Modification de The applicability of the law of armed conflict

{{Infobox Lecture
 | image = 
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 | faculté = 
 | département = 
 | professeurs = [[Robert Kolb]]
 | assistants =  
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 | cours = [[Droit international humanitaire]]
 | lectures =
*[[Introduction au cours de droit international humanitaire]]
*[[Les sources du droit des conflits armés]]
*[[L’applicabilité du droit des conflits armés]]
*[[Les règles matérielles du droit des conflits armés]]
*[[Les règles du droit des conflits armés non-internationaux]]
}}

This is a very important chapter, because before applying the law, it is necessary to know to which situation it is applicable. Applicability is therefore a subject that logically preceded any application. The lawyer never forgets to give it the importance it deserves. Regrettably, the General Observer and among these, journalists in the first place almost always fail to consider this point and pretend that all the Geneva Conventions, this or that Convention applies simply because there is an armed conflict. Obviously, this is not serious, first of all, we must meticulously analyze the applicability. We see relatively quickly that the subject is unfortunately extremely complicated. Regrettably, not because it would be wrong to do a little intellectual gymnastics in the classroom, but regrettably for substantive reasons because IHL, in journalistic terms, is the "last bastion against barbarism". On a more serious level in the vocabulary, it is a matter of protecting people, it is a minimum of protecting people and we would still like to guarantee protected people this minimum of protection under simple and clear conditions. If a right must be applied under simple and clear conditions, it is still this one, unfortunately, the opposite is true.

It is obviously not an invention of the lawyers to have wanted to complicate the applicability of this right. In this case, they must be completely absolved. On the contrary, lawyers have tried each time to simplify and increase legal certainty. Those who did not want it were the States, in other words, the politicians. And for good reason, because it is sensitive that the period of armed conflict and especially the civil war, when one is exacerbated in one's almost paranoid sensitivity, one sees enemies everywhere and one does not necessarily want to apply generous rules to one's enemies.

The States have therefore not wanted more generous rules and we can only bow to them since we are here as lawyers to expose the law in force as it is made by the legislator while criticizing it, but we must take it as it is, we cannot invent a better law on applicability than the one we find on the ground.

Applicability is always a question of material applicability or ratione materiae, it means to which situation does a body of law apply, to which these rules are applied, in this case, those of IHL. There are then considerations of personal applicability, namely ratione personae, in the plural, ratione personarum, to which specific rules apply, in this case those of IHL. Then there are questions of temporal applicability, i.e. from when these rules apply and until when. There are also questions of spatial applicability, to which spaces or in other words where a specific set of rules applies, namely IHL.

{{Translations
| fr = L’applicabilité du droit des conflits armés
| es = La aplicabilidad del derecho de los conflictos armados
}}

= The applicability ratione materiae =
Material applicability refers to the situation to which the rules or laws of armed conflict apply.

To which situation, then, does IHL apply? It applies differently according to two types of conflict, which are the two types of bases that IHL distinguishes as a result of the will of States, namely, on the one hand, situations of international armed conflict, which are roughly armed conflicts between States; and on the other hand, non-international armed conflicts. These are typically, but not exclusively, conflicts in which a government fights against either dissident factions in its own army or insurgents or rebels, the latter being civilians who have taken up arms to fight the central government and who normally clash with the regular troops of that state. There are sometimes dissident factions in armed factions that can fight on the rebel side or can fight alone without rebels against loyalist army factions. In all these cases, there is a non-international armed conflict.

These are the two main situations, and the substantive applicability of the law differs according to these two situations with some common rules, but with many different rules. We are therefore obliged to make this distinction if we want to apply the law correctly. Even the concept of armed conflict, which is one of the situations to which the law of armed conflict applies, the very concept of armed conflict is not at all identical in international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC).

The major difference between the IAC and NIAC is that there is a much more generous material application in the IAC, that is, the law of armed conflict applies much more quickly under much easier conditions in a situation such as we will see it for the IAC because here, States have to deal with their peers and on an equal footing, it is easier to agree to apply rules quickly, there is no reason to make difficulties when there are wounded, a small confrontation such as a border incident between armed forces of States, there is one wounded, it is much easier to say to apply the first Geneva Convention and to ensure that the necessary care is provided for the wounded and sick.

In a NIAC, on the other hand, the situation is very different, i.e. the threshold of applicability is much higher and the very notion of armed conflict is much more restricted. The law of non-international armed conflicts therefore applies to fewer situations or at least with greater difficulty, it takes almost an initiation process to get to the door, whereas international armed conflict is a door open to all winds.

== International armed conflicts ==
The IAC is the main category that has existed for centuries, the NIAC is an intruder that humanitarians have wanted to place with a different strong fortune, because after all, the law of armed conflict has never really been applied properly in the NIACs.

With regard to IACs, there are five situations of applicability, in other words, there are five situations in which all or part of the IHL applicable to international armed conflicts applies. :
#The first situation is common to both types of conflicts, IAC and NIAC. This situation is perhaps the most surprising, which is peacetime. IHL also applies already in peacetime, simply, there are not all the provisions that apply, but some.
#For the IAC only, there is an application in the event of armed conflict which means "de facto armed confrontation" and therefore "hostility". In NIAC, there is also armed conflict, but that does not mean the same thing.
#Thirdly, there is the situation of a declared war. It is surprising that we distinguish between an armed conflict and a war, it shows once again how much more precise the legal vocabulary is than the everyday vocabulary.
#There is the fourth threshold for the applicability of territories that would be occupied without armed resistance.
#A particularly historical category, the wars of national liberation. The national liberation war, at least according to Additional Protocol I, Article 1§4, is an international armed conflict and not a non-international armed conflict.

These are the five situations and we will only comment on four of them: peace, armed conflict as de facto hostility, declared war and war situation, occupied territory without armed resistance. These are four alternative gateways to IHL, in the application of certain IHL rules, but care must be taken that each of these gateways does not lead to the application of the same rules in the law of international armed conflict. The last three situations mentioned, war, armed conflict and occupied territory without resistance, give rise in principle to the application of all the rules of the law of armed conflict except in the case of occupied territory, it is above all the rules on the occupation of the territory that apply by force of circumstance because that is what it is all about, there is no longer hostility, there is an occupied territory, there is no fighting because there has been no resistance, so it is in reality only the right of occupation that will apply. If there were ever to be hostility, acts of hostility, struggles, attacks, defensive operations, which is compatible with occupied territories, in occupied territories there may be skirmishes, in which case other IHL rules would also be applied. On the other hand, in the peace situation, the first threshold mentioned, there are only a few, but not very many, rules of the law of armed conflict that apply. The others are dormant since the others are intended for situations where there is a situation of belligerency and in times of peace, by definition, there is no such thing as a situation of belligerency.

=== The peace situation ===
Contrary to what some believe, the law of armed conflict already applies in peacetime through some of its provisions. These are provisions which, in their very text, specify that they already apply in peacetime. Or, then, provisions which by interpretation must already apply in peacetime with regard to their object and purpose. In other words, these provisions would miss their purpose and purpose if they were applied only when armed conflict has already broken out.

There is Article 14 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies to civilians, and in this provision, "general protection of populations against certain effects of war", this provision which concerns health locality areas, it is stated, "From peacetime, the High Contracting Parties and, after the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict, may establish on their own territory and, if necessary, on the occupied territories, health and safety zones and localities organised in such a way as to protect the wounded and sick, the infirm, the elderly, children under fifteen years of age, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years of age from the effects of war....". In peacetime, it makes sense, we will not wait until the armed conflict to start organizing the health forces, because if we did, it would be a little too late.

The same is true of a whole series of other provisions found in the Geneva Convention. If we take the question of the training of military forces or what is called the dissemination of IHL, sometimes it is also called dissemination in English. Contracting parties have an obligation when ratifying or acceding to an IHL convention to provide for the training of their armed forces, in particular at the level of commanders and senior officers, to ensure that, in the event of armed conflict, the armed forces are aware of the applicable rules. The State also undertakes to disseminate IHL, including in civilian terms because civilians may be confronted with IHL rules in the event of armed conflict. These obligations of dissemination and training must obviously apply immediately, as soon as the convention is in force for a State, there is no reason to say that we would wait for an armed conflict to begin before starting to train the military in their duties, because once again, it would be too late.

Article 58 of Additional Protocol I contains a provision concerning spatial planning. What is planned is that military objectives must be separated as much as possible from areas of civilian concentration and civilian objects, they must be physically separated because in the event of armed conflict, a belligerent is always within his right to attack a military objective and if that military objective is in the middle of civilian concentrations, there will be greater collateral damage. By asking States to make an effort, it is not an absolute obligation because, depending on the territory, it is not possible to separate military objectives and civilians much more difficult in a case like this, as Switzerland is a densely populated territory with an army that is not by profession.

That being said, we understand that this provision and it is also in the commentary on the additional protocol, so it was accepted during the negotiation that this provision does not apply only in time of armed conflict, we do not wait for armed conflict to separate military objectives and civilian areas, but we try to take it into account already in land use planning, i.e. already in time of peace we will try not to build munitions depots in a school for example to make an absurd example.

These provisions apply from peacetime onwards by their express wording or by their interpretation according to their object and purpose.

=== Situations of belligerence ===
A more serious case is situations of belligerence. They are of three types and, in addition, this applicability that we are now discussing is regulated in common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 2 is therefore a common article, found in each of the Geneva Conventions with the same text.

It is considered that this common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions sets out the customary principles of applicability of IHL, so that this provision applies not only to the Geneva Conventions, but also applies not as a conventional norm, but also to the principles it indicates as customary law for other IHL conventions. Not only for those concluded after 1949, but even for those concluded before 1949, the 1907 Hague Regulations, which do not provide for this kind of situation of armed conflict and war, an occupied territory without resistance, the 1907 Hague Regulations being 1907, are considered to be classic, i. e. applicable to war situations, it is nevertheless considered that this provision of Article 2 also modifies the Hague Convention on this point by subsequent practice for the simple reason that States now accept that the applicability of IHL is determined according to the criteria indicated in modern law, namely Geneva of 1949, and that old law is no longer fully applicable on the issue, because it is outdated.

There are these three situations here. The first two, namely armed conflict and declared war, in the first paragraph of Article 2 and the occupied territory without resistance in the second paragraph of Article 2.

What about armed conflict, namely de facto confrontations, de facto hostilities that may take place and give rise to the applicability of IHL? It is the terms of Article 2 which stipulate that "Apart from the provisions which must enter into force in time of peace, this Convention shall apply in the event of declared war or any other armed conflict arising between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them". The text of the provision states that these principles apply to "High Contracting Parties". This is obviously quite logical because Article 2 is a conventional article which as such can only apply to the parts of the Geneva Convention. But since principles are also principles of customary law, they are also applied outside the Geneva Convention. Simply, Article 2 is not applied, but the customary principles on the material applicability of IHL, in this case, the principle on armed conflict as a de facto armed confrontation.

This is therefore a criterion that has emerged from pure and simple effectiveness. It must be noted that there are hostilities somewhere between the armed forces of two or more States. This is what distinguishes armed conflict within the meaning of the first paragraph of the war, a term also contained in the first paragraph of Article 2.

War, contrary to popular belief, is from a legal point of view only a situation normally triggered by a declaration. War is declared and when war is declared by one State against another State or several States, a situation of war between the two States is legally established. This war situation has legal consequences. One of them is that acts of violence that may be committed between States where war has been declared are now generally lawful, but can only be measured in the law of armed conflict, otherwise it would be a violation of the other State's sovereignty. But, following the declaration of war, this is no longer the case.

War is purely a legal state because we can have situations of war without hostility of any kind, and there have been some historically. Here, in armed conflict, on the contrary, it is the fact of hostilities that counts and only him, not the label or qualification. It goes without saying that it is not necessary for a war to have been declared. In this case, there is a situation where there is no war because it has not been declared, but where there are de facto hostilities and therefore an armed conflict.

What do we gain from this whole operation? This is very simple: we ensure the applicability of IHL in a situation where otherwise there would be a gap, as was often the case in the 1920s and 1930s. If we did not have the provision on armed conflict, but only the provision on war, it would be enough not to declare war and to carry out acts of hostility, and to bombard, for example, and to say that there is no war and therefore there is no need to apply the law of armed conflict, namely the law of war. This was done in the 1920s. The bombing of Corfu by Mussolini in 1923 was a bombing outside a state of war, war had not been declared and IHL could therefore not be applied. It is a serious flaw at the bottom. The Japanese tried again to argue in such a way when they invaded Manchuria, they called it a police operation and did not declare war. Serious gaps in the applicability of the IHL of the time were opened by this capacity for manipulation since the right was attached to the label.

This gap is filled in the Geneva Conventions because, whether it is a war or not, from the point of view of de facto confrontation, it plays no role. It is an armed conflict as long as there is violence between belligerents. And the characterization of this violence, is it a war, is it a police action, is it an armed reprisal, is it something else, has no impact?

However, in order to have an armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions of customary law for the CAI, it must take place between States, which means between military forces of States. We could have an exception to this rule, which is not a real exception, moreover, if certain armed factions are effectively controlled by a foreign state, then, at that point, we would remain in a confrontation between states. Effective control is the responsibility of the State and we find them here.

It should be noted that there is no intensity threshold required. It is sufficient that there is violence between state military forces, but a particular intensity, a threshold defined in any way does not exist. Therefore, violence must not reach a certain level. Any situation of violence between State military forces is covered, so a border incident, a border skirmish with a few shots and perhaps a wounded person gives rise to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions under the aspect of "armed conflict".

Armed conflict is such a legal term here that we cannot have situations where violence is even more diffuse and yet there is an armed conflict within the meaning of the conventions. Let us take an example in which military forces of a State would capture with hostile intent, and therefore military personnel of a foreign State and detain them without a shot having been fired. From the point of view of the logic of the Geneva Conventions, this is an armed conflict. Persons thus detained shall be entitled to prisoner of war status for as long as they are detained.

Basically, it makes sense that there should be no minimum threshold. In non-international armed conflict, there is such a threshold, but not here. Basically, it is logical that there should not be such a minimum threshold because the purpose of protecting the Geneva Conventions is certainly better served by regulation as we have it today.

If, for example, there is only one dead, one injured, it would be too little, we are not going to deal with the Geneva Conventions, let us wait until it becomes more intense, then maybe a hundred dead, a hundred injured and then we will start rescuing them. That obviously makes no sense. The Geneva Convention I, namely the protection of the wounded and sick among armed forces in the field, must obviously apply from the first wounded. We are not going to start saying that there are not enough people injured and that we are not taking care of it. Similarly, if we capture only a soldier from another state and detain him, there is no reason not to grant him a status under Convention III and therefore to treat him badly and say that when we have 50 prisoners we will start applying the convention; that makes no sense in the systematic nature of these protective conventions.

It should be noted, however, that as a result of this particularity of the conventions and IHL, which implies a very low threshold for the entry of armed conflict, the term "armed conflict" has been altered to some extent. In the legal vocabulary, an armed conflict can be something very light and in the political vocabulary, we will avoid talking about armed conflict because foreign ministers will not sit in front of the press to make a joint press release and say that a small incident was an armed conflict. We are obviously not going to put fuel on the fire and we are absolutely right to de-escalate. From a legal point of view, however, this is an armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions in the sense that these Conventions are applicable to the title mentioned.

There is one final point to be made, namely whether hostile intent is necessary for there to be an armed conflict. Things have to happen between state armed forces, we have seen that these things can be quite general such as the capture of a few people and not necessarily shots fired; but do we need hostility in any case?

In the cases mentioned, hostility was there. In a border skirmish, we don't love each other, we shoot each other, so the hostile element is visible. In the capture of soldiers from another state, there is the element of hostility in capturing and detaining them. But what about other situations?

We can think of the one of mistakes. Guns are fired in foreign territory because they were mistaken, it was a military exercise, they thought they were firing on their territory and in reality they crossed a border; or a military detachment is walking, like an exercise in the mountains, they get lost and go down the wrong side of the border and in the neighbouring state they see a column advancing.

In the vast majority of cases, there will be no need to apply the law of armed conflict in any case and therefore the question will not arise. This is the case when the Swiss soldiers, it happened sometimes, not very often, but nevertheless, they made a mistake and went down to Italy, sometimes also due to bad weather. It is hard to believe that the Italians took this as an invasion and apart from that, even if they had taken this as an invasion, nothing else would have happened, there is no need to apply IHL, there would not have been anyone injured, there would not have been any hostilities, so nothing at all, we would simply have taken these people away and made them go to Switzerland.

In the case of cannon fire, this is a little more delicate. Here too, Switzerland has practice, we have already fired a few cannon shots in the surrounding areas. A famous incident and the one in 1968 when we fired several cannon shots into Liechtenstein territory, these cannonballs crashed into a forest, so there was nothing special, at most damage liquidated by the responsibility of the State if ever, but not by IHL.

It should be noted that in a case like this one, depending on the case, this can have other consequences. Between Switzerland and Liechtenstein it becomes almost a little funny, but if Pakistan fires cannonballs on the Indian side or aims at it, there will probably be a situation of armed conflict, even if only through reaction.

This can immediately follow a sequence and if it is really a mistake, the State which has made a mistake insofar as it has obviously understood that it has made a mistake, it is really in its interest to notify the opposing party as soon as possible so that we do not inadvertently enter an armed conflict there too. If this is the case, i.e. the other State reacts and hostilities follow, IHL applies even if everything was a mistake at the beginning and there was no hostile intent.

In other words, intentions do not count in IHL, but can probably be defused by very rapid communication when it is sensitive. In the case of Liechtenstein, there was nothing sensitive, there were not even wounded or sick and there was therefore no need to apply anything of IHL.

=== The declared war ===
War is a legal act, a reichtgesaft as German-speaking lawyers would say, i.e. a state of war is brought about by a state's declaration of will. It is sufficient for one State to declare war on another to force the other into a state of war, it is not a treaty, contract or agreement the state of war, it is a situation, legal triggered by a unilateral act.

As long as there is this declaration of war, from the moment of the declaration of war, IHL applies by virtue of what is provided for in Article 2 § 1 and also in customary law. It does not matter whether the declaration of war is a lawful or unlawful declaration in jus ad bellum. The ad bellum juice remains separated from the juice in bello. Therefore, whether the rule is declared unlawfully, declaration of war as aggression or lawful declaration of war, declaration of war as self-defence, has no impact, it will each time be a declaration of war. From the point of view of IHL, this is still sufficient.

The declaration of war provides us with a broader applicability of the law of armed conflict for the time between the declaration and the outbreak of hostilities, if any. If we had only armed conflict and not declared war as a category of applicability, we would have situations where war had already been declared, but hostilities had not already begun and during that period IHL would not apply, there would be a gap and this gap is filled by the alternative gateway of the declaration of war.

Sometimes war is declared, but there is never any de facto hostility. The most famous situations are the declarations of war by a whole series of Central and Latin American states to the Axis powers and in particular to Germany in the Second World War. Declaration of war which resulted in a state of war between Germany and these states respectively as, for example, Guatemala among others, but there was no hostility between the two, Germany was already relatively desperate and in any case the geographical distance between the two continents was such that there was no reason to consider that it could have fighting.

Why these states have declared war on Germany if not to do so; there are several reasons for this, one of which is quite predominant over others. Some states declared war on Germany because it allowed them to seize certain enemy properties. It was possible at the time to confiscate enemy property when war was declared, there were some fairly wealthy Germans there, but that was a rather secondary reason. The main reason is that, except for Denmark, which was in a situation of occupation, it was a condition for being invited to the United Nations San Francisco conference to have declared war on Germany or the other Axis powers until a certain date. You had to have declared war on Germany, so some states did it at the very last moment to be inevitable in San Francisco.

In the law of armed conflict, there is not only the conduct of hostilities and the rules governing them, but also the protection of persons. From the moment of the declaration of war, civilians who are on the territory of the two or more States concerned automatically become enemy civilians. These enemy civilians are protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. It is therefore necessary to protect them from the moment when a hostile relationship is created and this moment of hostility is that of the declaration of war.

=== The occupation of a territory without resistance ===
This is the purpose of Article 2§2 of the Second Geneva Convention. Here again, the Convention strives to fill a gap that would otherwise have remained gaping.

What gap?

There may be cases that are easy to imagine even when the imagination is not overwhelming. It is possible to easily imagine cases in which there is a hostile relationship between armies of two States and yet there has been no declaration of war and there is no hostilities either, and at that time IHL could not be applied to a situation that would deserve it. This situation includes the occupation of a territory without armed resistance against this occupation. Either one state invaded another and the other state decides not to resist or because it has no army like Costa Rica and no one comes to its aid and therefore it cannot resist, or it has an army and believes that we are weak enough compared to the invader and that there is no point in sending men to the coal mines to be killed like the situation in Denmark in 1940. In addition, Denmark does not even have a mountain, unlike Switzerland, which offers conditions of resistance. It is a choice that a state can make. At that time, there may be no declared war and no hostility either, since you give up defending yourself. It would still be odd if a State were to force a State to engage in hostile acts in order to be able to apply the conventions.

There are also other situations where paragraph 2 could apply, such as cases where there are troops of a State abroad who are there with the consent of the local sovereign, that consent is withdrawn at some point and that foreign troops do not leave. This is the kind of situation that the International Court of Justice believed it could see for Ugandan troops in the DRC in the case of the 1997 DRC v. Uganda armed activities case and the judgment is from 2005.

In short, in these situations too, it is possible to apply IHL even if there is no declared war and even if there is no de facto hostility. What will obviously be applied is above all the law of belligerent occupation, namely the rules relating to occupation and in particular those relating to the Fourth Geneva Convention in Article 47 et seq.

With regard to this second paragraph, when a territory is occupied and the occupation is the result of an armed conflict, i.e. hostility, at that time, international practice including the International Court of Justice as in the 2004 Wall case, these authorities therefore rightly consider that in this case, the first paragraph of Article 2 applies, i.e. that we are in a situation of armed conflict. The occupied Palestinian territories, for example, are not territories under Article 2§2, they are territories under Article 2 § 1 because the territories were occupied following the 1967 war and the 1967 war saw not very long, but rather hot hostilities. So, in paragraph 1, the occupation is just a result of the armed conflict, it continues the 1967 armed conflict, they are not occupied territories without resistance, they have been occupied as a result of resistance that has been broken.

One could say to oneself that all this is of little importance because IHL still applies and that is true; it would normally be of little importance, but the problem is simply that Israel has tried to argue and has remained totally alone with this argument that everyone has rejected and even the United States of America and that is saying. Israel argued with the text of the second paragraph by suggesting that the Geneva Convention would not apply to the 1967 occupied territories following the 1967 war because, says Israel, it is not clear that these territories belong to a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions since their status was controversial, there were several States potentially claiming membership of these territories, they are not territories belonging to a High Contracting Party, but they are territories with a contested status and therefore the Geneva Convention does not apply according to paragraph 2, the Convention will also apply in all cases of occupation of all or part of the territory of a High Contracting Party even if such occupation does not meet any military resistance from a High Contracting Party. In the first paragraph, the wording is slightly different and therefore this argument could not be taken so easily. That is precisely why Israel has tried to make an argument with the second paragraph, but it does not apply to these territories and even if it did, the meaning of the phrase "High Contracting Party" is obviously not at all that at all, but rather to simply recall that the Convention applies only to the contracting parties, which is normal because it is a convention; in customary law, in any event we would have the applicability of the rules according to an occupation, whatever its title. So, even if the territory is contested, it is enough for it not to be its territory and it is an occupied territory from the point of view of customary IHL.

Israel's argument was not accepted by anyone, it is considered that the first paragraph applies and that these territories are therefore occupied so that the Geneva Convention IV also applies. This is also the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the 2004 Wall case.

=== Summary of the material applicability of the law of international armed conflicts ===
We have found that the applicability of the law of international armed conflict is at a very low threshold and is facilitated by law, the applicability of the IAC is quickly entered into and the fundamental criterion for entry is functional, which is essential to enter IHL under the guise of armed conflict, which is by far the most important category statistically and legally. It is a functional perspective in the sense that as soon as there is a need to apply the conventions because one of the situations provided for in the conventions is carried out in a context of hostility between military forces, the conventions are applied.

As soon as there is, in the context of military forces of different States, a hostile context, an injured person, a sick person, a situation provided for in the first convention is set in motion, and from there, automatically, comes the idea that the convention must be applied.

By "functional", we must see the situations covered by the various conventions and whenever we find ourselves in such a situation following a hostile relationship between the military forces of two States, we are in the field of IHL even if sometimes only a few IHL rules will apply to the exclusion of others that they will not find applicable. If there is occupied territory, only the right of occupation is applied, the rules on the conduct of hostilities are not used and so on.

== Non-international armed conflicts ==
With non-international armed conflicts, it becomes significantly more complicated. There is a complication from the outset on four levels, complications that disturb the waters in a very considerable way.

First, there is a problem with the quality of the belligerents. In an international armed conflict, there is none because it is the military forces of two States that confront each other and military forces are relatively visible things, it is an organ of the State, it is quite organized, we know what we are talking about, it even wears uniforms.

In a non-international armed conflict, this is not at all the case because if on the one hand there are military forces from one State, on the other hand, there are sometimes very poorly identified entities of a quite different nature. There are armed groups, and the full range of armed groups is possible and this range can go from the top of the armed groups' range, i.e. rebels organized a little like soldiers, but when you go down the range, it becomes very elusive. What about criminal gangs in Africa and elsewhere, the "war lords" whose interest is not political, but generally economic, exploiting parts of the country to get rich, this maintains some private armies, the central government is too weak to do anything about it. A situation of belligerence or rather a situation of fighting crime? We are in poorly defined areas. We have also talked a lot about Mexico, a little bit like that, whereas there, it is more like that, it is drug gangs that make the law in certain parts of the country and fight Mexican armed forces, not just the police, so that we are in a situation of quasi-conflict, but is it an armed conflict, are they criminal gangs, are they belligerents too or not, not necessarily, because the traditional belligerent has a political motivation and not a private criminal motivation. The classic political motivation is to secede and form an independent state or to seize the government, the place of the government, which is not the case with these cartels.

This is more complicated, because there is an unidentifiable object on one side, at least difficult to identify.

The second difficulty is that, unlike international armed conflicts, in non-international armed conflicts, the intensity of the armed conflict is a criterion for the material applicability of the law. In other words, the situation of hostilities must be such that the armed conflict must pass a certain threshold of intensity before there is an armed conflict. Below, we talk about a situation of internal unrest and tensions. At the ICRC, the vocabulary is "other situation of violence". In Additional Protocol II, the terms are "disturbances" and "internal tensions". These are conventional terms.

It is unfortunate to have this intensity criterion because it produces significant legal uncertainty. In the IAC, if we can say that from the first shot there is applicability of the law, we are well off. When in non-international armed conflict it is said that for a certain intensity, this means that we are in many situations in a grey transition and that we do not know exactly from which date IHL applies and that very different arguments can be made in this regard. The government will generally say that there is no armed conflict and that it controls absolutely everything, they are just brawls, but that we should not worry about them. That is the government's logic. Others will say, however, that of course there is an armed conflict, especially those who support the rebels, and this legal uncertainty cannot be fully resolved. Syria still shows very well this kind of escalation, where it is not known exactly when the armed conflict began until today, since it has been a progressive escalation that is very typical of this kind of situation. So, when there is fighting like in Donetsk, we are certainly in an armed conflict, but from exactly when did it start, we do not know that. This is not very good from the point of view of legal certainty for provisions that must be applied to protect people.

Thirdly, there is not a single type of non-international armed conflict, there are several, so we will admit that when we have a single type of armed conflict such as international armed conflict, which is basically always the same through different gates, but still more or less the same, in a non-international armed conflict, there are several types and this complicates matters.

There are certain non-international armed conflicts in which common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies. There are then other non-international armed conflicts in which common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 2 of 1977 also apply, which is therefore the protocol provided for non-international armed conflicts. The two do not apply to the same situations, the criteria are not identical so that there are two types of armed conflicts and, in addition, in addition to pure non-international armed conflicts, namely government against rebels on their territory, there are others where non-international armed conflicts are internationalized by foreign interventions. So that we end up with the category of mixed armed conflicts, or as we sometimes say because it is more precise, but also much less elegant, we sometimes say that there are non-internationalized armed conflicts, namely internationalized NIAC, in English, internationalized non-international armed conflicts. It's the height of inelegance, but at least it's accurate. We have to see what applies in these conflicts and it becomes very complicated.

== Internationalized non international armed conflicts (mixed armed conflicts) ==
Qualification for situations involving non-international armed conflicts is more complicated than for international armed conflicts. This is because States more easily accept obligations in international armed conflict while they are significantly more defensive in non-international armed conflicts.

We will begin by identifying the minimum threshold to which the law of non-international armed conflict applies in order to see what specifications should be given in order to have an overall picture.

The minimum threshold for the applicability of the law of non-international armed conflicts is linked to the common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The only difference is that in this important provision, the content of the guarantees granted is set out with talent, but not the threshold of applicability. The only thing that is said to us in Article 3 is of a negative nature in the event of armed conflict by not having an international character. It is therefore a residual category that the non-international armed conflict referred to in article 3 residual category in the sense that everything that is not an international armed conflict automatically falls within the framework of a non-international armed conflict.

But then, what is a non-international armed conflict?

Defining negatively is obviously not defining at all, we simply know that there are two categories and that there is no third category for armed conflicts. To know what a non-international armed conflict is and how it differs from peacetime, from situations of internal unrest and tension that may exist within a State, this is not specified in Article 3. It is through practice that these clarifications have gradually crystallized. The content of this practice is expressed in fairly clear, if not very clear, terms in a 1962 ICRC expert report. This practice was continued after this expert report and its crystallization is now found in the case law of international criminal tribunals, including the Yugoslavia Tribunal, among others.

The criteria on which the practice was based in order to determine a NIAC are twofold, two cumulative conditions. These are the two conditions that distinguish an armed conflict in the non-international sense of the term from so-called internal unrest and tensions as in Article 1§2 of Additional Protocol II, or from the ICRC's vocabulary from "other situations of violence". On the one hand, there are internal unrest and tensions, situations of riots, internal violence; on the other hand, there are NIACs within the meaning of Article 3. What we need to determine is where the dividing line lies, to have when we enter situations of unrest and armed conflict. There are two criteria for this. First of all, the practice requires a minimum organization of armed groups, rebel forces.

What distinguishes a situation of unrest from a situation of armed conflict is first of all that the factions fighting the government appear as an armed force and not as sporadic acephalic rioters. This implies that these armed groups must be led by a responsible command that can issue orders and be obeyed, in other words that there is discipline and that in this way the armed group in question can comply with the rules of the law of armed conflict. In other words, the actors who fight each other must appear to be belligerents to some extent. They will not be States in this case on both sides, there will normally be the State army on one side only, but the non-state belligerents must appear a little bit like a State armed force, we must at least take back the degree of organization in an analogous way so that by discipline, it can make sense to try to apply the rules of the law of armed conflict to these people.

Consider the justification for this criterion. If there are sporadic rioters with people at their head, simply more or less excited citizens running through the streets and looting what they find. Such a situation can lead to extremely intense violence, but it would be completely superfluous, even far-fetched, to try to apply the law of armed conflict to these people, in other words a whole series of rules because we have no interlocutor and there is no internal decision-making channel that can enforce compliance with these rules. The only thing that can be done in this case is to demand respect for human rights rules applicable in the territory with a rather murky aim of tensions. Of course, the law of armed conflict cannot be applied in this kind of situation because it is a right of belligerency, we need interlocutors and we need groups that resemble an armed force.

The second cumulative and necessary criterion for identifying a non-international armed conflict is more problematic. The second is a criterion that States like, but lawyers do not like. There must be a minimum intensity of conflict. That is to say, the struggle must appear to be a struggle that has taken hold of society as a whole, it is a collective character that we have to face here, that the number of victims is generally considerable although it is not a strict criterion - in the Swiss civil war, the Sonderbund, there were about a hundred deaths -. It is a criterion of intensity, sometimes even over time, but the criterion of duration is also not so sure. There is a famous Latin American case of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 1997 La Tablada case, in which an armed group attacked a military barracks with very violent means, that is, with means of war. The fight lasted for a very short period of time, thirty hours or so just about a day, and the Commission concluded that there was a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of Article 3 by considering the intensity of the fighting more than the number of victims, the way in which the fighting was conducted, they were conducted in the same way as armed forces with weapons of war.

What we already see with these summary explanations is that the question of intensity gives rise to uncertainties. As far as organization is concerned, there may not be enough factual information to decide easily and quickly whether the rebel armed forces are sufficiently organized, but it is clear relatively quickly if they are. The intensity of the conflict, on the other hand, is a rather uncertain criterion. In many cases, this leads to legal uncertainty, especially since there is often a continuity between internal unrest and tensions and the crystallization of an armed conflict. It is not uncommon for all these phases of gradual consolidation of the conflict, which begins with riots and ends with armed conflict, to be passed. This is almost emblematic in Syria, where it was difficult to say exactly when this non-international armed conflict began, it was probably a little easier in Ukraine in 2014 because events followed one another faster than in Syria. We remember that in April 2014 we were probably still in the phase of post-Meiden internal tensions and unrest and that certainly in May 2014 we had moved on to non-international armed conflict. What makes it possible to say is that we had moved on to the combat phase, there had been fighting at Donetsk airport, fighting like a military operation, and it would therefore be difficult to conclude that there was no armed conflict at that time. Between April and May, there was not a huge phase and we know that is where things turned out. For Syria, everything was more gradual, it took longer.

This legal uncertainty was acceptable to the States. It is not the lawyers who want it, it is the States who cherish it. The reason is quite simple: it gives a considerable margin for argument. There will therefore very often be a situation in which the local government denies that it is in the presence of a non-international armed conflict, says that there is some unrest, some riots, a small insurrection, some noisy assholes, and that everything is under control and that we have to move because there is nothing particular to see, but in any case no non-international armed conflict. Other States, especially if they sympathize with the cause of the rebels, will consider much more quickly that there is a non-international armed conflict and the ICRC will probably fall between the two, but each will probably have its own qualification and therefore, it will often be impossible to say with certainty from when the law of non-international armed conflict applies. If we want to overcome this unfortunate legal obstacle, there is nothing left but to go through, as is very often the case, special agreements by putting the question of principle in brackets. It is thus perfectly possible to negotiate with a government that is reluctant to recognize a situation of armed conflict, but by telling it that this is not a non-international armed conflict, what interests IARC is that the content of Article 3 be respected, that it is "applied because the government itself, the rebels who seek international respectability, will not say that they wish to harm people. Normally, in the political struggle, no one claims to want to infringe Article 3. A rebel group that wants to become a government tomorrow knows that international respectability is important. At that time, there will be a special agreement to apply the content of Article 3 by putting the question of the qualification of the conflict in brackets. This is the pragmatic side with which IHL is very often dealt with, but it is unfortunate that from a legal point of view we do not have clearer regulations.

When we have these two criteria, organization and intensity, we have a non-international armed conflict and we can apply common Article 3. These two criteria constitute the line. Internal unrest and tensions are not specifically defined in the law of armed conflict because it does not concern us directly and we do not need to define them because by defining one of the branches, CANI according to Article 3 according to the two criteria, we can say that everything that is not CANI, Article 3, and which is not international conflict either, is automatically TTI. It is therefore sufficient to define one of the branches by letting all the other situations in the residual domain fall. Purists make a distinction between unrest on the one hand, internal tensions, riots on the other hand, structural political violence on the other hand, such as, for example, imprisoning many people, we can read in the commentary on Additional Protocol II to Article 1§2 to find out more.

So that is the applicability of the minimum threshold of the law of non-international armed conflict. In other words, by "minimum threshold" we mean that if we are no longer in internal tensions or unrest and we move into a non-international conflict according to the two criteria we are automatically in common Article 3, we apply it according to the two criteria we have just seen.

The situation in non-international armed conflicts is a little more complicated in the sense that we also have an Additional Protocol II that is supposed to apply more specifically to non-international armed conflicts. What complicates the matter is that the applicability threshold of Additional Protocol II is not in the same place as the applicability threshold of Common Article 3. There are additional requirements to be able to apply the rules contained in Protocol II to a situation of non-international armed conflict. In other words, as soon as there is a non-international armed conflict, we are in Article 3, automatically it is always possible to apply it; any non-international armed conflict gives rise to the applicability of common Article 3 either as a treaty for the parties to the Geneva Conventions or as customary law for any other States and movements. A number of these non-international armed conflicts are also non-international armed conflicts that give rise to the applicability of Additional Protocol II of 1977.

Therefore, any non-international armed conflict falls under common Article 3, but not all non-international armed conflicts necessarily fall under Protocol II. Conversely, any non-international armed conflict or armed conflict to which Protocol II applies also gives, in parallel to the applicability of Article 3. These two always apply together, but there are cases where Article 3 applies alone as a minimum threshold and Additional Protocol II does not apply. We note that there is no case of a Protocol II conflict that goes beyond the circle of Article 3.

Why did you make a convoluted regulation of the type? Would it not have been smarter to apply Protocol II to exactly the same conflicts that were covered by Article 3. The answer is "yes" and "no". Yes, undoubtedly, and this was provided for in the ICRC's draft, it was a question of developing common Article 3, which was a little too brief, so we wanted to give it more substance, but it was logical from this point of view to try to maintain the same conditions of applicability. But not also for two reasons: the first is political and the second is legal. The political reason is that States do not like the law of non-international armed conflict and they immediately took the opportunity at the 1977 Geneva Conference to restrict the conditions for the applicability of Protocol II to ensure that less law of non-international armed conflict applies to conflicts with which these States may be confronted. States are very sensitive to foreign powers and even organizations such as the ICRC coming into their internal affairs when a government is fighting for its survival against rebels whom it considers criminals on its own territory. He considers this to be an internal issue par excellence of vital interest and accepts broad and bold international rules with the powers of third powers who can then come forward to make complaints. States do not want someone to come to this sensitive moment to hold them to account. This is evident at the conference, the applicability of Protocol II is repressed as much as possible, it is an old atavistic reflex of States, it shows that humanitarian aid is really only an argument for non-international armed conflicts. However, there is also a legal reason for this difference in the applicability threshold and it is more serious. This is because Additional Protocol II developed, it is true, common Article 3, and the strictly humanitarian guarantees that this common Article 3 contains, but Additional Protocol II also developed the Hague law which was absolutely not in common Article 3, there was nothing on means and methods of combat, common Article 3 only deals with persons in a non-combat situation.

When rules are introduced in Article 13 et seq. of Protocol II concerning means and methods of combat, it is nevertheless normal to have a threshold of applicability at least for these slightly higher rules because for rebels to be able to adhere to this type of rule, they must sometimes be a little more organised or more firmly established in the territory than in the very evanescent threshold of common Article 3. The problem is that if rules applicable in a non-international armed conflict are already sufficiently stringent and cumbersome and there are rebel movements that are sufficiently poorly organized just to fall within Article 3, but without territorial control, without anything, asking them to subsequently apply certain rules classified as "strong" may result in a material impossibility so that these rules would not be taken seriously afterwards because there are things that rebel movements when there is no territorial base, for example, cannot do. If there is a land base, there is control over one part of the territory, there are things that can be done.

What are these conditions of restricted applicability? First of all, it should be noted that Protocol II also presupposes that both conditions are met, namely those of Article 3. That is what makes us in this kind of configuration, namely that there are no cases that go beyond that. The two criteria in Article 3, namely "organisation" and "intensity", apply to Protocol II. Nothing is changed. Rather, what is being modified is that two additional requirements are now being added, the first in particular. This additional requirement is the territorial control that armed groups must have. Protocol II therefore applies only in the situation where the rebels control part of the territory even if it is small, but who control it like the government, excluding government forces and who are thus able to conduct concerted and continuous military operations. This is the purpose of Article 1 § 1 of Additional Protocol II.

"This Protocol, which develops and supplements common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its current conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 2 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or organized armed groups which, under the leadership of a responsible command, exercise such control over part of its territory as to enable them to conduct continuous and concerted military operations and to apply this Protocol".

The very last words have a certain importance: "and to apply this Protocol". The legislator indicates here one of the fundamental reasons for this rule. Its concern is that these armed groups should be able to apply this protocol with these different contents. Territorial control must therefore be interpreted in the light of this criterion. Territorial control is not a separate requirement. Obviously, territorial control is required, since this is stated in full, but from which entity should this control be exercised? This is a specific issue that is linked to the ability of these armed groups to implement the protocol.

If it appears that this territorial control is such that they can apply these rules, then the protocol applies and the territorial control may be relatively weak if in this situation this control nevertheless allows the group to apply the rules of the protocol. It is therefore a case in point so that there are also some uncertainties. Nevertheless, the criterion of territorial control is generally interpreted very broadly. All that is required is a minimum of territorial control and it is assumed that in this case the rebels, armed groups have the possibility to apply the rules of the protocol.

There is a second restriction in relation to common Article 3, which is that this Protocol is applicable to conflicts which "take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or organised armed groups. This means that the protocol applies to bilateral relations between loyalist government forces on the one hand and rebels, rebel forces and even, depending on the case, dissident and therefore non-loyalist state armed forces on the other. This means, on the other hand, that the protocol does not apply in relations between rebel groups or dissident armed forces. It happens in some non-international armed conflicts more and more frequently, moreover, formerly the DRC, Lebanon and Colombia have provided very good examples, but now there are even more. Rebel factions of armed groups sometimes fought each other on the territory of a State facing armed conflict. In Africa, it is the rule to have such groups that also fight horizontally. Protocol II does not apply to these armed conflict relationships. Common Article 3 applies to it because it does not have this restriction, but not Protocol II. There is a twofold restriction so that an armed conflict under Article 3 can also be subject to the rules of Additional Protocol II, it must be subject to territorial control, and in addition, it must be a conflict between government forces, dissident forces or rebel armed groups.

It should also be noted in passing that in the statutes of criminal courts, and in particular in the Rome statutes in Article 8 of the International Criminal Court, this criterion of territorial control has been completely removed. This means that the Rome Statute criminalises and penalises rules arising from Additional Protocol II, but without taking over the threshold of applicability of territorial control or relations between governments and rebel groups. These rules are therefore generally applied as obligations that all parties to an international armed conflict would have.

It is not entirely clear what the state of customary law is. Perhaps customary law, the ICRC study, would seem to militate in this direction. Either to no longer have this criterion of territorial control as well as the limitation to the type of relationship between government - dissident or rebel group. What is certain is that for Additional Protocol II, on the other hand, these criteria apply, so that if you are a party to Additional Protocol II, you may have to apply fewer rules of customary law. This should at least basically stimulate a few States perhaps to ratify Protocol II, but Professor Kolb doubts that they are thinking as well in legal technique. In case of uncertainty, special agreements will have to be used each time, so agree to apply this or that rule, including Protocol II, with the question of its formal legal applicability in brackets.

We have seen the conditions under which the law of non-international armed conflict applies, with regard to Article 3 on the one hand and Additional Protocol II on the other. What about the other texts?

There are a number of texts that apply to any armed conflict, such as, for example, the 1993 Paris Convention on Chemical Weapons, which already applies in peacetime, or Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on Mines and Booby Traps, which is the second version of Protocol II, in other words. So now, these texts, what thresholds do they apply to? On the threshold of Article 3 or on the threshold of Protocol II?

First of all, it is necessary to look in the texts themselves to see if they specify. If in such a text there is a regulation referring to Article 1 of Additional Protocol II, we are set, these are the conditions of Additional Protocol II. In the absence of such regulation, i.e. in cases of silence and doubt, the threshold of article 3 is legally applicable because it is considered to reflect the threshold of general applicability of the law of non-international armed conflicts. This is how the applicability of the conventions on chemical, biological and other weapons is interpreted, for example, which makes all the more sense because these conventions, these conventions, already apply in peacetime and therefore even in peacetime it is not permitted to use such weapons, including in situations of internal unrest and tension; this would be a very strange interpretation since when armed conflict occurs it would seem that these conventions do not apply until the armed conflict meets the specific provisions of Additional Protocol II. It should always be borne in mind that the threshold of Article 3 applies in the event of doubt.

We are entering the minefield of non-internationalized internationalized armed conflicts, we can also say mixed armed conflicts, which are very frequent. Many conflicts are mixed conflicts, i.e. conflicts that are partly international armed conflicts and partly non-international armed conflicts. There were still some wonderful examples with Libya and the 2011 operation. There were two armed conflicts there, one international with NATO states against the Libyan government, and at the same time there was also a non-international or even several armed conflicts between the government and the various rebel forces. The question for us is how do we legally respond to these situations of mixed conflicts?

We will not mention here the cases where a conflict changes in nature, i.e. cases where a non-international armed conflict becomes a block of non-international armed conflict and vice versa, a non-international armed conflict becomes a block of international armed conflict because in this case there is only one passage, but there are the thresholds that we have seen applicable before and after depending on the point at which the conflict breaks out. We can think of the example of Iraq with the 2003 armed intervention, international armed conflict in the phase of allied intervention and then the new government was installed, that it was considered sufficiently independent and that it invited foreign forces to stay, the conflict turned entirely into a non-international armed conflict. It did not stop because there have always been rebel factions and other terrorists who continued the struggle, but it was no longer an international armed conflict, we moved from one to the other as the occupation ended. Already, moreover, before the end of the occupation, but there was a mixed international situation for the occupation and not international for the government's fighting against these various rebel factions. A very simple example is the successful secession where from a certain moment a new State is created, if the struggle continues, it could be that from a certain moment it becomes an interstate struggle. The issue is a little more complicated because it is not certain that the old government until it recognizes the new state is obliged to treat it as a state.

However, the most interesting situation for us is precisely the mixed conflicts where both have to be applied at the same time. Here, the classic example, a general category that can be applied to X conflicts, is the situation of foreign military intervention in a civil war. There is a non-international armed conflict and then foreign forces intervene. By "intervention", we mean here that foreign states send armed forces to the territory for civil war in order for them to participate in hostilities. It does not matter that these armed forces are regular army soldiers, it very often happens that these forces are transvestite forces, i.e. so-called volunteers or other persons who are difficult to identify; Ukraine still gives examples. In the case of hidden transactions, the difficulty is purely a factual difficulty, namely whether these so-called volunteers or others are indeed sent by the State and act on its behalf. It is a question of fact that may be difficult to determine, but that we must leave pending. What is unfortunate about this factual situation is that it cannot be determined and therefore not knowing which law is applicable depending on the difficulty of determining the fact. This shows once again how difficult this applicability of IHL is.

Let us take the very simple case that there is a civil war like in Vietnam or the DRC. There is a civil war at the beginning, states enter to fight with troops either on the government side or on the rebel side.

Let us see the case where in a mixed conflict, there is at the same time in the same conflict in relation to different events an international armed conflict and also a non-international armed conflict or several of them. The general rule in this matter is that the law remains fixed in these bilateral clusters. It is necessary to determine the applicable law according to the concrete relations between the belligerents: who is fighting against whom, that is what will determine the applicable law.

There is not a single applicable law, so for example, the internationalization of the conflict does not operate as a whole, just because in a non-international armed conflict there are several foreign States intervening with armed forces, it does not mean that the entire conflict would become an international armed conflict. That is precisely not the case. The original conflict between the government and the rebels retains its nature as a non-international armed conflict, for example, but at the same time, in other belligerent relations, there will be the application of the law of non-international armed conflict as with the example of Libya. At the same time, an international armed conflict, such as the United Kingdom against Libya, is a non-international armed conflict between the Kadafist government and a particular armed group.

This theory of the bilateralization of conflicts is also evident in practice. A very remarkable application of this doctrine can be found at the International Court of Justice in the 1986 Nicaragua case at paragraph 219. There were some direct attacks by the United States against Nicaragua, which meant an international armed conflict, and at the same time there was the civil war in Nicaragua between the government and the so-called "contras" forces. The Court applied its own law to each of these relationships, the one that was applicable, IAC or NIAC.

Let us now look at what it looks like, that is, what kind of bilateral relationship we could have in a mixed conflict. This is a little complicated not on the substance, but on the multiplicity of possible relationships. What always matters is the quality of the report, the moment there are States on both sides, it is always an international armed conflict, the moment there is a State against non-state entities or non-state entities between them, it is automatically a non-international armed conflict. It is the quality of the belligerent that determines the applicable law.

For example, the theme is one of civil war at the beginning, it is a non-international armed conflict with foreign interventions, so the base is a government fighting against rebel forces: government against rebel; state against armed group on its territory. The applicable law is NIAC. This can be from Article 3 or Protocol II, depending on the conditions of application of each of the texts.

In one case, there is a first state (1) which is a foreign state that intervenes on the government side, so it sends armed forces to the territory to support the government and to fight at the same time as the government forces and the rebels. We now assume that these foreign government forces are on a battlefield and confronting the rebels, there is an armed confrontation between the troops of the foreign state 1 and rebel forces somewhere on the state's territory facing civil war. The applicable law is CANI. What is decisive is whether or not the State has crossed a border to arrive on the territory of the State where the armed conflict is taking place, but what matters is that we have a State against a non-state entity, i. e. NIAC.

In another case, there is a government still struggling with rebel forces, but this time these rebels are supported by a foreign state. There is a State (2) fighting on the side of the rebels. Government forces fall on the armed forces of State 2 that are on its territory to support the rebel cause, so here it is IAC. The captured forces are prisoners of war.

Another scenario is with State 1 forces fighting for and with the government against State 2 forces fighting on the rebel side, i.e. State 2 sending troops to support the rebels. There is an armed clash between State 1 and State 2 troops on the territory facing civil war. What is applicable? From the IAC, state against state.

In a different case, there is a group of rebels (A) against a group of rebels (B) so rebels against rebels. The law that applies here is NIAC; one can even be precise in this case, because Protocol II can already be excluded in any case on a conventional basis. We could say that it is a NIAC article 3.

In another case, there is the government or even alternately State 1 forces intervening, one or the other or both, attacking a group of rebels and the particularity of these rebels is that they operate beyond the national border of the State, they are in a neighbouring State and conduct cross-border operations in the territory facing civil war. It is therefore as if there were a civil war in Switzerland and some armed groups were taking refuge near the border in Italy to conduct operations in Switzerland from Italy and that now the Swiss government or the state that would intervene on its behalf was going to make an expedition to Italy to bring the Estocade to these armed groups hiding behind the border. We must not be caught by the fact that a border is crossed, what matters is not that, what matters is the type of relationship: State versus non-state entity and therefore it is a NIAC.

A final hypothesis is that a government is fighting rebels. These rebels, in this case, are controlled by a state 3, so there is a government, a rebel group except that the rebel group happens to be a creation of a foreign state. A foreign State controls them, at least, according to the criterion of overall control, but perhaps even the control is effective and therefore even stronger, but we assume that the control is at least overall in the sense that we have discussed in law the responsibility of the State. In simple terms, rebels are guided by a state. Legally, what matters is that it is a state against a state. The rebels do not appear legally as an independent body, they are only the extended arm of a state; legally speaking it is a state organ or a state organ that controls them. So it's as if State A is fighting State B, in this case. Here, the government versus the state 3.

There is a certain complexity, but it is not enormous either, it is a de facto complexity more than a legal complexity. The complexity of the law is not really there because we are still in the IAC and NIAC categories, sometimes it can still qualify a little bit, all this is not too complicated, theoretically at least. On the ground, it can become quite complicated if we have to distinguish between very multiple military operations based on armed encounters, which applies if there are 5 or 6 intervening states and 5 or 6 rebel groups and everyone is fighting cheerfully against everyone, there is not much complexity in the qualification, but there are still many different situations and a certain complexity is obvious.

What about the United Nations, if the United Nations ever sends peacekeepers to a territory, for example; what happens then and what is the conflict called then? It is also a situation that resembles foreign intervention when the United Nations sends peacekeepers or other troops to the territory of a state. Blue helmets in the traditional sense were not drowned to participate in the armed conflict, but rather in phases where the armed conflict was paused and interposed between the belligerents and a relatively warm peace was maintained. However, in exceptional cases, peacekeepers in the strict sense of the term, sent with the consent of the State concerned, have been caught up in the turmoil of the armed conflict. The case of Congo in 1960 is often mentioned when troops were sent there and the central government was relatively quickly confronted with secessionist movements, the most famous of which was the Katanga movement. At that time, gradually, UN forces were drawn into this armed conflict and fought on the government side against the secessionist forces.

What happens much more often is that the United Nations authorizes States to send tropes to a territory, as in the case of resolution 1973 in the context of Libya. It is therefore another hypothesis where State forces under United Nations mandate or authorization are involved in armed conflict. This case does not interest us here because it is a foreign intervention. Libya can be analysed as such. The fact that there is a United Nations authorization is not relevant because it is the separation of ius ad bellum and ius in bello. The title of the intervention or its justification for the use of force has no bearing on the law of armed conflict, whether with a United Nations mandate or illegally, it has no bearing on the qualification of IHL and this also applies here.

If, on the other hand, there are peacekeepers who sometimes can participate in combat, although this is not so frequent. We should question the quality of these peacekeepers, that is, United Nations peacekeeping operations. These personnel are under dual command, both under the command of the United Nations through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who has, let us say, strategic control of the troop and at the same time under the control of their respective states. These are contingents from different States that remain under their national command, particularly for any tactical, i. e. direct operational, question. Strategy is the purpose of the operation and tactics is the decision to intervene here or there, to do this and that, to use this or that weapon or to take that or that position; for that, it remains under the control of the various national commands.

Therefore, from the point of view of interest here. If there are UN troops somewhere like Somalia, what happens? What is the qualification of the conflict? It is States such as Katanga that are fighting against secessionist movements and therefore internal armed movements. So it is a situation where government forces are against rebels, and therefore NIAC. Now, there is a different opinion on this issue, but it is very controversial. Professor Kolb has long held and still holds a different view today, according to which the only exception to this kind of scheme is that of the strength of international organizations such as the United Nations, which should apply the law of international armed conflict in their belligerent relations. Professor Kolb has developed a whole series of arguments to this effect, it seems to him that this scheme is mainly made for States. Since there is a United Nations force, the law of international armed conflict should be applied already because United Nations practice goes in this direction, we must look at the 1999 bulletin of the Secretary General, the "circulaire" as it is also called in French, which sets out the rights that its troops must respect, all the rules contained in it come from the international armed conflict, and secondly, Professor Kolb has a relatively poor view of an international organization such as the United Nations, which preaches on human rights in particular and has special provisions in the Charter that fall short of the law of international armed conflict. The question is very open-ended and it is possible to object quite easily to what Professor Kolb says if they were really United Nations troops. If they were really United Nations troops, but they are not really United Nations troops in the sense that they are state contingents that are made available to the United Nations, but which remain at the same time under national command at the operational and tactical level. This is why Professor Kolb now has more doubts about his own opinion of the past. If they were real United Nations troops, that is, troops that would be under the exclusive command of the United Nations, strabby and operational, then he would fully agree with his former opinion. Since these are also troops under national control, Professor Kolb has more doubts today. The issue is very controversial, Professor Kolb had her voted on once when he was at the ICRC to find out how her other legal staff saw the issue. We voted on the issue and there was a split of channels 12 to 11. Luigi Condorelli had gone to the toilet and so if he had been there again he would have voted according to Professor Kolb on his side, which would have been 12 to 12. Even if it is speculative knows his opinion on this subject. In other words, it is a more or less total sharing at the ICRC on this issue. It is simply a very controversial issue.

States sending peacekeeper contingents are reluctant to apply the law of international armed conflict, they prefer to stick to this pattern: non-international armed conflict, no prisoners of war, etc.

This is on the qualification of conflicts from the point of view of the material applicability of the law of armed conflict. To be clear, the term "peacekeeper" means nothing in law, it is "participants in peacekeeping operations" known as "PPOs" which is the precise term with a legal meaning.

= Applicability ratione personae =

== Holders of the Law of Armed Conflict ==
The question here is to whom the law of armed conflict applies. The first clear and simple rule is that the law of armed conflict is addressed primarily to States and in States primarily to their military branch. This should not surprise us because the State is the subject par excellence of war and, in addition, conventions are made by and for States. Indeed, who ratifies the conventions on the law of war, humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict? It is the States and these conventions are not open to other entities. It is enough to look in the clauses on ratification and accession to these conventions, we find each time the vocabulary according to which States can become parties and sometimes we use a slightly more flattering vocabulary which is that which powers can become parties as with the 1954 Convention on Cultural Heritage in Time of Armed Conflict where in the accession clause there is the following vocabulary, namely "the Powers" which are the States being a vocabulary that States sometimes willingly use for themselves; they see themselves as volunteers as "Power".

It is therefore quite normal that, like practically all public international law, it is addressed to States, and the same thing can be found in the law of armed conflict. This is particularly true for the IAC where there are confrontations between state armed forces. This is less true for NIAC, where one must recover to apply the law of armed groups and explain how IHL can be applicable to armed groups. In the IAC, we are in pure interstate. There are also some more IAC branches that are particularly state oriented, such as maritime warfare, maritime catches, smuggling, all these issues are rules that only apply in interstate warfare.

The conventions apply to the State and to all organs of the State. Of course, the military branch is most concerned by the conventions of the law of armed conflict, but it is the State that ratifies the conventions, it is the State that is bound by customary rules and this therefore means that all organs of the State are bound and not only the military branch. This is relevant because we have seen that some rules of the law of armed conflict also apply to subjects other than the military branch. We have already mentioned Article 58 of Additional Protocol I, where there is an influence on spatial planning, but spatial planning is necessarily other bodies concerned than the military branch, but also as another example civilians to whom IHL concepts must be disseminated, again very often it will be other bodies than the military branch which will deal with this dissemination of IHL to civilians.

States are bound and are the subjects par excellence of IHL, but what about others and who are already the others? First there are international organizations and there is the United Nations: can the United Nations itself be held as an organization by IHL obligations? If these obligations apply only to States, the United Nations could not be bound by them. It is another question to consider whether or not when the United Nations sends troops somewhere, whether or not it internationalizes the conflict. Now the question is whether the United Nations itself can be bound by rules of the law of armed conflict. The question then arises for armed groups, rebels, how can they be bound by rules of the law of armed conflict. It is not obvious, if we take the conventions, have the rebels ratified the conventions; normally, an international convention applies only to those who have ratified it or who have acceded to it. The rebels have not ratified or acceded to the Geneva Conventions, they cannot even do so because the Geneva Conventions are only open to States. But then how can we explain that rules of the law of armed conflict, for example common article 3, are applicable to rebels on a conventional basis and what about custom, for that matter: do customary rules apply to rebels? No doubt an explanation must be found to apply them, otherwise the entire law of non-international armed conflicts would be in weightlessness. If it could only be applied to state armed forces and not to rebels, there would be no reciprocity, it would not work. But it is also necessary to see how we can justify this personal applicability to armed groups that have not ratified this or that convention or alternatively how the applicability of customary rules can be explained to such groups. Finally, it is true that the secondary question arises as to the extent to which private individuals such as ourselves can be held by IHL and among individuals there are certain particularly important classes of individuals, such as private military companies that can intervene in conflicts. Private military companies (PMCs) are individuals from a legal point of view. Can they be held by IHL is how.

It can therefore be seen that personal applicability issues are not without importance.

The general rule in this area has emerged recently, in the 1990s, it was in the shadows before or perhaps no longer existed at all before the 1990s. This rule is a rule of effectiveness. In very short terms, it means that material participation in armed conflict as an actor or in legal terms, the material capacity to participate in armed conflict, automatically also entails personal capacity. In simpler terms, the actors of an armed conflict are also bound by the law relating to that armed conflict. Participating in an armed conflict automatically also means being bound by the rules of the armed conflict. This rule of effectiveness or this principle of effectiveness is there to fill gaps that would otherwise remain gaping. It would still be remarkable if in a branch of law that seeks to protect against excessive destruction and also seeks to protect people, the victims of war, we could have participants in an armed conflict who would not be bound by this protective law. It seems much more logical to say that everyone who participates in armed conflict can be bound by various obligations depending on the conventions they have ratified and so on, that is clear; but that they certainly have the capacity to be bound by rules of the law of armed conflict. This is the rule that has emerged more and more in recent years.

Let us now look at what this means for each of the topics: international organizations first, armed groups second, and individuals third. These are the three categories where personal applicability is a problem.

=== International organizations ===
For international organizations, the issue is resolved although it has been extremely controversial for years. We will use the United Nations as an example because it is the world organization and it is probably the most important in terms of peace and security.

The United Nations did not consider itself bound by the law of armed conflict as an organization for a long time and until the 1990s. There were various reasons and arguments really. None of them were really decisive. One of these reasons was to say "we are not a party to the conflict", the United Nations would be above the parties to the conflict, it would try to pacify the dispute, to find a solution such as, for example, sending peacekeepers to separate the parties, but the United Nations is not a party to the conflict. If we wanted to apply IHL to them, it meant that we would see them as a belligerent, as a party to the conflict and we totally refuse their role. The United Nations also increased by the fact that it was not a party to the conventions and could not be, because it could not ratify the Geneva Conventions, accede to them since these conventions are only open to States. The United Nations also argued finally that there was a whole series of provisions of IHL that it was not in a position to apply because there is a whole series of rules in IHL that involve a territory, a State organization. For example, when IHL provides that courts must be operated when arresting certain civilians, enemies, etc., the United Nations does not have a court for this purpose, it is not a State precisely, it does not even have a territory and it cannot detain persons in a territory. So, in any case, we could not apply all this as it stands.

What the United Nations always conceded, however, was that it would apply the "spirit and principles of IHL". The United Nations has of course always said that it goes without saying that we will respect the fundamental content of IHL, in other words, they will never do things that would be "cowardly", but they are not bound by the letter, but they are always correct. It must be said that they have always been from the point of view of IHL. This old doctrine is over. It is understandable somewhere if we have a historical antenna in the sense that at the time it was the Cold War and all these IHL issues were very sensitive and highly politicized and that the United Nations was trying to stay away.

Henceforth, the United Nations, like a whole series of other organizations, has subsequently accepted the application of IHL, and has even accepted it in the Secretary-General's bulletin, which is only an expression of this, the 1999 circular concerning the applicability of IHL to United Nations forces, a peacekeeping operation. This circular can be found in the 1999 International Review of the Red Cross or on the ICRC website.

The principle is now accepted, international organizations can and are bound by IHL, they may not be able to apply all the provisions, but it will be necessary to see in customary law what it means exactly for them to be bound by IHL, but all the fundamental rules, they agree to apply them as such and the most important ones with some gaps, are found in the circular.

=== Armed groups ===
It is clear that a whole series of rules of the law of armed conflict must be applied by armed groups, particularly in non-international armed conflicts. In a non-international armed conflict, the government faces armed groups, rebels. Knowing how the government can be bound is not a difficult question, especially since States ratify the conventions, but knowing how an armed group can be bound is more complicated.

In this respect, a fairly careful distinction must be made between conventional and customary law.

With regard to customary law, the explanation of how an armed group can be linked is not too complicated. The rule that every participant in an armed conflict is automatically bound by it must be applied and it is concluded that the armed group as a group participating in an armed conflict, in other words, as a belligerent group, is bound under customary law by the referring rules, which means that the manifest practice is that groups apply these rules and States accept this application on a reciprocal basis. This easy-to-understand rule has been expressed in a variety of sources, including the so-called Šahoviæ resolution of the Institute of International Law, which is a resolution on the applicability of IHL and human rights law in armed conflicts involving non-state entities. This is a 1999 resolution in which, particularly in Article 4, the above principle is expressed in a particularly clear but also broad way, since it concerns not only IHL but also human rights law. What this resolution posits as an expression of customary law, the resolution does not say "I invent this", it is based on practice, is that armed groups are also bound by certain customary provisions of human rights law. This does not really pose many problems, plus the content of the customary rules, which is difficult to determine, but the very fact that armed groups are bound by these rules does not pose a problem and is fairly easily understood. What is more complicated is to express why one or more armed groups are bound by treaty provisions. Because, obviously, these groups must be bound by treaty provisions, otherwise, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well as the entire Additional Protocol 2, would not make sense. These provisions must apply between a government and armed groups, rebel groups. If we cannot ask rebel groups to apply these treaty rules, all these conventions fall, because a government cannot apply them to itself, there is no treaty for itself or if there are contracts with itself.

An explanation had to be found and it is not legally very simple. The explanation that has the most credit is the Pictet explanation since the first one who exposed it with a certain bravery was Jean Pictet whose comments to the Geneva Conventions of the 1950s. Pictet, as we do not always say, has varied a little bit. If we look at the comments, we won't find exactly the same explanation, there are small variations.

The explanation is as follows: when a State ratifies or accedes to the Geneva Conventions known as the "Pictet", these conventions are applicable throughout its territory. In other words, it is not only engaging itself in inter-State relations, which it certainly does, but not only, it is also engaging all persons on its territory, since it is necessary for it to do so in order for the conventions to apply to armed groups at the time when those conventions become applicable on its territory normally with the publication of those conventions in the official series. In other words, ratification or accession to the IHL Convention would have a twofold effect: It is true that the conventions are applicable between States, and this also applies to Additional Protocol II, since other States may request compliance with Protocol II from a State at fault - the inter-State dimension does not disappear - but there would also be an inter-State dimension in the territory of the State in question, each person and in particular each national of that State being bound by the Geneva Conventions, a law applicable in the territory of the States in question, i. e. States that have ratified or acceded. The discussion on this issue may not be as important practically as it is in theory, and that is why, since IHL is mainly about practical problems to be dealt with, and the theoretical issues become a little blunt. This is above all a practical question and not really a major legal question because, if we take Additional Protocol II, we still have no idea that armed groups, barefoot groups that have formed into armed groups and of which some of the members may be illiterate, we should not imagine that they are familiar with Additional Protocol II and they will not be familiar with the Geneva Conventions either, they will not have heard about these conventions. That is why it is all very well to say that all this applies automatically on the territory and that as soon as an armed group is formed, the persons constituting that armed group are bound by the Geneva Conventions or Protocol II, etc., and legally, this explanation is undoubtedly sufficient, it is possible to sanction it criminally if they commit war crimes. But if we really want to enforce the rules of IHL, we would have to go to these people and tell them that as an armed group they are not supposed to ignore Article 3 and the Geneva Conventions. It is the ICRC delegate who, in most cases, will do the job, go to these groups and publicize these rules, and it is there that these groups will learn that these rules exist and that it is practically through a declaration of membership of this group that things will be done. As soon as these groups say that they want to respect these conventions and generally they want to respect them, for them it is a political issue, they want to take over the government, they want to secede, they want to be respectable; to say that they apply the Geneva Conventions is very exciting for a secessionist movement or for an armed group because they already feel like a quasi-state and on that it is possible to play, it is possible to flatter self-esteem. Basically, we must reach out to these people and get them to adhere to these texts, already by making them aware of their existence. Without this, there is the Pictet theory on how to legally bind these people and to enforce the law, we must go beyond that.

=== Individuals ===
By "individual" we mean private persons who act in a private capacity and not individuals who act as agents of the State as military commanders, for example. Because when individuals act as agents of the state, they commit the state. Private individuals are also captured by IHL, although this is traditionally more limited except perhaps currently with private military companies.

Individuals within the meaning of international law are multiple entities and not just the individuals we all are. Of course, that too, but not only. Commercial companies, i.e. legal persons of all types, are also from the point of view of the DIP of individuals because they are simply private actors.

In relatively short terms, it has been considered for some time now that private individuals are also subject to IHL and the clearest expression of this trend can be found in criminal law trials. Thus already in Nuremberg following the Second World War, a whole series of individuals were tried who were not agents of the State, but private personalities. The most famous of them are important entrepreneurs in Germany, for example in the metal industry, industrialists such as Mr. Krupp or the managers of IG Farben and others. These people were tried by the American tribunal in Nuremberg, some of them by the International Military Tribunal. In Mr. Krupp's context, Mr. Krupp's industries had received a whole series of prisoners of war, in principle protected by the 1929 Geneva Convention, and these people were subjected to extremely hard work with very little food and, if any, with deaths and no medical treatment because in the end one could always replace people with others and therefore why bother. The same is true of more recent criminal trials, where businessmen may have been convicted of IHL violations by the Rwanda Tribunal.

The main problem from the legal point of view since we have towards these atomized individuals and because they do not come into contact so often with IHL. People like us obviously act every day and do a lot of things during an armed conflict, it is possible to steal also during an armed conflict, to kill people during an armed conflict; it is rather rare for individuals to have a sufficient connection with an armed conflict when they commit these crimes because they normally act in a private capacity and this does not bring them into the fold of IHL. Anyone who murdered another during an armed conflict did not commit a violation of IHL, but more normally a violation of the Criminal Code. It is therefore necessary to establish a link with the cause of a party to the conflict. If you take a rifle and kill an enemy soldier, there is obviously a link to the armed conflict with the cause of a belligerent, and that's what makes these cases relatively rare, because people who take a rifle and fight against the other side are normally part of armed groups, so we come back to a square that is different from the one we're dealing with here. But there are cases where the question of the "nexus" as the courts say is quite delicate, that is, if the person is acting on behalf of a belligerent, there are different tests here that are in the criminal law. In any case, these trials show us indirectly that these IHL rules are applicable, because otherwise there would be no war crime - war crimes are nothing more than violations of the law of armed conflict. If the law of armed conflict did not apply to these individuals, then they could not commit war crimes and could not have been convicted of such war crimes.

Last but not least, the special category of private military companies remains. This is now an important issue on which the literature is beginning to abound. These companies are therefore individuals from the point of view of legal analysis: private entities. As long as they commit acts that are related to the law of armed conflict, they are bound by the law of armed conflict and in particular their members, the physical individuals who act for them are bound. And Contracting States, such as the Geneva Convention, have an obligation to ensure that all entities on their territory comply with the principles of the law of armed conflict. This is one of the objectives of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. It is because the State undertakes the obligation not to respect the Geneva Conventions, but also to ensure compliance, and this means first of all by entities on its own territory. The doctrine today is in ecstasy before Article 1 for other reasons, always seeing the external aspect in it, and it believes it can say that third States should have to request compliance with the Geneva Conventions when they are not respected, but the original meaning of Article 1 was to say that the State undertakes an obligation also towards other entities on its territory to ensure that they will respect IHL in the event that it should have contact with IHL, which is clearly the case of private military companies.

The problem is somewhat the same as the one mentioned above with regard to armed groups. It is possible to say that private military companies are and that the individuals who work for them are bound, but not much is gained because if these people know almost nothing about IHL, we will not have made much progress. That is why, in order to facilitate the task of these States in controlling these companies, to facilitate their legislative task, but also to make IHL obligations known, there is a whole series of processes and in particular much talk about the Interlaken process because Switzerland has been at the forefront. These are processes of integration, participation and collaboration so that all actors come together and try to improve compliance with IHL and ensure that its cause can be heard.

The other problem with these companies is that they tend to blur the principle of distinguishing between what is military on the one hand and what is civilian on the other, and this is obviously a serious problem. But this is obviously a material problem.

== Extension of the conventional scope of application by special agreements ==

Comment est-ce que des entités peuvent étendre le domaine des obligations de DIH qui leur sont applicables ? Parfois, le DIH applicable juridiquement à telle ou telle entité reste en deçà des règles qui pourraient raisonnablement s’appliquer au conflit en question. Dans un conflit armé non international par exemple, il n’y a pas de statut de prisonnier de guerre, donc pas d’obligation spécifique de traiter les personnes capturées d’une certaine manière sauf des obligations élémentaires de ne pas torturer et ainsi de suite. Le droit prévoit toutefois d’étendre les obligations assumées et notamment par des accords particuliers. En d’autres termes, comment les acteurs de DIH peuvent-ils aller au-delà du DIH applicable ex lege, comment peuvent-ils assumer les obligations supplémentaires d’appliquer des règles qui normalement sur la base strictement juridique ne sont pas applicables, mais que ces acteurs peuvent vouloir appliquer de leur libre gré. Quels sont ces mécanismes pour leur faciliter cette extension des obligations applicables ?

Il y a deux mécanismes que nous devons brièvement considérer en la matière. Le premier est inscrit dans l’article 2§3 des conventions de Genève qui est un article commun à toutes les conventions. Le deuxième mécanisme est inscrit à l’article 3§3 des conventions des Genève qui est également une disposition commune. L’article 2 § 3 est en principe pour des conflits armés internationaux, et l’article 3§3 est pour des confits non internationaux.

L’article 2 § 3 à deux phrases : « Si l’une des Puissances en conflit n’est pas partie à la présente Convention, les Puissances parties à celle-ci resteront néanmoins liées par elle dans leurs rapports réciproques. Elles seront liées en outre par la Convention envers ladite Puissance, si celle-ci en accepte et en applique les dispositions ». Ce qui nous intéresse est la deuxième phrase, mais la première mérite une explication. Si nous sommes fort en droit des traités, nous aurions compris qu’en principe à ce qu’à quoi on pourrait légitimement s’attendre est que la première phrase est superflu, car même si on ne l’avait pas écrite, le résultat serait le même en droit des traités. Le problème est que la réglementation dans le droit des conflits anciens comme le règlement de La Haye notamment était différent et notamment il y avait une lex speciali en la matière à l’époque qui se répartissait du droit général des traités et ce droit spécial ancien a été répudié dans les conventions de Genève dans la première phrase de l’article 2§3 et d’ailleurs les conventions de 1929 l’avaient répudiée et la convention de Genève de 1949 confirme l’orientation.

De quoi s’agit-il ? C’était l’ancien problème de la clause dite « si omnes ». Le droit spécial d’avant 1949 et 1929 aussi était le droit autour de la cause dite « si omnes » qui veut dire « si tous ». La formule est brève est veut signifier « si tous sont liés par une convention ». Le contenu de cette clause était de dire que s’il y avait un conflit armé, une convention prenant le règlement de La Haye s’appliquait tant que tous les États partie au conflit armé en question étaient aussi liés par le règlement de La Haye. Donc, il y a un conflit qui commence entre cinq États qui se font la guerre groupée par coalition, tous les cinq États sont partie au règlement de La Haye et celui-ci s’applique dans les relations entre tous les États. Supposons qu’un sixième État entre dans le conflit et que ce sixième État ne soit pas lié par le règlement de La Haye. À ce moment-là on traite en opération la clause si omnes, qui disait que dans ce cas, non seulement on n’appliquait pas le règlement de La Haye entre les parties au règlement et le sixième État qui n’était pas partie — cela est normal et cela est du droit des traités — mais qu’en plus, on arrêtait d’appliquer le règlement de La Haye même entre les États qui étaient liés, c’est-à-dire les cinq. La raison de cette clause particulière était les nécessités militaires. On considérait que ces États, les cinq, seraient placés dans une position plus défavorable s’ils devaient appliquer le règlement de La Haye par rapport au sixième État qui lui aurait plus de liberté puisqu’il n’a pas accepté les restrictions conventionnelles. Cela apporterait donc une inégalité de traitement entre les belligérants en donnant en plus une incitation à ne pas ratifier des conventions parce qu’évidemment si l’on sait que dans le cas où un État qui n’est pas partie participe à un conflit armé à plus de liberté qu’un autre, alors on peut hésiter à ratifier une convention pour assumer un désavantage militaire. Or, il s’est avéré déjà pendant la Première Guerre mondiale que ce principe n’était pas praticable, que dans un conflit mondial comme la Première Guerre mondiale justement, il y aurait fatalement un État ou un autre qui ne serait pas lié par le règlement de La Haye. Et arrêter de l’appliquer juste dans le cas où il y a plus besoin de l’appliquer, le règlement de La Haye contenait à l’époque des dispositions sur les prisonniers de guerre et il n’y en avait pas d’autres en 1907. Cela était quand même fâcheux de se dire que dans ce cas on ne l’applique pas parce que cela veut dire que dans les gros conflits là où cela est le plus nécessaire d’appliquer ces conventions, on ne serait jamais ne mesure de les appliquer. C’est la raison pour laquelle après l’entrée en conflit du Monténégro qui n’était pas lié par le règlement de La Haye, les autres États ont décidé de toute de même continuer à appliquer le règlement de La Haye et c’est à partir de ce moment-là où la clause si omnes à déclinée jusqu’à ce qu’on l’eût répudié en 1929 et ensuite surtout en 1949 et on n’en trouve la trace dans l’article 2 § 1. On retrouve d’ailleurs cette disposition dans les articles sur la dénonciation des conventions de Genève.

À l’article 2§3, il est dit que ces puissances qui sont donc liées par la convention « seront liées en outre par la Convention envers ladite Puissance, si celle-ci en accepte et en applique les dispositions ». Donc, il suffit que le sixième État accepte d’appliquer les conventions de Genève par quelque moyen que ce soit, cela peut-être par déclaration, par une note verbale, accepte d’appliquer et applique les conventions de Genève et celles-ci sont applicables. Là encore, il s’agit d’une règle qui est unique dans le droit des traités. Il n’y a pas besoin de ratifier où d’adhérer à une convention pour que celle-ci nous soit applicable évidemment si on y a consenti.

D’une certaine manière, un État tiers assume tous les droits et les obligations de la convention de Genève sans ni la ratifier ni y adhérer. On y voit là le signe d’une volonté du législateur de Genève de rendre applicable le DIH le plus facilement possible sans formalisme et sans difficulté si seulement un État est prêt d’accepter à l’appliquer. On peut se demander pourquoi ne ratifie-t-il pas tout simplement ou pourquoi d’adhère-t-il pas aux conventions de Genève, cela serait plus facile. Il peut arriver que des États hésitent à se lier par ces conventions pour l’avenir pour des raisons politiques diverses et varier. On ne souhaite pas leur fermer la porte pour ce qui est de l’applicabilité des règles contenues dans la convention, il leur suffira à ce moment-là de déclarer qu’ils acceptent d’appliquer la convention dans tel ou tel conflit armé en cours pour que s’installe une obligation réciproque entre les parties à la convention de Genève et cet État tiers et qui reste État tiers et pourtant n’est plus entièrement tiers parce qu’il a accepté pour un conflit armé ou pour un laps de temps à appliquer les conventions. Ce mécanisme est général, il est possible de l’appliquer aussi à d’autres conventions de DIH et notamment les protocoles.

En plus, il est possible non seulement de rendre applicables les conventions de Genève, mais d’aller plus loin encore si on le souhaite bien entendu et c’est là le domaine des accords spéciaux à l’article 6, 6, 6 et 7 des quatre conventions de Genève. Dans ces dispositions, il y est écrit que les belligérants peuvent se mettre d’accord d’appliquer toute règle supplémentaire qu’il voudrait dans leur rapport réciproque. Ce seraient des règles qui iraient au-delà de ce qui est prévu dans les conventions de Genève ou qui répondent à des sollicitations qui se trouvent dans les conventions de Genève. Dans la convention de Genève III relative aux prisonniers de guerre, il y a une sollicitation aux États belligérants de considérer favorablement le transfert des prisonniers de guerre dans les États neutres. On sollicite les États, ils peuvent conclure des accords en ce sens s’ils le veulent.

Il y a donc ces deux mécanismes : 2 § 3 et 6, 6, 6, 7 pour ce qui est des conflits armés internationaux. Il y a le deuxième grand mécanisme qui est l’article 3§3 pour les conflits armés non internationaux en principe.

En 1949, mais encore aujourd’hui assez largement, mais toutefois moins dramatiquement qu’en 1949 ; en 1949, lors de l’adoption des conventions de Genève, le droit des conflits armés non internationaux était, pour peu dire, dans ses « couches culottes ». Il n’y avait que l’article 3 et l’article 3 contient fort peu. Les rédacteurs des conventions de Genève étaient donc conscients qu’ils avaient laissé beaucoup plus de lacunes et c’est peu dire qu’ils n’avaient réglementé le CANI. Et, par conséquent, afin de pallier ces insuffisances qu’il avait fallu laisser puisque les États n’avaient pas été d’accord d’aller plus loin, il y a une invitation dans le troisième paragraphe de l’article 3 d’aller au-delà du droit applicable dans l’article 3 et d’assumer d’autres obligations par des accords : par des accords spéciaux exactement comme prévu dans l’article 6, 6, 6, 7, mais on le répète ici au sein de l’article 3 parce que pour le conflit armé non international cela était particulièrement urgent et que donc, on a pensé qu’il était utile de rappeler cette sollicitation dans cette disposition. Donc, on a opportunément rappelé la chose dans l’article 3 § 3.

Cette sollicitation est pratiquement des plus importantes dans le sens où beaucoup d’accords ont été conclus dans des conflits armés non internationaux dans lesquels on s’est mis d’accord entre belligérants à appliquer tel tout le pan du droit des conflits armés qui n’aurait pas été automatiquement applicable, mais que les parties belligérantes sur une base de réciprocité voyaient d’un bon œil évidemment sous sollicitation du CICR.

Il y a, pour prendre un ancien exemple, la guerre civile au Yémen en 1962. Un accord spécial a pu être conclu entre les parties au conflit, gouvernement d’un côté et rebelle de l’autre, qui prévoyait d’une manière vague il est vrai, mais néanmoins non inintéressante, le respect des dispositions essentielles des conventions de Genève au-delà de l’article 3. Les parties n’ont pas été prêtes à accepter quelque chose de plus concret, de plus précis, mais ce qui est évident est qu’elles ont été au-delà de l’article 3. Toutes les grandes dispositions, toutes les dispositions importantes de protection des conventions de Genève ont été acceptées par elle à travers cet accord spécial.

Un autre exemple intéressant est celui de l’ancienne Yougoslavie avec la guerre de Bosnie en 1962. Les parties belligérantes se sont mis d’accord d’appliquer toute une série de conventions dont d’ailleurs les protocoles additionnels entre chacune d’entre elles, dans un conflit armé qui était de caractère mixte par ailleurs, mais relativement complexe, cet accord spécial a permis au tribunal pénal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie de s’en sortir parfois facilement là où autrement il aurait eu beaucoup de difficultés interprétatives. Car il a pu parfois dire qu’il n’était pas particulièrement nécessaire qu’il se plonge davantage dans la question de savoir si tel ou tel acte de belligérance avait été commis sur le territoire bosniaque dans le contexte d’un CAI ou dans le contexte d’un CANI parce que tout simplement, les parties belligérantes avaient accepté d’appliquer intégralement le protocole additionnel premier et que donc elle s’était juridiquement liée à cela par leur accord spécial — l’accord spécial étant une espèce d’accord collatéral.

En dernier lieu, un exemple qui ne touche pas au conflit armé non international, parfois on ne distingue pas nécessairement très proprement les accords spéciaux article 3 § 3 et les accords spéciaux articles 6, 6, 6, 7 ; même des juristes du CICR hésitent parfois, le professeur Kolb ayant fait remarquer une fois à ses collègues qu’il lui parlait d’un accord spécial sous l’article 3 § 3 et que c’était un conflit armé non international lui faisant remarquer sa minutie de juriste universitaire. C’est un joli exemple. Il y a une guerre israélo-arabe, regrettablement il y en a eu beaucoup, ici nous parlons de celle de 1973. Or dans ce conflit, les parties au conflit, à savoir l’État d’Israël et les États arabes, ont accepté par un accord spécial d’appliquer les règles sur la protection de la population civile contenue dans ce qu’aujourd’hui nous appelons le protocole additionnel I, donc les articles 48 et suivants. Pourquoi cet exemple est remarquable ? C’est parce que nous nous situons en 1973 et que le protocole additionnel I est adopté en 1977. Ce qui signifie donc que les parties se sont mises d’accord non pas d’appliquer des règles contenues dans une convention déjà conclue, mais se sont mises d’accord d’appliquer des règles qui étaient à l’époque dans le projet du CICR donc des règles non applicables juridiquement, pas abouties encore, un projet législatif, or ils ont jugé que ce projet législatif était bon se mettant d’accord pour l’appliquer. Cela montre que les parties sont entièrement libres de bricoler des règles qui leur conviennent ou d’en reprendre et le CICR peut aussi leur proposer toute sorte de services normatifs, leur proposer par exemple des projets d’accords pour que les parties puissent y trouver leur compte, les modifier peut-être partiellement et les adopter.

= L’applicabilité ratione loci =

L’applicabilité spatiale n’est pas d’une complication énorme, quelques questions pointues, mais dans lesquelles nous allons entrer à peine. Le principe général en matière d’applicabilité spatiale tranche quelque part sur le principe général en matière de droit de l’homme est que s’applique avant tout le principe d’effectivité, à savoir que le droit des conflits armés n’est pas territorialement limité, mais qu’il s’applique partout où il y a des situations couvertes par le droit des conflits armés. Cela soulève la question de savoir quels sont les espaces où il peut y avoir des situations juridiques couvert par le droit des conflits armés.

== Le théâtre de la guerre  ==

Le principe d’effectivité est là où il y a des situations couvertes par le droit des conflits armés est où celui s’applique. Ce que cela signifie concrètement est comme suit : tout d’abord, le DIH s’applique sur l’ensemble du territoire des belligérants, plusieurs lorsqu’il y a un conflit international, éventuellement un seul quand il y a un conflit armé non international. Il faut remarquer que le droit des conflits armés s’applique sur l’ensemble des territoires des parties belligérantes même là où il n’y a pas de combat. La raison en est que, si on prend un conflit armé international, il y a des civils ennemis à protéger où qu’ils soient sur le territoire, il ne faut pas confondre l’applicabilité du DIH avec la seule applicabilité du droit de La Haye, moyens et méthodes de guerre, conduite des hostilités, où il est évident que ces règles seront appliquées là où il y a des hostilités et non pas dans les parties du territoire où il n’y a pas les hostilités ; mais le DIH est plus large. On sait aussi que dans différentes parties du territoire, il peut y avoir différents types de conflit armé international, armé non international, mais cela n’est rien de nouveau. Il n’en demeure pas moins que c’est sur l’ensemble des territoires de belligérants que s’applique al DIH. Ensuite, il s’applique partout où il y a de fait des combats ou des situations le mettant en jeu donc par exemple sur la mer, à savoir la haute mer. La haute mer n’est pas sous la souveraineté d’un État, mais on peut y faire des actes de belligérance étant couvert par la liberté de la haute mer, on peut donc y attaquer des navires de guerre de l’État adverse est pratiquer le contrôle vis-à-vis de navires battons des pavillons divers d’ailleurs, notamment pour ce qui est du contrôle de la contrebande. Il faut dire que ces règles ont aujourd’hui, à savoir la contrebande, beaucoup moins d’importance qu’au XIXème siècle où il y avait une pratique et une littérature extrêmement riche — que le professeur Kolb trouve passionnante, à savoir la contrebande et la contrebande de guerre.

Il y a aussi l’applicabilité du droit des conflits armés dans des zones où il n’y a pas de combat, mais simplement des situations donnant lieu à l’applicabilité du DIH comme l’occupation. Avec l’occupation d’un territoire, il n’y a plus d’hostilité dans la phase d’occupation ou alors très peu d’hostilité, mais il y a la situation d’occupation de guerre reconnue par le DIH comme donnant lieu à une applicabilité de certaines de ces règles, en l’occurrence celles sur l’occupation du territoire.

Il faut remarquer qu’il n’y a aucune limite spatiale parce que les activités belligérantes peuvent avoir lieu n’importe où et c’est la raison pour laquelle si nous devions avoir des activités militaires confrontatives donc donnant lieu à un conflit armé dans l’espace extraatmosphérique, il y aurait automatiquement l’applicabilité de ces conventions. Est-ce qu’elles seraient bien faites afin de régir des activités guerrières spatiales, cela est une autre question. Probablement faudra-t-il prévoir par exemple vaisseaux-hôpitaux plutôt que des navires-hôpitaux parce qu’on ne pourrait appliquer cela que par analogie à l’espace extraatmosphérique, sans doute faudra-t-il à ce moment-là une autre convention sur la guerre spatiale qui soit plus spécifique et qui réponde aux besoins particuliers. Bornons-nous à noter que pour l’instant, forte heureusement, il n’y a pas de conflits armés même internationaux qui s’étendent même de manière significative dans l’espace. Il y a bien évidemment du matériel militaire dans l’espace, mais pas d’hostilité ou d’actes tombants sur le DIH pour l’instant.

== Les zones à régime spécial ==

Il faut savoir qu’il y a des zones qui sont couvertes par un régime spécial, soit plus intense du point de vue du DIH soit moins intense d’une certaine manière. Il y a certaines zones qui sont par exemple des zones sanitaires signalées par la Croix Rouge ou le Croissant Rouge, des zones donc où l’on recueille des malades et où on le prodigue les premiers voire mêmes les seconds est troisièmes soins. Ces zones sont agréées par les belligérants et elles sont spatiales en cela qu’elles sont en principe immunisées contre l’attaque. Il y a donc certaines zones où il y a une immunité contre l’attaque ce qui est un renforcement de la protection du point de vue du DIH. C’est une zone où le DIH s’applique spécialement dans le sens qu’il interdit des attaques. Précision que le principe de l’immunité contre l’attaque n’est bien entendu pas absolu, s’il y a des actes d’hostilité qui sont faits à partir d’une zone sanitaire, il est possible de l’attaquer.

Dans le sens contraire, il y a aussi des zones où le DIH s’applique évidemment, mais où on l’encourt des risques particuliers s’y on y pénètre. Un exemple est des zones minées. Les belligérants peuvent utiliser des mines, les mines antipersonnelles sont prohibées par la convention d’Oslo – Ottawa, mais il y a d’autres types de mines qui peuvent être utilisées et notamment des mines anti véhicules. Des champs minés sont signalés comme champs minés ; ce n’est rien de particulier du point de vue du DIH, c’est simplement que si on y pénétrait avec des véhicules, il y a des risques supplémentaires dans une zone de ce genre puisque la partie a exercé une faculté que lui laisse le DIH. La même chose serait vraie pour les zones de combat maritime. Il est plutôt rare aujourd’hui que nous ayons de grandes batailles maritimes, mais lors de la guerre Falkland/Malwine en 1982, il y a eu encore des opérations navales importantes. Il y a eu des zones de combats, c’est-à-dire des zones où les belligérants avaient signalé que dans telle ou telle zone il risquait d’y avoir des opérations miliaires entre les navires. Il est évident que dans ces zones de combats signalées comme telles, le DIH continue à s’appliquer. Par conséquent, s’y on y entre avec un navire civil, un belligérant n’a pas le droit de simplement attaquer et de couler le navire civil. Ceci étant, un peu comme avec les mines, s’y on pénètre dans la zone de combat dument communiqué à la navigation, on encourt des risques particuliers, car cela tir dans des zones de combats et puis si le navire civil est coulé évidemment sans être spécialement visé, c’est à nos risques et périls que nous y avons pénétré.

Un problème épineux est le problème actuel du scope of battlefield. Le problème a pris de l’essor avec la guerre contre le terrorisme. Certains États dans la guerre contre le terrorisme, notamment les États-Unis d’Amérique, mais ils ne sont pas les seuls, prétendent pouvoir attaquer des cibles notamment avec des drones dans des pays très divers comme le Yémen ou encore le Pakistan entre autres. Pour les questions de fait, les journalistes sont utiles, pour les questions de droit moins. Le problème est maintenant de savoir si le DIH s’applique, si en d’autres termes on l’exporte avec chaque drone qui frappe quelque part, est-ce qu’à ce moment-là, d’une certaine manière, des régions entières du monde, toute une partie de l’Afrique, toute la péninsule arabique, l’Afghanistan e le Pakistan, est-ce que toutes ces régions sont des régions de conflit armé. Peut-être, mais le problème est qu’il ne s’agit pas nécessairement de conflits armés internationaux parce que maintenant les États-Unis ne frappent pas les forces gouvernementales au Pakistan ou au Yémen ou autre, mais ils frappent des groupes armés, à savoir ce qu’on appelle des groupes terroristes. Par conséquent, on est dans une configuration de conflit armé non international, État contre groupe armé. Dans un conflit armé non international, il y a un critère d’intensité du conflit pour qu’il y ait un conflit armé non international. Par conséquent, il n’est pas toujours évident qu’on atteigne le seuil de l’intensité surtout dans des interprétations plus restrictives. Même si l’on applique ces critères et même si on a de la sympathie pour le cas La Tablada de la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme qui peut difficilement être considéré comme hostile au DIH, tout de même, La Tablada, attaque d’une base militaire avec des groupes armés sur une base parfaitement militaire avec des instruments de guerre et des combats extrêmement lourds à vrai dire pendant plus de 30 heures, ce n’est pas le cas d’une frappe avec un drone où l’on frappe en quelques secondes et une ou des personnes décèdent et c’est tout. Alors après surgit la question de savoir si l’on peut cumuler des actes multiples. Mais même si on les cumule, ce sont des actes sporadiques. Bref, il y a des problèmes de ce type afin de décider si le droit des conflits armés s’applique. S’il ne s’applique pas, ce qui n’est pas impossible, il reste le droit des droits de l’homme et c’est la raison pour laquelle d’ailleurs on discute si souvent de la question de savoir si ces frappes de drones sont compatibles avec le droit des droits de l’homme. Avec le DIH cela serait plus facile de les rendre compatibles parce que la liberté de tuer en DIH est quand même plus grande que dans le droit des droits de l’homme. Pour ce qui est du droit des droits de l’homme, cela est d’un autre ressort et nous devons discuter de DIH dans ce cours.

La dernière remarque en matière d’applicabilité ratione loci, est la question de savoir dans quelle mesure le droit des conflits armés lorsqu’il s’applique sur un espace y élimine l’applicabilité parallèle du droit de la paix. La réponse à cette question est que si dans un certain territoire on a un confit armé et par conséquent le droit des confits armés s’appliquent, cela ne signifie pas que le droit de la paix ne s’applique plus. En réalité, c’est plutôt une superposition de régimes juridiques. Il y a le droit de la paix qui continue de s’appliquer aux relations pacifiques entre les États comme la diplomatie – il arrive qu’il y ait encore des missions diplomatiques avec des États mêmes avec lesquelles on est en conflit armé, cela se comprend même assez bien parce qu’il faut aussi parler avec ses ennemis, et « parler » dire mission diplomatique. Il y a en tout cas des missions diplomatiques itinérantes et il est tout à fait évident qu’à ces missions diplomatiques s’applique le droit de la paix, à savoir le droit des relations diplomatiques tel que codifié notamment dans la convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques de 1961.

L’état de conflit armé a aussi un impact sur les traités. Il y a par exemple des traités qui sont suspendus, voire terminés lors de l’éclatement du conflit armé. Un traité qui est typiquement considéré comme terminé est une alliance, cela est vraiment très incompatible entre les États en état de conflit armé étant anciennement des États alliés ; il y en a d’autres qui sont suspendus comme des traités de commerce par exemple ; il y en a d’autres qui s’appliquent en revanche. Évidemment, tout le droit des conflits armés s’applique quand il y a un conflit armé. Il y a toute une doctrine sur la question de savoir comment le conflit armé interagit avec les traités conclus par les États. Bien sûr, il faut distinguer aussi entre les traités bilatéraux et multilatéraux. La commission du droit international a à l’étude ce sujet de l’impact de la guerre sur les traités et donc on peut lire dans la littérature ou regarder sur le site de la commission internationale — le rapporteur sur ce sujet, monsieur Brownlie, est décédé d’un accident de voiture et donc d’une certaine manière il s’est occupé de la violence et de l’impact de la violence sur les traités ne lui portant pas chance.

= L’applicabilité ratione temporis  =

L’applicabilité ratione temporis est l’applicabilité temporelle du droit des conflits armés. La question est ici de savoir à partir de quel moment s’applique ce droit et jusqu’à quel moment il s’applique.

== Le début de l’applicabilité  ==

Le début d’application est relativement simple, sauf dans deux cas qui sont toujours les troubles faits. Le principe simple est que le début d’application du droit des conflits armés se confond avec les différents seuils matériels d’applicabilité du droit. Nous avons défini ce qu’est un conflit armé et donc, dès le premier acte d’hostilité s’applique du DIH. Il y a un seuil d’entrée et de déclaration de guerre : dès la déclaration de guerre qui est un ace proclamé, il est possible de le dater très exactement, s’applique le droit de conflits armés. Pour ce qui est de l’occupation, il en va autrement.

Quels sont les cas un peu plus compliqués ? Il y en a deux.

D’abord l’occupation de guerre. Il n’est pas si évident de définir quand une occupation de guerre commence pour la simple et bonne raison que l’établissement d’une occupation est un acte graduel. Ce qu’il y a lors d’une occupation est d’abord l’invasion. Il y a une phase d’invasion, ensuite une consolidation de l’invasion et un établissement de l’occupation, mais tout cela se fait graduellement et c’est la raison pour laquelle il n’est pas si évident de dire que maintenant le territoire est occupé. L’invasion est lorsque le premier char, le premier militaire pénètre sur le territoire. Après, à un moment donné, lorsque la résistance ennemie est brisée, donc il n’y a plus d’acte de belligérance sur une grande échelle, il peut néanmoins avoir quelques poches de résistances, mais plus tout au plus, et on établit le contrôle sur le territoire. Le signe extérieur le plus évident de tout cela est l’établissement d’une administration d’occupation. Au plus tard, au moment où l’administration est établie par la puissance occupante, au plus tard à ce moment, on est sûr qu’il y a une occupation du territoire. Nous allons voir que certaines dispositions s’appliquent déjà à la phase d’invasion. Avec l’occupation tout est très compliqué. Ce qui nous suffit est de rester conscient que la question de l’occupation est graduelle au début et que donc cela pose des problèmes supplémentaires afin de déterminer l’applicabilité.

Le deuxième cas qui est compliqué également, pour la même raison, parce que c’est un phénomène graduel, est celle du conflit armé non international où à cause de l’intensité requise, on est aussi confronté à une gradualité des situations, en tout cas le plus souvent, par conséquent, le début de l’application de ce droit pourra rarement être déterminé avec une ultime certitude, nous serons dans des fourchettes.

=== La fin générale des opérations militaires ===

Quand est-ce que le droit des conflits armés cesse de s’appliquer ? Il y a ici plusieurs hypothèses. La première est que ce droit cesse parce que les situations matérielles qui donnent lieu à son applicabilité cessent de leur côté. Donc, par exemple, dans un conflit armé international, si les deux États belligérants concluent une paix, séparée ou globale, le conflit armé est alors terminé et donc le droit des conflits armés n’a plus lieu de s’appliquer. Il faut aussi considérer une deuxième manière d’arriver à une terminaison, dit aussi « fin » ou « extinction ». Cette manière est tout simplement de dénoncer, donc de se retirer, de résilier une convention parce qu’une fois qu’on s’est retiré d’une convention, celle-ci ne sera plus applicable dans nos relations avec d’autres États. Il faut donc considérer les deux questions : cessation d’applicabilité parce que les faits matériels viennent à manquer ; mais aussi qu’en est-il de la dénonciation, peut-on dénoncer des conventions de droit des conflits armés, peut-on dénoncer les conventions de Genève, peut-on dénoncer les protocoles additionnels et si c’est le cas, quel est l’effet de cette dénonciation ?

Comment cesse de s’appliquer le droit des conflits armés parce que les situations qui ont donné lieu à son applicabilité disparaissent ? La règle fondamentale en la matière est que la terminaison d’applicabilité du DIH ne se fait pas à une seule date et en bloc, mais se fait par vagues successives en fonction des dispositions diverses. Donc, on sort par des paliers et à des instants échelonnés dans le temps.

Il y a trois portes de sorties que nous pouvons appeler d’objectives. Par cela, le professeur Kolb entend que les raisons matérielles disparaissent, contrairement aux raisons subjectives de terminer l’applicabilité du DIH, cela est typiquement la dénonciation.

Tout d’abord, dans l’objectif, dans la fin des situations donnant lieu à l’applicabilité, il y a, pour ce qui est du droit de La Haye en matière de conduite les hostilités, il y a la « fin générale des opérations militaires ». Cela fait au fond sens que de se dire que lorsque les opérations militaires, les opérations belligérantes sont terminées, alors, le droit de La Haye ne s’applique plus.

Il y a ensuite, pour le droit de Genève, qui a un seuil de terminaison différent, ce n’est pas la fin générale des opérations militaires pour le droit de Genève. Pour le droit de Genève, c’est plutôt la fin des détentions, des internements et au-delà d’ailleurs la restitution des biens. Et puis, comme toujours, l’occupation a encore un régime à part parce que l’occupation est véritablement compliquée et en rien ne se mélange-t-elle aux autres règles faisant quelque part bande à part, l’occupation est une prima done. En ce qui concerne la fin des opérations militaires, on trouve cette porte de sortie à l’article de la convention 4 de Genève répété à l’article 3.b du protocole additionnel I. Par analogie, on l’applique évidemment aussi dans les conflits armés non internationaux.

Que veut dire « fin générale des opérations militaires » ? Cela veut dire la cessation effective et définitive des hostilités. Et cela se fait normalement par un armistice général et qui soit évidemment définitif. C’est ce qui distingue l’armistice d’ailleurs des « cessez-le-feu » qui ne sont pas par essence définitifs. La conclusion d’un armistice n’est qu’une possibilité. Il y en a d’autres. Il peut y avoir une capitulation inconditionnelle et qui est donc par cela même définitive. Anciennement, il y avait aussi ce qu’on appelait la « debellation ». La debellation était anciennement la décapitation d’un État par l’effondrement de toutes les structures gouvernementales si bien que l’État vainqueur assumait le gouvernement de l’État et ensuite le territoire. C’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle aujourd’hui on ne parle plus de debellation puisqu’il n’y a plus le droit d’annexion. Mais anciennement, la « debellatio » était une des manières de faire cesser les opérations militaires par l’effondrement des structures gouvernementales de l’ennemi. On parle parfois de « quasi debellation » pour le cas de l’Allemagne à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale puisqu’il y a eu l’effondrement du gouvernement et les alliés ont bien assumé les fonctions gouvernementales pour l’Allemagne. La différence avec une debellation au sens juridique du terme est évidemment que les puissances alliées n’ont à aucun moment eu l’intention d’annexer le territoire allemand, tout au contraire.

La « fin générale des opérations militaires », le terme « général » était utilisé à bon escient parce qu’on signifie par cela que tant que les opérations militaires n’ont pas cessé, non seulement entre deux belligérants, mais aussi entre leurs alliés, on n’a pas une fin générale des opérations militaires, on n’a qu’une fin partielle des opérations militaires et le droit de La Haye a évidemment vocation à continuer à s’appliquer. Si on conclut un armistice comme la France par exemple lors de l’invasion allemande, mais que des alliés continuent à se battre comme, par exemple, le Royaume-Uni, il n’y a pas évidemment, une fin générale des opérations militaires.

=== La question des conventions de Genève ===

Le deuxième seuil de sortie est celui du droit de Genève donc notamment des conventions de Genève, des protocoles dans la mesure où les protocoles traitent du droit de Genève et non pas de la conduite des hostilités, la fin des détentions et des internements. C’est là l’objet des articles 5, 5, 5, 6 des conventions de Genève I à IV. Il est aisément compréhensible que tant qu’il reste des personnes détenues comme, par exemple, des prisonniers de guerre, celles-ci doivent être couvertes par la convention de Genève III s’agissant de prisonniers de guerre. Tant qu’il y a des civiles qui n’ont pas été libérées, la convention IV doit s’appliquer à leurs bénéfices. Il serait tout de même douteux que l’on dise que le droit de Genève s’arrête à la fin des opérations militaires donc avec l’armistice définitif, et dès ce moment-là, les prisonniers de guerre ne jouissent plus de protection sous la convention III, car il est évident qu’ils seront détenus encore pendant une certaine période.

La fin générale des opérations militaires est un acte, l’armistice, mais après il faut organiser tous les rapatriements, cela prend un certain temps ; cela serait quand même bizarre que les conventions ne s’appliquent et qu’on ne protège plus les prisonniers de guerre pendant cette période. Idem pour toutes les autres personnes protégées. C’est donc la raison pour laquelle ces conventions restent applicables aussi longtemps qu’il y a un prisonnier de guerre qui n’a pas été libéré, un seul blessé et malade qui est encore dans le contrôle de la partie adverse, un seul civil qui n’a pas encore libéré comme, par exemple, un civil détenu dans un camp comme à l’article 79 et suivants de la convention IV. Cela peut prendre des années. Dans la guerre Iran — Irak, c’est au début des années 2000 que les derniers prisonniers de guerre ont été libérés, semble-t-il, en tout cas les derniers. Le professeur Kolb ne sait pas si on peut parler de libérant, parlant plutôt des cercueils resitués, pourra on peut être dire. Cela signifie donc qu’un conflit armé peut durer encore très longtemps. On peut avoir encore pendant 20 ans ou 30 ans une applicabilité du droit de Genève à raison du conflit de 1967 s’il y a encore des personnes détenues ou des personnes dont on ne connaît pas le sort.

Les conventions de Genève traitent surtout des personnes protégées et elles ne contiennent pas spécifiquement de règles sur les biens, parfois oui, mais indirectement en parlant des biens qui appartiennent aux personnes protégées. Toutefois, il est évident aussi que tant que des biens qui doivent être restitués à leur propriétaire restent confisqués par la puissance adverse et que ces biens n’ont pas été remis, le droit de Genève reste également applicable. La commission Érythrée — Éthiopie nous l’a rappelé. Donc, si on réquisitionne des voitures et qu’on ne les a pas encore restitués aux propriétaires, si on enlève les objets personnels des prisonniers de guerre et notamment les objets qui peuvent être dangereux dans un camp de prisonnier de guerre, les armes personnelles par exemple, mais aussi des sommes d’argent trop importantes ou des valeurs trop importantes qui sont confisquées au moment où un prisonnier de guerre entre dans le camp de prison. C’est à restituer au moment de la libération. Tant que cela n’ait pas fait, il y a également les dispositions pertinentes qui continuent à s’appliquer tant que cette restitution n’a pas eu lieu. Voilà donc pour le seuil habituel des conventions de Genève échelonné dans le temps en fonction des libérations des personnes concernées.

=== L’occupation de guerre ===

En troisième lieu vient l’occupation de guerre. Il y a deux difficultés majeures dans la détermination de la fin du droit de l’occupation de guerre. La première a trait à la disparation du fait du fait de l’occupation en lui-même. Quand est-ce qu’une occupation se termine en tant que fait sur le terrain ? Il est facile de dire quand une personne est relâchée, c’est-à-dire quand elle n’est plus internée. Il n’est pas évident de dire quand un territoire n’est plus occupé. Mieux, il est évident de le dire dans certains cas, mais pas dans d’autres. Une deuxième difficulté nous vient de ce malencontreux article 6§3 de la Convention de Genève IV.

==== Déterminer quand le fait de l’occupation arrive à son terme ====

La première série de problèmes est de déterminer quand le fait de l’occupation arrive à son terme. Le cas classique est le seul cas simple est que l’armée ayant envahie le territoire est s’y étant installée se retire. À ce moment-là, l’occupation cesse par évacuation du territoire occupé. Cela correspond à peu près au cas de figure de la fin des internements et des détentions pour ce qui concerne les personnes. Mais maintenant viennent les cas plus compliqués.

On sait que l’occupation de guerre suppose une présence hostile. Quand est-il donc si une puissance occupante reste sur le territoire occupé, mais qu’elle argumente que désormais, elle n’y est pas en tant que puissance hostile, mais sur invitation du nouveau gouvernement du territoire occupé qui souhaite que l’ancien occupant reste sur son territoire. Si le consentement à rester sur le territoire octroyé par le gouvernement local à l’État occupant devait être pris juridiquement au sérieux, il en résulterait que l’occupation serrait terminée puisque l’occupation suppose une relation d’hostilité, et qu’au contraire, lorsque le gouvernement local habilité et invite une puissance étrangère à venir militairement sur le territoire, ce territoire n’est pas occupé, autrement le Mali devrait être un territoire occupé par la France depuis 2014, si ce n’est avant, mais ce qui n’est évidemment pas le cas.

La grande difficulté en la matière vient évidemment du point de déterminer quand est-ce que le gouvernement local peut librement donner son consentement à ce que l’occupant reste. Il est légitime de penser que ce gouvernement local qui ne peut en définitive jouir de sa place que suite à la bonne volonté de l’occupant soit trop dépendant de ce dernier pour exprimer librement une volonté. Dès lors, il y a dans l’histoire, régulièrement, des problèmes significatifs liés à la fin de l’occupation avec des argumentations divergentes. Un cas classique en est l’Irak, et encore aujourd’hui, les juristes ne savent exactement à quel moment l’occupation s’est terminée ; il y a bien une version officielle qui est le 27 Juin 2004 avec le départ de l’administration Bremer. Mais, le premier gouvernement d’Afghanistan avec la phase d’occupation étant tout sauf véritablement indépendant des Américains étant composé d’anciens agents de la CIA en grande partie et par conséquent, on peut franchement douter de son indépendance. Toujours est-il qu’en suite, il y a eu des élections libres et il y a eu un gouvernement afghan nouveau et qu’à partir de ce moment-là en tout cas, l’invitation pouvait légitimement être donnée. Peut-être avons-nous lu dans la presse que désormais, les Américains souhaitent s’en aller relativement vite d’Afghanistan et que c’est le gouvernement afghan qui les freine comme il peut. En mars 2015, le Premier ministre afghan était aux États-Unis afin de demander à ce que les États-Unis restent. Il faut également rappeler que l’Union soviétique argumentait dans les années 1950 que le Japon continuait à être occupé par les Américains, sauf qu’évidemment les Japonais souhaitent librement que les Américains restent parce qu’ils se sentaient de plus en plus encerclés par des pays communistes. En termes brefs, il y a à chaque fois des discussions sur la capacité juridique du gouvernement local à inviter les forces étrangères parce qu’on mettra en doute son indépendance réelle et donc la liberté de formuler cette invitation. Cela rend difficile la détermination du moment ou cesse l’occupation.

Deux autres cas de figure sont à signaler, n’étant pas du même acabit, mais tout de même. Il y a tout d’abord, la question jusqu’à présent encore assez théorique, de savoir si le Conseil de sécurité pourrait mettre fin à une occupation en déclarant tout simplement qu’elle est terminée. Il est vrai qu’on n’est pas passé trop loin de ce cas de figure dans la situation irakienne comme mentionnée en 2004 puisque la résolution 1546 du Conseil de sécurité prévoyait que cette occupation cesserait le 30 Juin 2004 qui était la date prévue où l’administration américaine Bremer devait se retirer et le nouveau gouvernement afghan prendre les rênes du pouvoir. Ensuite, le départ effectif a été le 27 Juin.

Est-ce que le Conseil de sécurité pourrait dans une résolution contraignante en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies déclarer qu’une certaine situation n’est plus une occupation de guerre et qu’elle cesse à telle date ou qu’elle n’a jamais était une occupation de guerre, et si jamais le Conseil de sécurité le faisait, est-ce que cette décision aurait priorité par rapport au DIH, en tout cas conventionnel, à cause de l’effet conjoint de l’effet des articles 25 et 103 de la charte et par rapport au droit coutumier du droit des conflits armés en vertu du principe de la lex speciali ?

La question reste posée et elle peut donner lieu à des débats très intéressants sur des limites du pouvoir du Conseil de sécurité : est-ce que le Conseil de sécurité est tenu de respecter le DIH, est-ce que le DIH forme une limite à ses pouvoirs qu’il ne serait outrepassé ; c’est un débat de juristes très intéressant. Toujours est-il que la question est compliquée si elle devait se présenter. Dans la résolution 1546, cela était dans le préambule et cela était comme un simple constat de fait, mais c’était là la simple description d’un fait anticipé. Le Conseil de sécurité n’a pas pris position sur cette question dans un paragraphe opérationnel. C’était un considérant du préambule. Si cela avait été inséré dans le corps de la résolution, nous aurions sans doute eu plus de discussions.

Signalons encore des situations telles que celles de Gaza. Les territoires occupés en Palestine sont particulièrement compliqués sur tous les points et en voici un très bel exemple. Gaza cesse d’être occupée depuis le retrait de l’armée israélienne et cela ne fait pas de doute. Si on n’occupe pas avec une présence physique un territoire alors on n’est pas occupant au sens classique du terme parce que toute une série d’obligation du droit de l’occupation ne peuvent pas être appliquée, elle suppose la présence physique sur le territoire. Quand on doit veiller à la vie civile, à l’hygiène, protéger les musées, on ne peut pas faire tout cela du dehors. Il n’en demeure pas moins que c’était anciennement un territoire occupé et qu’Israël a gardé à peu près un contrôle complet sur toutes les frontières de Gaza, il y a quelques corridors vers l’Égypte.

Dès lors, Gaza est complètement contrôlé vers l’extérieur par Israël sur la frontière commune et en mer par des zones d’exclusion, et on peut se poser la question de savoir si le droit de l’occupation ne devrait pas continuer à s’appliquer au moins sur certains points. Non pas toutes les dispositions évidemment, mais au moins par exemple les dispositions qui régissent la responsabilité de la puissance occupante pour l’approvisionnement du territoire occupé, car Israël maitrise tout de même très largement l’approvisionnement, ouvrir ou fermer la frontière. Faudrait-il donc continuer à appliquer au moins ces dispositions-là, l’occupation se continuerait-elle partiellement et fonctionnellement par rapport à certaines dispositions et pas à d’autres à cause du contrôle effectif des frontières ; la question a agité aussi la doctrine et des esprits, et comme nous pouvons l’imaginer, des réponses ne sont pas uniformes.

==== L’article 6 § 3 de la Convention de Genève IV ====

La deuxième serait de difficulté vient du malencontreux article 6§3 de la Convention de Genève IV. Cette disposition a été insérée en 1949 pour des raisons tout à fait adventis, à savoir à cause de l’occupation de l’Allemagne notamment et de toutes ses spécificités. Il y était prévu et il est toujours prévu dans cette disposition que le droit de l’occupation doit s’appliquer intégralement pendant une année après la fin générale des opérations militaires et que suite à l’écoulement de ce délai, seulement certaines dispositions de la convention continueraient à s’appliquer ; ce qui signifie à contrario que toutes les autres cessent de s’appliquer une année après la fin générale des opérations militaires si, bien entendu, le territoire est encore occupé.

C’est une branchette de dispositions qui doit s’appliquer si un territoire est occupé même au-delà de la limite temporelle d’une année après la fin des opérations militaires, les autres dispositions ne s’appliquent plus.

Le but de cette limitation était d’assurer aux puissances qui occupaient l’Allemagne une certaine liberté dans la gestion de cette situation très particulière où il s’agissait de reconstruire l’État. On a donc réservé notamment les grandes dispositions humanitaires. C’est-à-dire qu’on a plus ou moins rappelé que la puissance occupation même après une année suite à la fin des opérations militaires ne devrait pas faire de « saloperies » dans le territoire occupé précise le professeur Kolb, et donc on a inséré ces dispositions qui sont censées contenir les protections humanitaires les plus importantes. En revanche, du point de vue administratif, on voulait laisser plus de liberté à la puissance occupante.

Il faut ajouter que cette disposition singulière vient aussi de cette conception ancienne qui prévalait totalement en 1949, à savoir que l’occupation de guerre est une incidente de la guerre et qu’elle est appelée de cesser très rapidement après la fin des opérations militaires. En d’autres termes et plus simplement, on ne pensait pas qu’il y aurait des occupations prolongées. Il a fallu l’expérience des territoires occupés de Palestine pour qu’on se ravise et dans le protocole additionnel I, qu’on revienne en arrière et qu’on aligne de nouveau la fin du droit de l’occupation militaire sur ce qui était prévu à l’article 42 du règlement de La Haye et qui constitue encore aujourd’hui la règle coutumière, à savoir que le droit de l’occupation dure aussi longtemps que dure l’occupation. C’est la seule règle logique au fond. Il y a un droit de l’occupation et celui-ci doit s’applique aussi longtemps que le fait de l’occupation où lui-même persiste. Telle était la règle de l’article 42 du règlement de La Haye, telle est de nouveau la règle dans l’article 3.b du protocole additionnel I. Telle n’est pas la règle pour les parties à la convention de Genève IV en vertu de la disposition précédente.

Cela crée certaines difficultés juridiques. Pourquoi ? D’abord parce qu’il est évident que pour ce qui concerne les parties à la convention IV qui sont également parties au protocole additionnel I, pour ces États, dans leurs relations réciproques, prévaut la règle de l’article III du protocole additionnel I, donc l’ancienne règle : le droit de l’occupation dure aussi longtemps que dure l’occupation. La raison en est tout simplement la lex posteriori. Mais pour les États qui n’auraient ratifié que la convention IV et pas le protocole additionnel I, ce dernier n’est pas applicable dans leurs relations réciproques et dans leurs relations avec des États parties au protocole, ne s’applique que la règle de l’article 6 § 3. Alors se pose la question supplémentaire de savoir si cette règle a été abrogée par la pratique subséquente. Car, en effet, elle n’a jamais été invoquée cette règle depuis 1949. Même Israël ne l’a pas invoquée pour les territoires occupés en Palestine. Il faut bien dire qu’Israël se plaçait de toute manière du point de vue de la convention IV qui ne s’applique pas juridiquement et formellement, et donc, il aurait été mal venu de plaider que l’article 6§3 s’appliquait. Mais enfin, tout de même, ils ne l’ont pas invoqué. Le seul passage où l’on trouve une invocation est la Cour internationale de justice dans l’affaire du mur et elle cite en réalité l’article 6 sans approfondir la question de savoir qu’est-ce que vraiment encore applicable.

En d’autres termes, il y a donc la difficulté de savoir si le droit coutumier subséquent aurait abrogé par la pratique subséquente l’article 6 § 3. Là encore, les opinions divergent dans la doctrine. Le professeur Kolb a lui-même soutenu que l’article 6§3 n’était plus applicable. En 2015 il y croyait encore, et en réalité, il faut être honnête et dire qu’il y a aussi des visions différentes sur la question et que donc s’ouvre une certaine marge d’interprétation et de complexité en la matière, ce qui est mal venu.

Cela montre seulement une chose. Lorsqu’on légifère, il ne faut jamais le faire avec des cas particuliers en tête, notamment lorsque ces cas particuliers sont véritablement assez singuliers. On ne légifère pas avec l’Allemagne en tête, l’Allemagne occupée, on légifère en pensant à des catégories générales, car hard cases made that law.

== La fin objective de l’applicabilité : fin du conflit armé et/ou de la captivité ; problème des territoires occupés ==

« Résiliation » dirait-on dans un vocabulaire qui nous est un tout petit peu plus familier, sauf que « résiliation » est réservé à des contrats privés et que la dénonciation et le terme que l’on utilise pour les traités. Soit dit en passant, la dénonciation d’un traité n’a absolument rien à voir avec le fait de dénoncer quelque chose dans le sens d’attaquer quelqu’un parce qu’il aurait fait quelque chose de mal. Ce n’est pas J’accuse de Zola qui est ici en cause.

Est-ce qu’on peut dénoncer des conventions humanitaires comme les conventions de Genève par exemple ? Il ne faut pas approcher cette question de manière dogmatique, mais il faut l’approcher avec le droit des traités. Par approche dogmatique, on entend qu’on ne doit pas dire que ce sont des dispositions humanitaires donc, évidemment qu’on ne peut pas les dénoncer. C’est une erreur que certains étudiants font assez souvent et, d’après l’expérience de M. Kolb, plus souvent à Berne qu’à Genève. Il suppose que c’est parce qu’il y a beaucoup de classes de droit de l’homme à Berne, car ses collègues de Berne sont des spécialistes de droits de l’homme avec un raisonnement qui est « un tout petit peu tordu », parce que les gens croient qu’on vit dans un monde différent de celui dans lequel on est. Si on applique simplement le droit des traités, la première chose à faire est de regarder, de jeter un petit coup d’œil dans les conventions concernées afin de voir si elles ont des clauses expresses qui permettent la dénonciation. Si elles ont de telles clauses, il y a évidemment lieu de les appliquer puisque les parties se sont mises d’accord sur le fait qu’on puisse dénoncer la convention en question. Si on le fait pour les conventions humanitaires, on découvre vite qu’un grand nombre des conventions et en tout cas celles que nous avons cité jusqu’à présent comme le règlement de La Haye, les conventions de Genève, le protocole additionnel, donc, toutes les clauses les plus importantes contiennent des clauses de dénonciation. Pour ce qui est des conventions de Genève, ce sont les articles 63, 62, 142, 158 de la convention I à IV. Pour ce qui est du protocole additionnel I, c’est l’article 99.

Ce qu’on peut dire est que ces dispositions n’ont jamais été mises en application jusqu’à ce jour puisqu’aucun État n’a présenté au dépositaire, c’est-à-dire à la Suisse, une lettre de dénonciation jusqu’à ce jour. Aucun État, y compris les États-Unis en 2001, 2002, 2003 qui étaient la phase dans laquelle ils critiquaient les conventions de Genève ; aucune lettre de dénonciation. La question est donc du point de vue pratique peu implorante, mais il est possible de dénoncer.
À quelles conditions peut-on le faire ? C’est précisé dans ces dispositions qui sont toutes coulées dans le même moule. Il y a donc le même contenu. Il est dit dans les dispositions mentionnées que, tout d’abord, la dénonciation prend effet un an après la notification faite au dépositaire. Donc, il y a une notification que le dépositaire reçoit et c’est un an après qu’elle prend effet de date en date. Dans certains traités on précise même l’heure exacte parce qu’il y a des heurs différents, notamment en ce qui concerne les accords financiers parce qu’en matière financière cela peut faire une différence, mais cela n’est pas du DIH.

Il est précisé que la dénonciation ne peut avoir effet dans un conflit armé déjà commencé. Donc, si on dénonce une convention de DIH, en l’occurrence les conventions de Genève dans les dispositions mentionnées précédemment, pendant un conflit armé, non seulement s’appliquera la règle d’une année, mais non seulement en plus s’appliquera la règle que jusqu’à la fin de ce conflit armé, nous ne serons pas libérés des obligations encourues. Le but est évidemment de ne pas permettre aux États de se dérober exactement au moment où ils devraient appliquer les conventions parce que la tentation pourrait évidemment être relativement grande d’être partie aux conventions de Genève tant qu’il fait beau temps et au moment de les appliquer, de prendre une liberté par des dénonciations. Donc, pas jusqu’à la fin du conflit armé en cause et nous avons vu que cela peut signifier pendant encore dix ou vingt ans parce que si jamais il y a encore des personnes détenues, des prisonniers de guerre, etc., cela peut signifier que ces conventions seront amenées à s’appliquer encore fort longtemps.

La dénonciation ne vaut qu’à l’égard de la personne dénonçant, donc c’est celle qui est libérée des obligations sous les conventions, mais les autres parties à la convention de Genève restent liées entre elles. Cela va de soi en droit des traités, mais c’est une réaffirmation, on rappelle que la clause si omnes de s’applique plus en DIH. On retrouve la deuxième trace de la clause si omnes ici.

Et enfin et en tout dernier lieu, ces clauses rappellent notamment que le droit international général ainsi que la clause de Martens restent applicables même si et quand on dénonce des conventions. Ce rappel est également superflu en matière juridique parce qu’il est évident que le droit international général reste applicable, mais ce n’est pas tout à fait par hasard qu’on a inséré cette clause ici. D’une certaine manière, on rappelle aux États qu’il ne sert pas à très grand-chose de dénoncer les conventions de Genève parce que la très grande majorité des obligations y contenues sont des obligations coutumières bien qu’une dénonciation ne libère de presque rien sur le fond, mais en plus donne une très mauvaise image. C’est sans doute aussi la raison pour laquelle aucun État ne prétend aujourd’hui et probablement pour un certain temps encore dénoncer ces conventions.

Il faut savoir qu’il est possible de les dénoncer juridiquement, aux conditions que nous venons d’indiquer.

= Annexes =
* “Les Conventions De Genève De 1949 Et Leurs Protocoles Additionnels.” Humanrights.ch - Le Portail Suisse Des Droits Humains, www.humanrights.ch/fr/droits-humains-internationaux/humanitaire/conventions-de-geneve/.

= Références =
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[[Category:Robert Kolb]]
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