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	<title>The theory of resources equality by Ronald Dworkin - Historique des versions</title>
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		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=51161&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* The general idea */</title>
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		<updated>2021-09-12T21:37:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;The general idea&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 12 septembre 2021 à 23:37&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l39&quot;&gt;Ligne 39 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 39 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;quot;Egalitarian&amp;quot; does not necessarily mean &amp;quot;progressive&amp;quot; because what Dworkin says has been easily picked up and shared by a whole bunch of conservatives with the principle of accountability, which is the principle that everyone is responsible for their choices.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cohen, G. A. (1989). On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. Ethics, 99(4), 906–944. https://doi.org/10.1086/293126&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;BARRY, N. (2006). Defending Luck Egalitarianism. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23(1), 89–107. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00322.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Knight, C. (2013). Luck Egalitarianism. Philosophy Compass, 8(10), 924–934. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12077&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;quot;Egalitarian&amp;quot; does not necessarily mean &amp;quot;progressive&amp;quot; because what Dworkin says has been easily picked up and shared by a whole bunch of conservatives with the principle of accountability, which is the principle that everyone is responsible for their choices.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cohen, G. A. (1989). On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. Ethics, 99(4), 906–944. https://doi.org/10.1086/293126&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;BARRY, N. (2006). Defending Luck Egalitarianism. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23(1), 89–107. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00322.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Knight, C. (2013). Luck Egalitarianism. Philosophy Compass, 8(10), 924–934. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12077&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;For Dworkin, if we are at a disadvantage because of our choices, that is certainly an inequality, but it is not an injustice. There are situations that express forms of inequality, but that &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;do &lt;/del&gt;not necessarily mean that there are injustices.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;For Dworkin, if we are at a disadvantage because of our choices, that is certainly an inequality, but it is not an injustice. There are situations that express forms of inequality, but that &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;does &lt;/ins&gt;not necessarily mean that there are injustices.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Dworkin tries to think of a theoretical model that allows us to consider two things, a form of redistribution that, on the one hand, as a good liberal, starts from the idea that individuals must be free to pursue their conception of the good, that is sensitive to differences in aspiration.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Dworkin, Ronald. &amp;quot;[https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bulr90&amp;amp;div=16&amp;amp;id=&amp;amp;page= Justice for hedgehogs].&amp;quot; BUL Rev. 90 (2010): 469.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Dworkin, the conception of justice must take this into account; on the other hand, it must be independent of initial endowments. This means that it considers on an equal footing people with and without a natural disability problem. A just model has to be one that tries to equalize injustices or inequalities that people are not responsible for, that is, a distribution that is independent of natural goods that is not a justice that rewards the able-bodied and burdens the unemployable (1). On the other hand, it is a distribution that considers the distinction between choice and circumstance (2).&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Dworkin tries to think of a theoretical model that allows us to consider two things, a form of redistribution that, on the one hand, as a good liberal, starts from the idea that individuals must be free to pursue their conception of the good, that is sensitive to differences in aspiration.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Dworkin, Ronald. &amp;quot;[https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bulr90&amp;amp;div=16&amp;amp;id=&amp;amp;page= Justice for hedgehogs].&amp;quot; BUL Rev. 90 (2010): 469.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Dworkin, the conception of justice must take this into account; on the other hand, it must be independent of initial endowments. This means that it considers on an equal footing people with and without a natural disability problem. A just model has to be one that tries to equalize injustices or inequalities that people are not responsible for, that is, a distribution that is independent of natural goods that is not a justice that rewards the able-bodied and burdens the unemployable (1). On the other hand, it is a distribution that considers the distinction between choice and circumstance (2).&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44885&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur le 8 mars 2020 à 11:57</title>
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		<updated>2020-03-08T11:57:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 8 mars 2020 à 13:57&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l1&quot;&gt;Ligne 1 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 1 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;{{Infobox Lecture&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | image = &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
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&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | cours = [[Political Theory]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | faculté = &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | département = &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | professeurs = [[Matteo Gianni]]&amp;lt;ref&gt;[https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/speri/membres/matteo-gianni/ Page personnelle de Matteo Gianni sur le site de l'Université de Genève]&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;Concordia University, Faculty of Arts and Science - Department of Political Science. “Dr. Matteo Gianni.” Dr. Matteo Gianni, https://www.concordia.ca/artsci/polisci/wssr/all-guest-lecturers/matteogianni.html&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;Profil de Matteo Gianni sur ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/2010087511_Matteo_Gianni&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;Profil Linkedin de Matteo Gianni - https://www.linkedin.com/in/matteo-gianni-2438b135/?originalSubdomain=ch&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;[https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=QP7aLBAAAAAJ&amp;amp;hl=fr Matteo Gianni - Citations Google Scholar]&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;“Matteo Gianni - Auteur - Ressources De La Bibliothèque Nationale De France.” Data.bnf.fr, https://data.bnf.fr/fr/16166342/matteo_gianni/.&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;“Matteo Gianni: Università Degli Studi Di Udine / University of Udine.” Academia.edu, https://uniud.academia.edu/MatteoGianni.&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | enregistrement = &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt; | lectures = &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[What is political theory? Epistemological implications]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[What is political theory? Meta-ethical issues]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[The egalitarian theory of distributive justice by John Rawls]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[The theory of rights by Robert Nozick]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[The theory of resources equality by Ronald Dworkin]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[The theory of capabilities of Amartya Sen and Marta Nussbaum]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[The communitarian perspective]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*[[The multiculturalist perspective]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;}}&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Translations&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Translations&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| fr = La théorie de l’égalité des ressources de Ronald Dworkin&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| fr = La théorie de l’égalité des ressources de Ronald Dworkin&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44107&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44107&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:21:07Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:21&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l56&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Tan, Kok-Chor. “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 105, no. 11, 2008, pp. 665–690. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20620136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Segall, S. (2007). In Solidarity with the Imprudent. Social Theory and Practice, 33(2), 177–198. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200733224&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rasmussen, Kasper. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=bfeiCgAAQBAJ&amp;amp;lpg=PP1&amp;amp;ots=DUL5GyxaKE&amp;amp;dq=egalitarianism%20luck&amp;amp;lr&amp;amp;pg=PP1#v=onepage&amp;amp;q=egalitarianism%20luck&amp;amp;f=false Luck egalitarianism]. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. Print.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Knight, Carl. [https://books.google.fr/books?hl=en&amp;amp;lr=&amp;amp;id=5RGrBgAAQBAJ&amp;amp;oi=fnd&amp;amp;pg=PP1&amp;amp;dq=egalitarianism+luck&amp;amp;ots=d_z1Kj11G9&amp;amp;sig=qshw5fmx2D4667mfFV6suZ4z2_I#v=onepage&amp;amp;q=egalitarianism%20luck&amp;amp;f=false Luck egalitarianism : equality, responsibility, and justice]. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Print.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, Richard J. &amp;quot;[https://books.google.fr/books?hl=en&amp;amp;lr=&amp;amp;id=FM0UDAAAQBAJ&amp;amp;oi=fnd&amp;amp;pg=PA24&amp;amp;dq=egalitarianism+luck&amp;amp;ots=00-dLrV1Ti&amp;amp;sig=oadQGqqcgrob_taSAEGfWwvMdcw#v=onepage&amp;amp;q=egalitarianism%20luck&amp;amp;f=false Luck egalitarianism–a primer].&amp;quot; Responsibility and distributive justice 1 (2011): 24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;/ins&gt;This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Tan, Kok-Chor. “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 105, no. 11, 2008, pp. 665–690. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20620136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Segall, S. (2007). In Solidarity with the Imprudent. Social Theory and Practice, 33(2), 177–198. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200733224&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44104&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44104&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:18:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:18&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l56&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Tan, Kok-Chor. “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 105, no. 11, 2008, pp. 665–690. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20620136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Tan, Kok-Chor. “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 105, no. 11, 2008, pp. 665–690. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20620136.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Segall, S. (2007). In Solidarity with the Imprudent. Social Theory and Practice, 33(2), 177–198. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200733224&lt;/ins&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44101&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44101&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:17:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:17&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l56&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Tan, Kok-Chor. “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 105, no. 11, 2008, pp. 665–690. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20620136.&lt;/ins&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44098&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44098&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:16:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:16&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l56&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 56 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, &amp;quot;Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility,&amp;quot; Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 548-579.  https://doi.org/10.1086/233526&lt;/ins&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44095&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44095&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:15:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:15&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l55&quot;&gt;Ligne 55 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 55 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics, 32(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2004321/217&lt;/ins&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44092&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44092&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:15:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:15&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l55&quot;&gt;Ligne 55 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 55 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This has been the subject of much criticism.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Voigt, K. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 389–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44089&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44089&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:13:28Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:13&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l55&quot;&gt;Ligne 55 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 55 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory. This has been the subject of much criticism.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brown, Alexander. &amp;quot;[https://philpapers.org/rec/BROLEA Luck egalitarianism and democratic equality].&amp;quot; (2005).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kaufman, A. (2004). Choice, Responsibility and Equality. Political Studies, 52(4), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arneson, R. J. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/233272&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;/ins&gt;This has been the subject of much criticism.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44086&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Arthur : /* Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_theory_of_resources_equality_by_Ronald_Dworkin&amp;diff=44086&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2020-02-18T17:10:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Some criticisms of chance egalitarianism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Version précédente&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Version du 18 février 2020 à 19:10&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l57&quot;&gt;Ligne 57 :&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Ligne 57 :&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory. This has been the subject of much criticism.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;This current of liberalism is called the egalitarianism of luck, which is a Dworkian approach. This is an important approach that starts from the idea that the issue of luck must be considered in theory. This has been the subject of much criticism.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective. Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In ''What is the Point of Equality?'' published in 1999, Elisabeth Anderson wonders what to do with people who made the wrong choices from a Liberal perspective.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anderson, E. S. (1999). What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/233897&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;/ins&gt;Should we leave them to their dismay, or should a certain conception of the person or a certain human dignity imply that they should still be taken care of? The question is rather rhetorical. Anderson starts from the idea that you simply can't morally suspend helping people who are suffering from a situation that leads to conditions of human non-dignity. For her, the distinction of Dworkin makes it possible to mark out a few situations, but nevertheless, in the face of people who have made the wrong choice, what do we do with a firefighter? Can a firefighter who is a person whose life expectancy is lower because of risk-taking, start from the idea that he is responsible for his choice? Is it the idea that the firefighter should not be helped because he suffered a work accident and said that he did not have to be a firefighter?  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;There are a whole bunch of cases where what means &amp;quot;bad luck&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;bad choice&amp;quot; is very problematic. Between a firefighter burned during an intervention and the surfer who, despite all the avalanche danger warnings, decides to go down a mountain, is this the same situation? The question that arises is what is the intuition and the argument behind the idea that we need to help him. In political theory, the interesting question is why help is needed. From which perimeter of the relationship is there a duty to help? When should we recognize our citizens as individuals to whom we owe special obligations according to certain philosophers? One of the questions is whether we have more obligations and responsibilities with people with whom we share something or not. If we help the surfer, we help him or her because he or she is a human being, a neighbour or a acquaintance or not helping can have an impact on tourism. Behind the ultimate reason, there can be a whole bunch or no positions.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;There are a whole bunch of cases where what means &amp;quot;bad luck&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;bad choice&amp;quot; is very problematic. Between a firefighter burned during an intervention and the surfer who, despite all the avalanche danger warnings, decides to go down a mountain, is this the same situation? The question that arises is what is the intuition and the argument behind the idea that we need to help him. In political theory, the interesting question is why help is needed. From which perimeter of the relationship is there a duty to help? When should we recognize our citizens as individuals to whom we owe special obligations according to certain philosophers? One of the questions is whether we have more obligations and responsibilities with people with whom we share something or not. If we help the surfer, we help him or her because he or she is a human being, a neighbour or a acquaintance or not helping can have an impact on tourism. Behind the ultimate reason, there can be a whole bunch or no positions.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;For Anderson, what matters is to avoid power inequalities and forms of oppression. That is what creates injustice and undermines equality, not the fact that people can make a bad choice. According to Dworkin, a person must be able to choose and pay their own costs. But what does it mean when someone has to flee war or famine as a choice? There is a strong empirical dimension behind what makes or does not make a choice. It is difficult to decide these questions philosophically. The more theoretical and general question is whether it is necessary for any inequality in relation to the original good to redistribute. For Dworkin, the answer is no, there are inequalities that are just, there are inequalities that depend on people's unwillingness or on the options that people have made. At that point, the state does not have to intervene. On the other hand, the state, unlike Rawls, must take much more seriously the situation of people who naturally have disabilities or forms of suffering that do not allow them to have an adequate quality of life. At that point, the state must intervene more. Case law of the Federal Supreme Court accepts the position of a health insurance fund, which has established in its case-law that a fund is no longer required to reimburse a medicinal product in excess of 100,000 euros. If someone is one of those unfortunate people who have a rare disease with little research carried out and very expensive drugs, the Swiss Federal Court has set a threshold at 100,000. -. In a way, a life is worth 100,000. -. Beyond that amount, there is nothing more to do. One could imagine that around such an issue, there is still a democratic decision about how much we are willing to invest or put into medical research before guaranteeing health. In this case, it's a legal decision. So maybe it is true that the caisses cannot pay more than a certain amount for economic reasons, but in reality, it means that a life is worth 100,000 - and beyond that, it is too expensive for society. The question that Dworkin asks is also this question, namely, treating people with equal attention, also means that society must make an effort to try as much as possible to at least facilitate the condition of these people.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;For Anderson, what matters is to avoid power inequalities and forms of oppression. That is what creates injustice and undermines equality, not the fact that people can make a bad choice. According to Dworkin, a person must be able to choose and pay their own costs. But what does it mean when someone has to flee war or famine as a choice? There is a strong empirical dimension behind what makes or does not make a choice. It is difficult to decide these questions philosophically. The more theoretical and general question is whether it is necessary for any inequality in relation to the original good to redistribute. For Dworkin, the answer is no, there are inequalities that are just, there are inequalities that depend on people's unwillingness or on the options that people have made. At that point, the state does not have to intervene. On the other hand, the state, unlike Rawls, must take much more seriously the situation of people who naturally have disabilities or forms of suffering that do not allow them to have an adequate quality of life. At that point, the state must intervene more. Case law of the Federal Supreme Court accepts the position of a health insurance fund, which has established in its case-law that a fund is no longer required to reimburse a medicinal product in excess of 100,000 euros. If someone is one of those unfortunate people who have a rare disease with little research carried out and very expensive drugs, the Swiss Federal Court has set a threshold at 100,000. -. In a way, a life is worth 100,000. -. Beyond that amount, there is nothing more to do. One could imagine that around such an issue, there is still a democratic decision about how much we are willing to invest or put into medical research before guaranteeing health. In this case, it's a legal decision. So maybe it is true that the caisses cannot pay more than a certain amount for economic reasons, but in reality, it means that a life is worth 100,000 - and beyond that, it is too expensive for society. The question that Dworkin asks is also this question, namely, treating people with equal attention, also means that society must make an effort to try as much as possible to at least facilitate the condition of these people.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Annexes =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;= Annexes =&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Arthur</name></author>
	</entry>
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