Arab Spring Against Terrorism: Issues and Perspectives - Historique des versions

Arthur le 16 février 2018 à 15:40

2018-02-16T15:40:32Z

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	\| es = Primavera árabe contra el terrorismo: cuestiones y perspectivas		\| es = Primavera árabe contra el terrorismo: cuestiones y perspectivas
	\| it = La Primavera araba contro il terrorismo: questioni e prospettive		\| it = La Primavera araba contro il terrorismo: questioni e prospettive
			\| de = Arabischer Frühling gegen den Terrorismus: Herausforderungen und Perspektiven
	}}		}}

Arthur le 14 février 2018 à 09:59

2018-02-14T09:59:39Z

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	Al Qaeda's fight seems to them to be outdated and above all historicized, that is to say, in a very particular context of the end of the Cold War and the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. But in no way can it make sense after the attacks of 2001 and the return of unilateralist power on the international scene, which has been worked out by the desire for a new multilateralism in favour of emerging powers.		Al Qaeda's fight seems to them to be outdated and above all historicized, that is to say, in a very particular context of the end of the Cold War and the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. But in no way can it make sense after the attacks of 2001 and the return of unilateralist power on the international scene, which has been worked out by the desire for a new multilateralism in favour of emerging powers.

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	There are clusters of converging troubling facts that seem to be attesting to this in the eyes of experts. They can be cited here: First, at the beginning of February, the Syrian People's Victory Front was created, a jihadist organization under the responsibility of a certain Abu Muhammad Al-Golani who advocates the struggle against Westerners, Turks, Americans and Iran to save the oppressed Syrian people. Then was assassinated on 10 February 2012 in Damascus the Alawite and Baasist Brigadier General Issa Al-Khawli, following the modus operandi of targeted Al-Qaida assassinations. Finally, according to the U. S. intelligence director, the two attacks on 23 December 2011 and the car bombing of 6 January 2012 in Damascus and the double or tripe car bombing on 10 February 2012 in Aleppo against the siege of military intelligence and the headquarters of the security forces "are typical of the attacks committed by Al-Qaida".		There are clusters of converging troubling facts that seem to be attesting to this in the eyes of experts. They can be cited here: First, at the beginning of February, the Syrian People's Victory Front was created, a jihadist organization under the responsibility of a certain Abu Muhammad Al-Golani who advocates the struggle against Westerners, Turks, Americans and Iran to save the oppressed Syrian people. Then was assassinated on 10 February 2012 in Damascus the Alawite and Baasist Brigadier General Issa Al-Khawli, following the modus operandi of targeted Al-Qaida assassinations. Finally, according to the U. S. intelligence director, the two attacks on 23 December 2011 and the car bombing of 6 January 2012 in Damascus and the double or tripe car bombing on 10 February 2012 in Aleppo against the siege of military intelligence and the headquarters of the security forces "are typical of the attacks committed by Al-Qaida".

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Arthur le 14 février 2018 à 09:38

2018-02-14T09:38:27Z

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	\| fr = Le Printemps arabe contre le terrorisme : enjeux et perspectives		\| fr = Le Printemps arabe contre le terrorisme : enjeux et perspectives
	\| es = Primavera árabe contra el terrorismo: cuestiones y perspectivas		\| es = Primavera árabe contra el terrorismo: cuestiones y perspectivas
			\| it = La Primavera araba contro il terrorismo: questioni e prospettive
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Arthur : /* References */

2018-02-09T22:22:58Z

References

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	= References =		= References =
	<references/>		<references />

	[[Category:science~~-politique~~]]		[[Category:political science]]
	[[Category:relations ~~internationales~~]]		[[Category:international relations]]
	[[Category:Rémi Baudoui]]		[[Category:Rémi Baudoui]]
	[[Category:~~sécurité~~]]		[[Category:security]]
	[[Category:~~terrorisme~~]]		[[Category:terrorism]]
	[[Category:2011]]		[[Category:2011]]
	[[Category:2013]]		[[Category:2013]]
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	[[Category:2015]]		[[Category:2015]]
	[[Category:2016]]		[[Category:2016]]
			[[Category:2017]]
			[[Category:2018]]

Arthur le 9 février 2018 à 21:52

2018-02-09T21:52:40Z

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	{{Translations		{{Translations
	\| fr = Le Printemps arabe contre le terrorisme : enjeux et perspectives		\| fr = Le Printemps arabe contre le terrorisme : enjeux et perspectives
			\| es = Primavera árabe contra el terrorismo: cuestiones y perspectivas
	}}		}}

Arthur le 8 février 2018 à 16:49

2018-02-08T16:49:48Z

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	Arab Spring Spring produces a cascade effect["the Arab Spring's cascading effects"] from Tunisia being a formidable vector of transformation. We also need to look at those who did not have an Arab Spring and we need to look at the factors that led to the absence of an Arab Spring. There is a difficulty in understanding and analysing this phenomenon. In the West, we depend on our referents and our own constructed representations of what democracy is. It has also been very difficult in the West to interpret and understand this phenomenon, but also to integrate it as a fundamental and important factor in the political transition of these countries, showing that political positions have been very complex.		Arab Spring Spring produces a cascade effect["the Arab Spring's cascading effects"] from Tunisia being a formidable vector of transformation. We also need to look at those who did not have an Arab Spring and we need to look at the factors that led to the absence of an Arab Spring. There is a difficulty in understanding and analysing this phenomenon. In the West, we depend on our referents and our own constructed representations of what democracy is. It has also been very difficult in the West to interpret and understand this phenomenon, but also to integrate it as a fundamental and important factor in the political transition of these countries, showing that political positions have been very complex.

			{{Translations
			\| fr = Le Printemps arabe contre le terrorisme : enjeux et perspectives
			}}

	= Arab Spring and Islamist Terrorism: THe Pandora Box Theory =		= Arab Spring and Islamist Terrorism: THe Pandora Box Theory =

Arthur le 8 février 2018 à 16:43

2018-02-08T16:43:15Z

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	* [[Combating terrorism and rebuilding transatlantic relations]]		* [[Combating terrorism and rebuilding transatlantic relations]]
	* [[Arab Spring Against Terrorism: Issues and Perspectives]]		* [[Arab Spring Against Terrorism: Issues and Perspectives]]
	* [[Homegrown jihadism ": How to prevent terrorist catastrophe?]]		* [[Homegrown jihadism: How to prevent terrorist catastrophe?]]
	}}		}}

Arthur le 8 février 2018 à 14:40

2018-02-08T14:40:14Z

Voir les modifications

Arthur : /* Références */

2018-02-08T14:34:05Z

Références

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	*Malet, David. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts		*Malet, David. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts

	= ~~Références~~ =		= References =
	<references/>		<references/>

Arthur : /* Conclusion */

2018-02-08T14:33:53Z

Conclusion

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	= Conclusion =		= Conclusion =
	~~L’analyse des~~ relations entre le Printemps arabe et le terrorisme recèle bien des difficultés parce qu’on dépend de représentations occidentales qui assignent au Moyen-Orient une impossibilité quasi pathologique à pouvoir accéder à la démocratie sur le modèle de la révolution islamique de l’Ayatollah Khomeiny. ~~Il y a une référence implicite du modèle conservateur de la révolution dans le monde arabe dans le cadre de l’Algérie en janvier~~ 1992 ~~et le~~ Front ~~islamique du Salut~~.
			The analysis of the relations between Arab Spring and terrorism harbours many difficulties because it is dependent on Western representations which attribute to the Middle East an almost pathological impossibility to be able to access democracy on the model of the Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeiny. There is an implicit reference to the conservative model of the revolution in the Arab world within the framework of Algeria in January 1992 and the Islamic Salvation Front.

	[[Fichier:Ennahda-supporters.jpg\|200px\|vignette\|droite]]		[[Fichier:Ennahda-supporters.jpg\|200px\|vignette\|droite]]

	Les victoires politiques des partis islamistes aux élections démocratiques en Tunisie comme la victoire des Frères Musulmans en Égypte font craindre à l’Occident un processus de clôture rapide du Printemps arabe par l’émergence d’un nouvel islamisme politique. La question ~~est de s’interroger sur quel serait la réalité de ce nouveau pouvoir démocratique~~ vis-à-vis ~~même de l’islam~~ radical~~. Les partis islamistes n’étaient pas sûrs que cela conduise à de la~~ violence ~~politique~~. ~~Quelque part~~, ~~les partis islamiques au pouvoir pouvaient être un frein au développement du terrorisme islamiste~~. ~~En Égypte~~, ~~les Frères musulmans étaient une~~ force ~~sociale structurante et susceptible de contrer les militaires du Conseil suprême des~~ forces ~~armées~~. ~~Les jeunes révèlent une~~ tension ~~interventionnelle entre des jeunes attachés à la liberté et des adultes plus conservateurs~~. ~~L’automne arabe qui lui succèderait quasi naturellement justifierait paradoxalement la clôture du processus démocratique en cours comme cela fut conduit dans le cadre de l’Algérie en janvier~~ 1992 ~~avec le~~ Front ~~islamique de Salut~~.		The political victories of Islamist parties in democratic elections in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood's victory in Egypt have led the West to fear a process of rapid closure of Arab Spring by the emergence of a new political Islamism. The question is what would be the reality of this new democratic power vis-à-vis radical Islam? Islamist parties were not sure that this would lead to political violence. Somewhere, the Islamic parties in power could be a brake on the development of Islamist terrorism. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was a structuring social force capable of countering the military forces of the Supreme Armed Forces Council. Young people reveal an interventional tension between young people committed to freedom and more conservative adults. The Arab autumn, which would almost naturally follow him, would paradoxically justify the closure of the ongoing democratic process, as it was carried out in the framework of Algeria in January 1992 with the Islamic Salvation Front.

	[[Fichier:Tunisie-constitution.jpg\|200px\|vignette\|gauche]]		[[Fichier:Tunisie-constitution.jpg\|200px\|vignette\|gauche]]

	~~En partant de l’hypothèse que l’émergence de partis islamistes dans le cadre du parlementarisme en cours de constitution en Tunisie et en Égypte ne conduirait pas~~ ipso facto ~~à la~~ violence ~~politique et à un régime islamiste absolu~~. ~~Rappelons d’abord que les islamistes tirent leur légitimité de la révolution même~~ ; ~~qu’ils représentent comme dans le cas égyptien la seule~~ force ~~politique structurante – au contraire du Parti de la~~ Justice ~~proche d’El~~-Baradei ~~fortement divisé – susceptible de contrer les militaires du Conseil suprême des~~ forces ~~armées~~ [CSFA]. ~~En tant que partis politiques le mouvement~~ Ennahda ~~comme celui du Parti de la~~ Justice ~~et des Libertés des Frères Musulmans sont traversés par des~~ tensions ~~fortes générationnelles entre jeunes assoiffés de liberté et adultes plus conservateurs~~. ~~Quant à la référence au rétablissement de la Charia, elle doit être contextualisée selon les~~ cultures. ~~La charia proche du droit romain dans le cas du mouvement~~ Ennaba ~~n’est pas assimilable à celle des Frères Musulmans qui n’est pas non plus celle d’Afghanistan~~.		Based on the assumption that the emergence of Islamist parties within the framework of the parliamentarism being established in Tunisia and Egypt would not ipso facto lead to political violence and an absolute Islamist regime. Let us recall first of all that the Islamists derive their legitimacy from the revolution itself; that they represent, as in the case of Egypt, the only structuring political force - unlike the Justice Party close to El-Baradei, which is highly divided - capable of countering the military forces of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces[CSFA]. As political parties, the Ennahda movement as well as that of the Justice and Freedom Party of the Muslim Brotherhood are subject to strong generational tensions between young people thirsting for freedom and more conservative adults. The reference to the restoration of Sharia law must be contextualized according to cultures. The Shariah close to Roman law in the case of the Ennaba movement is not comparable to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is also not that of Afghanistan.

	[[fichier:photo_hamideddine_bouali-2.jpg\|200px\|vignette\|droite\|photo:Hamideddine Bouali]]		[[fichier:photo_hamideddine_bouali-2.jpg\|200px\|vignette\|droite\|photo:Hamideddine Bouali]]

	~~Il demeure~~ important ~~de prendre aussi conscience des écarts qui existent entre les partis islamiques au cœur du Printemps arabe et du mouvement~~ Al-Qaida. ~~Chacun d’entre eux s’exprime d’abord dans une logique de l’État~~-~~nation~~. ~~Bien loin de revendiquer comme en~~ 1927 ~~temps de sa création la constitution d’un Califat sur l’ensemble des terres musulmanes~~, ~~les Frères musulmans réclament depuis longtemps leur reconnaissance dans la vie politique égyptienne~~. ~~Opposé au parti salafiste~~ Al-~~Nour~~, ~~le parti de la Liberté et de la~~ Justice ~~tente de s’associer au sein de l’Assemblée du Peuple avec le parti~~ al-Wassat ~~et le~~ Wafd ~~pour devenir un parti de gouvernement~~. ~~Rappelons que c’est ce positionnement structurel depuis plus de vingt ans~~, ~~qui avaient suscité contre lui l’opposition la plus farouche d’Al~~-Qaida ~~l’accusant de trahir l’Islam~~. ~~La relation entre le Printemps arabe et le terrorisme prend donc sens dans un contexte plus~~ global ~~de l’affaiblissement du mouvement~~ Al-Qaida ~~lié pour partie aux réussites partielles du contre~~-~~terrorisme occidental~~. ~~Mais de la même façon que le Printemps arabe a signifié dans un premier temps les faiblesses d’Al~~-Qaida, ~~il est aussi l’événement majeur –~~ via ~~l’exemple libyen et aujourd’hui syrien – qui peut aussi relégitimer leur~~ violence ~~effective~~.		It is also important to be aware of the gaps that exist between Islamic parties in the heart of the Arab Spring and Al-Qaida movement. Each of them is first expressed in a logic of the nation-state. Far from claiming, as in 1927, the creation of a caliphate on all Muslim lands, the Muslim Brotherhood has long since claimed recognition in Egyptian political life. Opposed to the Salafist party Al-Nur, the Freedom and Justice Party tries to associate itself within the People's Assembly with the al-Wassat and Wafd parties to become a governing party. Let us recall that it was this structural positioning for more than twenty years, which had provoked against him the fiercest opposition of Al-Qaida accusing him of betraying Islam. The relationship between Arab Spring and terrorism thus becomes meaningful in a more global context of the weakening of the Al-Qaida movement linked in part to the partial successes of Western counter-terrorism. But in the same way that Arab Spring initially meant Al-Qaida's weaknesses, it is also the major event - via the Libyan and now Syrian example - that can also relegate their actual violence.

	= Annexes =		= Annexes =