduce tension and end the conflict. In fact, society hopes for a return to normalcy, to a state prior to the crisis. The sacrifice of the scapegoat is then seen as a way to appease the gods, to purify the community and to erase the fault that caused the crisis. Violence is thus ritualised and controlled, transformed into a beneficial act for the community.

State and political violence

The relationship between the state and political violence is complex. In general, the state has a monopoly on legitimate violence in a society, a concept introduced by the sociologist Max Weber. This means that only the state has the right to use physical force to maintain order, enforce the law and defend the nation against external threats. However, political violence goes beyond the legitimate use of force by the state. It also includes violence perpetrated by non-state actors, such as terrorist or rebel groups, seeking to achieve their political goals.

Political violence can also include illegitimate state violence, such as repression, torture, enforced disappearances or extrajudicial executions. These acts are usually committed by authoritarian regimes to maintain their power, but can also occur in democracies, usually in crisis situations. In addition, the state can also be the target of political violence, as in the case of coups, revolutions or insurrections. In these situations, groups of individuals attempt to overthrow the government in place by force.

Finally, it is important to mention that political violence is not always physical. It can also be structural, as when certain individuals or groups are systematically excluded from political, economic or social power. Similarly, symbolic violence, such as propaganda or hate speech, can also be considered a form of political violence.

Political violence and extreme violence

There are various concepts to explore the issue of violence, especially with regard to violence in a political context. The four main concepts are:

Classic political violence refers to the use of force to achieve a political objective. It can be state violence, such as repression or war, or non-state violence, such as terrorism or armed rebellion.
Infrapolitical violence refers to acts of violence that are political in nature, but are not necessarily recognised as such. This can include forms of structural violence, such as the systematic exclusion of certain groups from political, economic or social life.
Metapolitical violence is a more complex concept that refers to violence that goes beyond the traditional political domain. It can include acts of violence that are motivated by beliefs or ideologies that transcend traditional politics, such as religious fundamentalism or ideological fanaticism.
Extreme violence, finally, refers to acts of violence that are so atrocious and devastating that they go beyond our usual understanding of what constitutes violence. This can include acts such as genocide, crimes against humanity or the most brutal forms of terrorism. The term 'barbarian' is often used to refer to those who commit such acts, suggesting that they have transgressed the boundaries of what is considered acceptable or civilised behaviour.

These concepts are not mutually exclusive and may overlap in many cases. For example, an act of political violence can also be a form of metapolitical violence if it is motivated by an extremist ideology.

Classical concept of political violence

Political violence as a classical concept is intrinsically linked to the notion of power and authority. It can be employed either by a state or public authority in order to exercise, maintain or extend its power, or by groups or individuals seeking to challenge that power. In this context, violence can take many forms, ranging from direct physical violence, such as war or repression, to structural or systemic violence, such as institutionalised discrimination or economic oppression. The question of the legitimacy of political violence is complex and can vary considerably depending on the context and perspective. For example, an action that may be considered illegitimate political violence by some (such as terrorism or armed rebellion) may be seen by others as legitimate resistance to oppression. Political violence is thus a complex form of violence that involves a multitude of factors, including power, authority, resistance, oppression and legitimacy.

The following are two common justifications for the use of violence, often articulated in the context of politics or armed conflict:

Violence as a principle of defensive action: This argument holds that the use of violence is justifiable if it serves to protect an individual, group or state from an imminent or real threat. This notion can be found in the principle of self-defence. It can also apply to the use of force by the state to maintain public order, prevent crime or protect national security. In such cases, the key question is often how proportionate the use of violence is to the threat, and whether other less violent means could have been used instead.
Violence in the service of a just cause: This argument justifies the use of violence as a means to achieve a wider or higher purpose. This may include the struggle for social equality, national liberation, or the defence of certain values or beliefs. In this case, violence is often seen as a necessary evil, justified by the severity of the injustice to be fought or the importance of the goal to be achieved. This approach can lead to situations where the means (violence) are justified by the end (the just cause).

Political violence in defence of the rule of law is a complex issue that gives rise to much debate. The use of force by the state, for example through the police or the army, is usually justified by the need to maintain public order and security. However, such force must always be used in a proportionate manner and in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. One of the major challenges facing public actors is to find the right balance between the use of force to maintain order and respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. Excessive use of force may not only violate these rights, but also provoke further discontent and resistance from the population. Moreover, state violence can also generate a cycle of violence: acts of violence by the state can lead to violent retaliation or resistance by those who feel oppressed, which in turn can lead to an escalation of violence. Thus, while violence may appear to be an effective tool for maintaining order in the short term, it can also be counterproductive and destabilising in the long term. This is why it is crucial that public actors always seek to use non-violent means to resolve conflicts and tensions whenever possible.

The symbolic question is how far it is possible to go. The impact of "blunder" - an excessive, illegitimate or cruel action, usually by law enforcement agencies - which can have serious consequences not only for the person directly involved, but also symbolically and socio-politically.

The notion of 'blunder' indeed underlines the borderline between the justified use of force by the state in the exercise of its functions and what is perceived as a transgression of this legitimacy. The consequences of such a transgression can be profound and multiple:

On an individual level, victims of blunders can suffer serious physical and psychological harm, and in the most extreme cases, such incidents can result in death.
At the symbolic level, a blunder can erode public confidence in state institutions and perceptions of their legitimacy. This can lead to feelings of mistrust and fear, but also anger and revolt, potentially leading to protests or civil unrest.
At the socio-political level, abuses can provoke intense public debate about governance, human rights, the rule of law, and the accountability of institutions and individuals. It can also lead to calls for structural reforms.

Consequently, 'blunders' are far from isolated incidents: they are deeply embedded in the socio-political fabric and can have important implications for the stability and legitimacy of the state.

The use of violence by political power requires justification, often formulated through public discourse. This rationalisation is essential to maintain the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the population. It is generally based on principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.

Legality: Violent action must be in accordance with the law in force. This is the basic principle to justify the use of violence by the state. However, it should be noted that legality alone is not always sufficient to ensure legitimacy, particularly if the laws in question are perceived as unjust or abusive.
Necessity: The use of violence must be presented as necessary to achieve some objective, usually related to the preservation of public order, national security, or the general welfare of the population. The concept of necessity is often invoked in situations of crisis or imminent threat.
Proportionality: The violence used must be proportional to the threat or offence. This principle aims to avoid excessive and arbitrary repression.

In addition to these principles, the state must also be transparent and accountable in its use of violence. This implies clear communication on the reasons for the use of violence, as well as the establishment of control and accountability mechanisms to prevent abuse. That said, it is important to remember that even with a well-constructed rationalisation, the use of violence by the state can still be contested and debated, particularly if it is perceived to be disproportionate, unjust, or discriminatory.

In some cases, violence can be seen as serving a just cause, particularly when it is used to resist oppression, defend human rights, or protect the vulnerable. This is often referred to as the 'just war' or 'justified violence' theory. This approach is based on the idea that violence can be morally acceptable if it is aimed at achieving a greater goal, such as social justice, freedom, or peace. For example, many consider that the use of violence by resistance movements during World War II was justified in the face of Nazi oppression. However, this perspective is also controversial. On the one hand, there is the risk that the concept of 'justified violence' is used to legitimise abusive or disproportionate acts of violence. On the other hand, some philosophers and political thinkers argue that violence, even in the service of a just cause, remains fundamentally immoral and destructive.

The "right of interference" is a concept that emerged in the 1980s and refers to the idea that the international community has the right - and even the duty - to intervene in the internal affairs of a state to protect human rights and prevent humanitarian disasters. This constitutes a departure from the traditional principle of non-interference, which makes state sovereignty an absolute norm of international law. This development is mainly due to a growing awareness of the human suffering caused by internal conflicts and oppressive regimes. However, like the notion of "just violence", the right to interfere is also a controversial concept. Some argue that it can be used as a pretext for military interventions motivated by geopolitical interests rather than humanitarian considerations. Others argue that international intervention can sometimes aggravate the very conflicts it seeks to resolve. Despite these debates, the right to intervene has influenced the way the international community approaches humanitarian crises and contributed to the creation of the concept of the 'responsibility to protect', adopted by the United Nations in 2005, which states that if a state is unable or unwilling to protect its population from mass atrocities, it is up to the international community to do so.

The right of humanitarian interference represents a significant change in the philosophy of international law. Traditionally, international law has been based on respect for state sovereignty, which means that each state has the right to control its own internal affairs without external interference. However, the right of humanitarian interference challenges this idea, asserting that the international community has the right and even the duty to intervene in the internal affairs of a state when human rights are seriously violated, such as in cases of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. It is therefore a controversial concept. On the one hand, it is praised for its ability to protect individuals from massive human rights violations. On the other hand, it is criticised for its potential to be used as a pretext for military interventions motivated by geopolitical interests rather than genuine humanitarian concerns. Moreover, there is a fear that humanitarian interference may aggravate the conflicts it seeks to resolve. Finally, the application of the right to humanitarian intervention poses practical challenges. Who decides when intervention is necessary? How can we ensure that intervention is conducted ethically and effectively? These questions continue to be debated by lawyers, political scientists and international actors.

The concept of sub-political violence

Sub-political violence generally refers to violence that is carried out outside of traditional state power structures. It is often linked to non-state actors, such as armed groups, criminal organisations or private militias, who exercise their own form of power and control, sometimes within the borders of a nation-state, but outside the direct control of the latter. This form of violence can manifest itself in different ways, ranging from organised crime and drug trafficking to political and ethnic violence. It is often linked to situations of state weakness or failure, where state power is insufficient to maintain order and provide security. Sub-political violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that poses many challenges in terms of security, governance and human rights. Taking it into account is essential for understanding contemporary dynamics of violence and power. In the 1980s and beyond, with globalisation and economic and political change, there has been an increase in sub-political violence in many contexts, as non-state actors have gained increasing influence. This trend has raised new questions about how we understand violence, power and the role of the state.

Sub-political violence can blur the boundaries between what is considered political and what is considered criminal. In many cases, the actors who carry out such violence may navigate between legality and illegality, sometimes using political mechanisms to strengthen their power while engaging in illegal activities. These actors may, for example, participate in elections or formal political processes while using violence to consolidate their power. They may also engage in legal economic activities while profiting from illicit markets. In addition, they may use violent and intimidating tactics to control local populations, while claiming to offer some form of 'governance' or protection. This complexity often makes it difficult to distinguish between political violence and organised crime. It can also make it more difficult for states and international institutions to respond effectively to these forms of violence, as traditional approaches to policing or conflict resolution may not be sufficiently responsive to these challenges.

In some areas where the nation-state is weak or absent, various groups may engage in sub-political forms of violence to control resources and establish their own authority. These groups may engage in a variety of activities, ranging from controlling drug trafficking or other illegal markets to providing social services in areas neglected by the state. Sometimes these groups may even create parallel forms of governance, performing functions normally carried out by the state, such as law enforcement and dispute arbitration. These forms of governance may be based on a combination of force, corruption, intimidation, economic control and sometimes social legitimacy. While these groups may sometimes offer some stability or services in the areas where they operate, they often contribute to long-term instability by undermining the nation state and perpetuating cycles of violence and crime. In addition, they can exploit and oppress local populations, creating difficult living conditions for many people.

Concept of metapolitical violence

The concept of metapolitical violence refers to violence that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of the political, that is no longer solely (or primarily) linked to the nation state, but is embedded in global, transnational and transcultural dynamics. These forms of violence can be motivated by a variety of causes, ranging from radical religious or political ideologies to reactions to globalisation and the desire to establish a new form of social or political order. They are often extreme acts of violence committed in the name of a broader cause, such as defending religious or cultural identity, fighting perceived injustice or promoting a particular vision of social or political justice. International terrorist groups, for example, could be seen as actors of metapolitical violence. This poses major governance and security challenges, as these forms of violence are often beyond the control of nation states and require a coordinated international response.

Several factors have been identified as possible sources of metapolitical violence.

Criticism of the over-modernity of advanced societies: This can include reactions to the speed of technological change, alienation and disillusionment caused by globalisation, and the breakdown of traditional social ties. Metapolitical violence can be a way for some groups to oppose what they see as the negative aspects of modernity and to assert their own cultural, social or religious identity.
Criticism of political secularisation and loss of connection with the spiritual: Secularisation and the erosion of religious faith in many modern societies can be perceived by some as a threat to their identity and values. In this context, metapolitical violence can be used as a means to defend and reaffirm the importance of religion and the spiritual in public and personal life.
A range of frustrations arising from modernity: These may include feelings of economic insecurity, social injustice, political exclusion or cultural marginalisation. These frustrations can be exacerbated by the perception that the benefits of modernity are unevenly distributed, which can lead to forms of metapolitical violence aimed at drawing attention to and combating these inequalities.

These factors are often interconnected and can reinforce each other, creating fertile ground for forms of violence that cross the traditional boundaries of the nation-state and the political.

Extreme violence vs. barbarism

Extreme violence is indeed a form of violence that is beyond any control, social norms, laws or generally accepted moral principles. It is often perceived as being 'gratuitous' in nature, i.e. committed for no apparent reason, without prior provocation, and going far beyond what would be necessary to achieve a given goal. It is violence that seems to go beyond any rational justification or explanation. Barbarism' is a term that is often used to describe such extreme forms of violence. It is a term that has a strong negative connotation, and is often used to describe acts of violence that are perceived to be exceptionally cruel, brutal or inhumane. It is often used to describe acts of violence that are committed in flagrant violation of generally accepted social, moral or legal norms. The terms "extreme violence" and "barbarism" are often emotionally charged and can be used in a polemical or partisan manner. It is also important to note that the perception of what constitutes 'extreme violence' or 'barbarism' may vary according to cultural, historical or individual context.

Extreme violence and barbarism are often manifested in armed conflicts and wars. It can take many forms, including sexual violence, genocide or ethnic cleansing, and massacres of civilians, among others. Sexual violence, including rape, is often used as a weapon of war to humiliate, terrify and dominate the enemy population. It has devastating consequences for the victims and for society as a whole, causing lasting stigma and deep trauma. Ethnic cleansing or wars of ethnic cleansing are another form of extreme violence. They are characterised by acts committed with the aim of completely eliminating a specific ethnic, religious or racial group from a geographical area. These acts may include murder, forced displacement, destruction of property and other forms of physical violence. These forms of extreme violence are not only gross violations of human rights, they also constitute war crimes and/or crimes against humanity under international law. Such behaviour is condemned by the international community and can be prosecuted by international courts, such as the International Criminal Court.

This means the disruption of classical forms of violence. This violence is qualified as extreme because it is qualified as violence beyond violence, it is a violence that would no longer have any rituals and that is extreme cruelty.

The "exponentiality of physical violence against people" means an unprecedented escalation of violence against individuals. This may include a drastic increase in murder, sexual violence, torture, among other acts of physical violence.
The process of regression from the civilisational process is a return to brutal and primitive behaviours and attitudes, in contrast to the norms and values that underpin a civilised society. This can be manifested in the abandonment of principles such as respect for human rights, justice and equity.
The deregulation of the laws and principles of war means the abandonment of rules that have been established to limit the destructive effects of war. This includes the disregard of the Geneva Conventions, which set minimum standards for the treatment of people caught up in armed conflict.
The de-institutionalisation of violence is the absence of any institutional or legal framework to control or regulate violence. This means that violence is no longer constrained or controlled by institutional structures, such as government or justice, and can manifest itself in anarchic and unpredictable ways.

All these elements contribute to the devastating nature of extreme violence and its impact on individuals and societies.

Determining the threshold at which violence becomes 'extreme' is subjective and may vary according to different perspectives. However, it can generally be agreed that violence becomes 'extreme' when it exceeds certain socially accepted limits. In the context of extreme violence, the shift from rationality to irrationality can be seen as a key factor. Violence is generally considered rational when it has a specific purpose, such as self-defence or the achievement of a political goal. When violence becomes gratuitous, disproportionate or out of proportion to its original purpose, it can be considered irrational. In the case of extreme violence, acts of violence are no longer linked to tangible objectives, but are often motivated by hatred, desire for destruction or other irrational motivations. This violence can be chaotic, unpredictable and often without any respect for human life or dignity. It is in these circumstances that violence is usually described as extreme. It is a subject of ongoing research in several disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, psychology and conflict studies, among others.

Extreme violence differs significantly from the classical conceptions of violence and warfare that we find in the works of Machiavelli and Clausewitz. Machiavelli and Clausewitz saw war and violence as tools of politics, used to achieve specific political goals. They presented war as a rational act that serves the interests of a state or a leader. In their theories, war is framed by rules and conventions, such as respect for non-combatants or proportionality in the use of force. Extreme violence, on the other hand, represents a break with these ideas. It is often devoid of any clear political objective, without respect for the conventions of war or human rights. It is characterised by its gratuitousness, its excessiveness, and its lack of distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In these circumstances, violence is used irrationally and indiscriminately, often to inspire terror or to destroy the opponent. It is therefore true that extreme violence challenges classical theories of war and political violence, showing that violence can go beyond rationality and become an end in itself, an act of pure barbarism. This represents a major challenge for researchers, policy-makers and humanitarian actors seeking to understand and prevent such violence.

Michel Henry, a French philosopher, wrote a book entitled "La Barbarie" in 1987. In this book he focused on the concept of barbarism, what it means and how it manifests itself in modern society. For Henry, barbarism is not simply an act of extreme violence, but a system that denies and dehumanises the individual. He sees barbarism as a consequence of modernity and the rationalisation of society, which leads to depersonalisation and dehumanisation. He distinguishes two forms of barbarism. The first is 'external barbarism', characterised by acts of violence and physical brutality. The second, more subtle but equally devastating in his view, is 'inner barbarism', which manifests itself in the dehumanisation and alienation of the individual in modern society. For Henry, the modern system, with its emphasis on technology, science and rationality, tends to neglect and despise the subjective and emotional aspects of human existence. This leads to an 'inner barbarism' where the individual is reduced to an object, a cog in a larger machine. In his work, he therefore emphasises the importance of recognising and valuing the subjectivity and inner experience of the individual to counteract this barbaric tendency of modernity.

Hannah Arendt (1906 - 1975): Radical Evil and Political Violence

Extract from a German stamp printed in 1988 with the effigy of Hannah Arendt.

Hannah Arendt is a leading figure in 20th century political philosophy. She was born in Germany in 1906 and was strongly influenced by her teacher and lover, Martin Heidegger. A Jew, she had to flee Germany in 1933 for France because of the rise of Nazism. Then, in 1941, she moved to the United States where she remained until her death in 1975. Arendt made significant contributions to our understanding of politics, authority, totalitarianism and violence. Among her best-known works are "The Origins of Totalitarianism" (1951), "The Condition of Modern Man" (1958) and "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil" (1963). In "The Origins of Totalitarianism", she seeks to understand how totalitarian regimes such as those of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union could emerge. She analyses the elements that contributed to the rise of these regimes, including anti-Semitism, imperialism and totalitarianism itself. In "Eichmann in Jerusalem" she examines the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi official responsible for organising the logistics of the Holocaust. In it, she introduced the controversial concept of the 'banality of evil', suggesting that atrocious acts can be committed by ordinary people who simply follow orders without question. His work has had a significant influence on a variety of disciplines, from political philosophy to critical theory to gender studies. Her thought continues to be relevant to many contemporary issues, including questions of power, authority and violence.

Hannah Arendt's work is largely informed by the tragic and turbulent events of the twentieth century, including the two world wars and the emergence of totalitarian regimes. Her concept of 'radical evil', developed in part in response to her reflection on Nazism and the Holocaust, is a particularly important notion in her thinking. According to Arendt, radical evil does not necessarily manifest itself in exceptionally violent or heinous acts of cruelty, but can occur in banal and routine ways, an idea she develops in her account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil". For Arendt, 'radical evil' is an evil that transcends the traditional human understanding of good and evil, in the sense that it is committed by people who do not perceive themselves as evil and who, in fact, may regard their actions as normal or even necessary. It is an evil that she argues has been enabled by the structures and systems of modernity, and which constitutes a break with traditional models of morality and responsibility.

Hannah Arendt's conception of 'radical evil' is partly influenced by the thought of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. However, Arendt's approach is distinct from Kant's in important respects. Kant introduces the notion of 'radical evil' in his Religion beyond the realm of reason alone. For Kant, radical evil is a potential inherent in human nature, i.e. a natural propensity to prioritise our own desires and interests above the requirements of the moral law. However, he also emphasises the capacity of human beings to overcome this propensity through the exercise of freedom and rationality. On the other hand, Arendt takes up the notion of radical evil in a completely different context, that of the mass crimes and totalitarianism of the twentieth century. For Arendt, radical evil becomes manifest when inhuman and destructive actions become so normalised that they lose their exceptional character. This radical evil manifests itself in the banality of its perpetrators, who commit horrific acts not out of an evil will but out of indifference, conformity or an inability to think for themselves. These two conceptions, though related, differ in their understanding of the nature and manifestation of radical evil. Kant sees evil as an inherent human potentiality that can be overcome, whereas Arendt sees evil as a manifestation of a social and political system, which goes beyond individuality and manifests itself in normalised structures and behaviour.

For Hannah Arendt, the concept of 'radical evil' represents a fundamental shift in our traditional understanding of evil. It is an attempt to conceptualise the mass atrocities perpetrated during the Second World War and totalitarianism. These events represented, for her, a type of evil that was different from what traditional philosophy and morality were equipped to understand. According to Arendt, radical evil was related to the banality of evil, a phrase she used to describe the fact that ordinary people could commit terrible acts under the influence of a totalitarian regime or when they conformed to authority. She developed this idea in particular in her book "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil", where she studied the case of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi bureaucrat who played a key role in the implementation of the Holocaust. Arendt stressed that Eichmann was not a monster, but an ordinary individual who did not think for himself and simply followed orders. Thus, for Arendt, the radical evil of the twentieth century was deeply linked to dehumanisation, the normalisation of inhumanity and the abdication of personal thought and moral responsibility.

Arendt examined the Holocaust and the persecution of Jews under the Nazi regime not as an example of a scapegoat mechanism, but rather as a manifestation of what she called the 'banality of evil'. Nazi antisemitism, according to Arendt, was not simply a matter of shifting guilt or evil onto another group. Instead, it was deeply rooted in Nazi ideology and was carried out by ordinary individuals who committed terrible acts not out of personal hatred or a desire to do harm, but simply because they followed the orders and logic of the totalitarian system. According to Arendt, the Holocaust was the product of a totalitarian power structure that stripped individuals of their ability to think for themselves and to exercise moral judgement. Jews were targeted not because they were scapegoats for the guilt of others, but rather because they were seen by the Nazi regime as a threat to their vision of a racially pure, homogeneous society.

René Girard's scapegoat theory is based on the idea that collective violence is generated by mimetic tensions within a community, which are then displaced onto a sacrificial victim - the 'scapegoat'. This victim is accused of causing the disorder and is punished or expelled to restore harmony within the community. However, Hannah Arendt challenges this idea in the context of the Holocaust. For Arendt, the Jews were not simply scapegoats bearing the brunt of collective blame or violence. Rather, they were the victims of a hateful ideology and a totalitarian system that specifically targeted them for extermination. Their persecution and murder were not the result of mimetic tensions within the German community, but rather of a systematic plan of extermination by the Nazi regime. In this sense, Arendt challenges the idea that evil can simply be displaced or projected onto a sacrificial victim. Instead, she argues that evil is a manifestation of human action and power structures, and can be perpetrated by ordinary individuals under certain conditions. This is what she called the 'banality of evil'.

Hannah Arendt, in her reflection on totalitarianism and specifically on the genocide perpetrated by the Nazi regime, introduced the idea of human 'superfluity'. For Arendt, "superfluity" refers to the condition of being surplus to requirements, of having no place or use in a given society or system. In the context of the Holocaust, this idea of superfluity was evident in the way Jews were viewed by the Nazi regime. They were seen as worthless beings, who could be exterminated without consequence. This idea of superfluity is an essential element of Arendt's radical evil, in that it suggests that the ability to treat others as superfluous, to dehumanise them to such an extent that they can be massively exterminated, is a form of evil that goes beyond our traditional conceptions of what evil is. Arendt suggests that this form of radical evil is not only carried out by psychopaths or monsters, but can be perpetrated by ordinary people who are embedded in totalitarian systems and who, for various reasons, are unable or unwilling to question the orders they receive or the ideologies they are presented with. This is what she calls the 'banality of evil'.

In her analysis of totalitarianism and concentration camps, Hannah Arendt distinguished three types of camps, which correspond to three different functions of the totalitarian system.

Hades" type camps were intended for the management of stateless people, asocials, and all those who were considered undesirable or superfluous in society. These camps were intended to contain, control and isolate these people, rather than to re-educate or exterminate them.
Purgatory" camps were re-education camps for those who were considered potential threats to the regime, but who were also considered reformable. The objective in these camps was to force individuals to adopt the ideology and behaviour approved by the regime.
Finally, the "Hell" type camps were extermination camps, where those deemed undesirable were systematically killed. These camps represented the most extreme and appalling form of totalitarian violence, where human life was systematically destroyed on an industrial scale.

In "hell" type camps, such as the Nazi concentration and extermination camps, Hannah Arendt described a process of systematic dehumanisation and depersonalisation.

Legal dispossession: Camp inmates were dispossessed of their legal rights, reduced to a state of extreme vulnerability by being excluded from the protection of the law. They were no longer considered as subjects of law, but as objects to be disposed of at the will of the regime.
Abandonment to all regulation: The camps were lawless spaces where the law was not applied, and where violence and brutality were the norm. It was here that detainees were often left at the mercy of "kapos" or camp guards, who were often criminals.
Destruction of personality and individuality: Inmates were systematically stripped of their personal identity and reduced to a number or category. The Nazis sought to destroy everything that made each prisoner unique, including their name, personal history, beliefs and aspirations.
Animalization: The extremely harsh conditions in the camps, marked by hunger, thirst, cold, forced labour, disease and pervasive violence, often reduced prisoners to a state akin to animality. The Nazi regime intentionally created conditions in which prisoners were forced to fight for survival in the most basic way, often at the expense of their humanity.

This process of dehumanisation was ultimately intended to facilitate and rationalise mass murder. By reducing the prisoners to a less than human state, the perpetrators of the Shoah sought to justify and conceal their crimes.

Jorge Semprún was a Spanish writer and politician who survived the horror of the Buchenwald concentration camp during the Second World War. He recounted his experiences as a Holocaust survivor in several of his works, including his book "Writing or Life". In his memoirs, he describes how he found some form of comfort and hope by looking at a tree from the camp grounds. This tree, which he could see but could not access, became for him a symbol of freedom, resistance and life in the face of the omnipresent horror and death in the camp. He used this image as a mental escape and a source of hope, allowing him to maintain some form of humanity and resilience in the face of the inhumanity of his situation. It is an example of how, even in the most desperate situations, human beings can find ways to resist and preserve their humanity. The strength of the human spirit can be extraordinary and it is stories like this that remind us of that.

The tactics used in the concentration camps were aimed not only at inflicting physical suffering, but also at destroying the humanity of those imprisoned there. In addition to cruel and inhumane treatment, prisoners were also deprived of their personal identity and individuality. This psychological degradation was an integral part of the strategy of terror and control. The idea of reducing prisoners to a state of "animality" was clearly evident in many aspects of camp life. The squalid living conditions, lack of food, lack of hygiene, and constant violence were designed to dehumanise the detainees and rob them of their dignity. In addition, the lack of temporal perspective, constant uncertainty and lack of information about the outside world also contributed to this dehumanising effect. By depriving the prisoners of the possibility of planning or even imagining a future, the torturers sought to keep them in a state of constant anxiety and despair. Finally, the destruction of solidarity and moral awareness was also an essential part of this strategy. By creating an environment where individual survival became the primary objective, the torturers sought to break down the bonds of solidarity and empathy that might help the detainees resist or maintain their humanity. All these tactics were aimed at completely dehumanising the prisoners and turning them into "inferior beings", in order to justify and facilitate their extermination. This dehumanisation was an essential component of the horror of the concentration camps, and is now widely recognised as a characteristic of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil

Adolf Eichmann in April 1961 at his trial in Jerusalem.

Hannah Arendt, in her report on Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem in 1961, introduced the concept of the "banality of evil". Eichmann, a high-ranking bureaucrat of the Nazi regime, was one of the main organisers of the Holocaust. Yet, during his trial, he claimed that he had only followed orders and had not acted out of personal hatred or malice.

For Arendt, Eichmann's case embodied a form of evil that was not rooted in personal monstrosity or perversity, but rather stemmed from shallow thinking and blind adherence to a system of command. She described it as 'terribly and frighteningly normal', implying that anyone, under certain conditions, could become an actor of evil. The 'banality of evil', for Arendt, does not minimise the horror of the actions committed, but rather highlights the way in which systemic structures and social pressures can lead ordinary individuals to participate in acts of extreme violence. This theory has generated much controversy and intense philosophical debate, and remains one of the most debated aspects of Arendt's thought today.

Adolf Eichmann, in fact, was not only a 'minor official' but a senior Nazi official responsible for the logistical organisation of the deportation and extermination of Jews during the Second World War. Eichmann was captured in Argentina by the Israeli secret service (Mossad) in 1960 and taken to Israel for trial. Of particular interest to Hannah Arendt in the Eichmann trial was Eichmann's statement that he had only been "following orders" and was therefore not directly responsible for the atrocities committed. It was this position, coupled with his apparent normality, that led Arendt to formulate her theory of the 'banality of evil'. According to Arendt, Eichmann was not a monster in the traditional sense of the word, but rather an ordinary individual who had allowed himself to be drawn into the Nazi bureaucratic system and who had abstracted himself from the reality and humanity of the victims. Arendt pointed out that this kind of evil, committed by ordinary people who dissociate themselves from their actions, is perhaps the most terrifying of all.

The Wannsee Conference, held on 20 January 1942 in Berlin, is generally considered to be the moment when the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question', i.e. the systematic extermination of the Jews, was formally decided by the Nazi leadership. Although the majority of the conference documents were destroyed by the Nazis at the end of the Second World War, a copy of the minutes of the meeting was discovered in 1947. This document provided concrete evidence of the Nazis' intention to exterminate the Jews.

In Eichmann's case, his guilt was not really in question at his trial. He had already admitted his role in organising the deportation of Jews to the concentration and extermination camps. The question was rather to what extent he was responsible for his actions, given his claim to have only followed orders. This is where Arendt's theory of the "banality of evil" came into play. Eichmann was convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other charges, and was executed in 1962. His trial highlighted the personal responsibility of individuals for their actions, even when acting within a bureaucratic system or following orders.

Hannah Arendt was struck by Eichmann's apparent normality, what she called the 'banality of evil'. In her view, Eichmann was not a bloodthirsty monster or an ideological fanatic, but rather an average bureaucrat who was content to do his job without questioning the morality of his actions. For Arendt, this represented a new kind of evil, one committed by ordinary people who simply conformed to the system in place without thinking about the consequences of their actions. She argued that this was partly possible because the Nazi bureaucracy had dehumanised the act of extermination, turning it into a mere administrative task. This does not mean that Eichmann was not guilty of his crimes. On the contrary, Arendt pointed out that, even in a bureaucratic system, individuals still have moral responsibility for their actions. However, this shows that evil can occur in ordinary circumstances and be perpetrated by ordinary people. It is this idea that gave rise to the concept of the 'banality of evil'.

The term 'banality of evil' that Hannah Arendt coined to describe Adolf Eichmann and similar Nazi war criminals refers precisely to this paradox. Eichmann was not a demonic psychopath or a deranged sadist, but rather a civil servant obsessed with the efficiency of his work. Arendt argued that evil, far from being the prerogative of inhuman monsters, can be perpetrated by quite ordinary people who accept the system as it is and do not question the orders they are given. She described Eichmann as a man who was, in her words, "terribly and terrifyingly normal". This 'banality of evil' is based on the idea that people can commit atrocious acts not because they are inherently evil or hateful, but simply because they do not think about the consequences of their actions. It is important to note that Arendt does not excuse Eichmann's actions, but rather seeks to understand how such crimes can occur. It is an invitation to vigilance and moral awakening for all to prevent such acts from happening again.

"We expected to meet a human monster, but what we got was an ordinary man who was less a monster than a clown. This quote from Hannah Arendt reflects her conception of the "banality of evil". For her, Eichmann and other perpetrators of mass crimes were not monstrous, inhuman figures, but ordinary people, who in Eichmann's case sometimes seemed derisory, even ridiculous ('a clown'). Arendt suggests here that the true nature of horror lies not so much in exceptional monstrosity as in the ordinary, the everyday, the habitual, the routine. In Eichmann's case, he was not motivated by fervent racial hatred, but simply performed his bureaucratic duties efficiently and zealously, without questioning the devastating consequences of his actions. This conception of the 'banality of evil' challenges our traditional perception of evil and individual responsibility for mass crimes, emphasising the role of critical thinking and personal ethics in preventing such acts.

Hannah Arendt's theory of the "banality of evil" confronts us with the ordinary and the habitual that can lead to extremes under certain conditions. Arendt highlights the capacity of an apparently 'normal' individual to commit unimaginable acts of cruelty and injustice when inserted into a system that not only allows, but encourages such actions. By dehumanising their victims and refusing to acknowledge their own role in the evil committed, individuals like Eichmann were able to detach themselves from the reality of their actions and justify them as simply carrying out orders or following the law. This reveals a troubling and deeply disturbing truth: evil is not always committed by deeply disturbed or inherently evil individuals. Sometimes it can be perpetrated by ordinary people who, in certain circumstances, are capable of extraordinarily horrific acts. This underlines the importance of moral vigilance, education and individual judgement to prevent the recurrence of such events in the future.

Hannah Arendt's theory of the "banality of evil" derives its meaning precisely from this observation: the individual, like Adolf Eichmann, can participate in acts of extreme evil without fully integrating or recognising the reality of what they are doing. In Eichmann's case, he saw himself as a mere functionary who was 'doing his job'. Arendt emphasises that Eichmann was not a psychopath or a fanatic, but rather someone who had disconnected himself from his capacity for moral judgement, thus allowing his sense of morality to be defined entirely by the system within which he worked. He followed orders and regulations without ever questioning the ethics or consequences of his actions. For him, the victims of the Holocaust were not real individuals with their own lives and experiences, but rather numbers and statistics in his logistic system. Therefore, Eichmann failed to recognise the reality of his actions and their devastating impact on real people. It is this disconnection from reality, this failure to see the moral and human implications of his actions, that embodies Arendt's 'banality of evil'. She reminds us that it is possible for ordinary people to commit acts of extreme evil when they are cut off from empathy and understanding of the reality of their actions.

According to Arendt, the ability to think is essential for moral judgment. Thinking, in this context, means more than simply reflecting or having thoughts - it is an activity that requires reflection, questioning, consideration of different perspectives and empathy. It is a kind of internal conversation where one considers the moral implications of one's actions and makes informed and ethical decisions. In the case of Eichmann and many others who participated in large-scale acts, Arendt suggests that their inability to think in this way made their participation possible. They simply followed orders, without taking the time to reflect on the moral implications or human consequences of their actions. Therefore, the absence of thought - in the sense of moral reflection and empathy - can lead to immoral actions. Individuals can then dissociate themselves from the reality of their actions and avoid moral responsibility. This is what makes evil so 'banal' or ordinary, according to Arendt - it does not require inherent wickedness, but simply an absence of reflective thought.

"We expected to meet a human monster, but we are dealing with an ordinary man... less a monster than a clown... The evil man would thus be each of us... If he allows himself to be slipped and dragged along insensibly he manages in historical and political circumstances to commit the greatest crimes. There is no more genius in evil than in good, but only ordinary men, in whom the spirit of evil watches and waits only for the favourable moment to blow and push them to radical evil, so that there is a disproportion between the evil committed and the quite ordinary appearance of the human being who accomplished it".

This is a powerful quote that sums up Hannah Arendt's thesis on the "banality of evil". The quote refers to her coverage of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi official who played a key role in the organisation of the Holocaust. Eichmann was not a particularly cruel or sadistic man by nature, but a zealous civil servant who simply carried out the orders of his superiors without thinking about the moral consequences of his actions. It is this lack of thought, this inability to consider the ethical implications of his actions, that Arendt refers to as the 'banality of evil'. The quote emphasises the idea that evil is not necessarily the work of 'monsters', but can be committed by ordinary people who detach themselves from their own moral responsibility. It is an important reminder that ethics and personal responsibility are essential, even (and especially) in situations where one is driven to act against one's conscience.

Professor Rémi Baudoui states that there is no action without thought. This statement underlines a fundamental conclusion of Hannah Arendt's philosophy: action and thought are intimately linked. For Arendt, the ability to think is fundamental to human morality and ethical responsibility. In the case of Eichmann, Arendt argues that he was able to participate in acts of unspeakable cruelty precisely because he did not think about the moral implications of his actions. He simply 'followed orders', detaching himself from personal responsibility. This absence of thought is, for Arendt, what makes evil 'banal' and frightening, for it suggests that anyone can become capable of committing terrible acts if they give up thinking and exercising moral judgment. This is why Baudoui's statement is so important: it emphasises the need for reflection and ethical engagement in everything we do. Without thought, we risk being drawn into actions that we might otherwise recognise as immoral or unjust.

Reconsidering the concept of violence

Hannah Arendt's view of violence is complex. She distinguishes between violence, power, authority and force, and argues that these are distinct concepts that are often confused. According to Arendt, power is a collective capacity that emerges when people come together and act in concert. It is based on mutual consent and cooperation, and is the basis of all political government. Violence, on the other hand, is an action that destroys, injures or kills. It can be used to defend power, or to destroy it, but it cannot create it. It is an instrumental form of action, often used as a means to an end, such as domination or coercion. Authority is a particular type of power that derives from respect or esteem for a person or institution. It is based on legitimacy and consent. Force, on the other hand, is a physical or material capacity that can be used to exert coercion or domination. For Arendt, then, violence and power are in fact opposites. Power comes from the people and their consent to be governed, while violence is an act of destruction or coercion. It is used when power is absent or has failed. In this, Arendt reminds us that violence can overthrow power, but it cannot replace or create it. This is a crucial distinction in her political philosophy.

Hannah Arendt challenged Max Weber's concept of legitimate violence. According to Weber, the state has a monopoly on legitimate violence, that is, the exclusive right to use physical force to maintain order and enforce the law. This notion is fundamental to Weber's definition of the state and to his more general theory of political power. However, Arendt challenged this idea. In her view, violence and power are distinct and often opposing concepts. Power, as she defined it, derives from consent and collective action, while violence is a form of coercive and destructive action. She argues that violence can be used to defend or destroy power, but it cannot create it. Arendt questions the legitimacy of the state's use of violence, arguing that any use of violence is potentially illegitimate because it contradicts the nature of political power, which is based on consent and collective action. She warns of the dangers of the use of violence by the state, particularly in situations where the state uses violence to maintain its power in the absence of popular consent or support. This is not to say that Arendt does not recognise any legitimacy in the use of violence by the state - for example, to maintain order or defend the community against external aggression. However, she stresses that such violence must be justified by ethical and moral principles, and not simply by the fact that the state has a monopoly on force.

Hannah Arendt suggests that violence can be used as an instrument by governments, but that no government can rely exclusively on violence to maintain its power. The idea here is that violence may be a method used by government to achieve certain goals, but it is not the source of power itself. In her book "On Violence", Arendt explores this idea in more detail. She argues that violence and power are distinct and often opposing concepts. Power, she argues, comes from consensus and cooperation between people; it is a collective attribute that emanates from the buy-in and support of people. Violence, on the other hand, is coercive and destructive. It can be used to defend or destroy power, but it cannot create it. A regime that relies solely on violence to maintain control is inherently unstable, as violence often provokes resistance and opposition. The idea of 'instrumental violence' refers to the use of violence as a means to achieve certain ends. For example, a government may use violence to enforce laws or to suppress dissent. However, Arendt argues that the use of violence in this way is fundamentally different from the exercise of power, which relies on the consent and cooperation of citizens.

In Hannah Arendt's perspective, the repeated use of violence by a government can be seen as a sign of weakness rather than strength. If a government has to constantly resort to violence to enforce its directives, it indicates that the government has difficulty in obtaining the consent and support of its citizens, and is therefore in a weak position. Violence is a tool of coercion, not persuasion. It may force people to comply out of fear of the consequences, but it does not win their consent or voluntary support. A government that can persuade its citizens to voluntarily support its policies is much stronger and more stable than a government that must use violence to enforce its decisions. This is why Arendt emphasised that power and violence are distinct concepts. Power, she argued, comes from consent and cooperation between individuals. Violence, on the other hand, is a method of coercion that can be used to defend or destroy power, but cannot create it. In this context, the repeated use of violence is therefore an indicator of political weakness. It suggests that the government is unable to persuade its citizens to voluntarily support its policies and must therefore resort to force to enforce its directives.

When a government or regime resorts only to violence to maintain order, it can be said to have ceased to be political in the true sense of the word. For Arendt, politics involves dialogue, persuasion and consensus. When violence becomes the main tool of government, it is no longer politics but tyranny or dictatorship. The Terror during the French Revolution is an example of this concept. Robespierre and the Jacobins used violence and fear to suppress opposition and maintain control, justifying their actions in the name of the Revolution and republican 'virtue'. They used mass executions, including the guillotine, to eliminate those they considered enemies of the Revolution. However, this regime of terror was not sustainable. It created widespread fear and instability, and eventually led to the fall of Robespierre and the end of the Terror. This example illustrates Arendt's point that violence can destroy power, but it cannot create or sustain it.

Arendt believed that violence was an ineffective tool of control in the long run and that it could not create real power. For Arendt, power is based on legitimacy and mutual consent, which is totally absent in regimes that use violence as a means of control. Indeed, she argues that violence can destroy existing power, but it does not have the capacity to create it. Violence can frighten and coerce people into obedience, but it cannot establish the true legitimacy or respect necessary for the long-term functioning of a government. Moreover, it warns against the danger that violence can become an end in itself. This happens when regimes become increasingly dependent on violence to maintain their control, and violence becomes not only a means, but an end in itself. This situation, according to Arendt, marks the end of true politics, which should be based on dialogue, persuasion and consensus rather than coercion and force.

"In short, it is not enough to say that, in the political sphere, power and violence should not be confused. Power and violence are opposed by their very nature; when one absolutely prevails, the other is eliminated. Violence manifests itself when power is threatened, but if it is allowed to develop, it will eventually cause the disappearance of power. As a result, non-violence should not be seen as the opposite of violence. To speak of non-violent power is in fact a tautology. Violence can destroy power, it is perfectly incapable of creating it."

This is a powerful quote that summarises Hannah Arendt's views on power, violence and non-violence. According to Arendt, power is inherently non-violent. When we talk about power, we are really talking about the ability to work together, to achieve common goals and to create mutually beneficial conditions. In this view, violence is contrary to the nature of power because it divides, destroys and forces rather than brings together, creates and persuades. The importance of Arendt's view is clear, especially when considering political or social contexts in which violence is often seen as a necessary tool to gain or maintain power. Arendt rejects this idea, arguing that violence can destroy power, but it cannot create it. Her reference to non-violence as a tautology for power reinforces this idea. In other words, power, by its very nature, is non-violent - it requires consent, commitment and cooperation, and cannot be maintained by force or coercion. This perspective has important implications for the way we think about politics, leadership and social relations.

Annexes

Arendt, Hannah, and Dominique Séglard. "Édifier Un Monde": Interventions, 1971-1975. Paris: Éditions Du Seuil, 2007. Print.
Sorel, George : Reflexion sur la violence (livre)
“How Do People Rebel? Mechanisms of Insurgent Alliance Formation.” The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, http://www.graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/research-news.html/_/news/research/2018/how-do-people-rebel-mechanisms-o

References

« Theories of violence in political science » : différence entre les versions