The transformation of contemporary security practices: the logic of risk
We will start from the practices, but add an element to the reflection which is that of questioning the logic of risk. We remain on the idea of transforming contemporary security practices, but we will look at what the logic of risk can bring to understand them. How this logic will make it possible to understand the transformations of the practices that interest us.
The previous session focused on the typical ideals of policing and military practice and the convergences between them. In this session, we will focus on the common rationality that underlies these practices today. The rationality we will explore is that of risk. Risk is becoming an increasingly problematic issue in our societies. We are going to talk about "rationality of risk" and not its socially constructed or not socially constructed nature. We will try to identify and explore the idea that risk has its own rationality, which is occupying more and more sectors of our society. How did this rationality of risk interfere with all the security practices we are interested in?
Safety through the prism of risk: from deterrence to risk management
Rationality of risk
What is risk? According to Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster in the article "Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest Editors' Introduction" published in 2008, risk is an estimate of the dangerousness of the future. A reference to the probability of an adverse event occurring in the future. We are between the notions of the present and the future, when we think in terms of risk, we think in terms of the future. One thinks in reference to the probability of an event. With calculations and data, we could mathematically succeed in preventing the future.
Thus, risk is seen as an attempt to tame uncertainty, the risk can be classified, quantified and predicted. So risk can be understood as a way of acting and thinking that involves calculating probable futures, followed by interventions in the present to control this future potential by preventing it from happening. That sounds absurd, but we are not here to say if the risks are not real or constructed, we are here to say how a vision of the world and rationality intrude into practices.
Sociologists have taken rationality and its influence on the world very seriously. In 2001, Ulrich Beck published his book "Risk Society". Another important author is Anthony Giddens. For these authors, but also for John Adams and Niklas Luhman, for a very long time, the main risk to individuals came from events that individuals did not control at all. The idea behind the reflective modernity concept is that we produce our own risks, threats and dangers. Paradoxically, we have come to societies that have solved many problems, but they have created new ones. This is linked to a new modernity with the idea that we ourselves produce our own risks and threats. This interest in risk stems from a series of environmental disasters that raise the idea that we have entered a new paradigm of risk. The novelty is that we produce our own risks ourselves. The development of industrial society is both evolution and problem.
The logic of risk rationality is present in several areas, including strategy, finance, health, the environment and insurance, for which François Ewald is one of the leading representatives. It is therefore necessary to question the impact of risk on society and how we will measure and perceive our security. The example of the environment is central to the emergence and diffusion of risk thinking, but it is also an example that speaks to everyone concerned. Questions need to be asked about the way in which society from risk to an impact on the way in which safety is measured and perceived. Indeed, there are certain transformations on what is meant by the notion of "risk society".
Threats and risks
| Threat | Risk |
|---|---|
| 1) intentionality: threat; 2) negative or ambiguous connotation; 3) consequence: a threat can be countered and eradicated; 4) refers to something that already exists (in the present), countering a threat: no threat; 5) threat can be unlikely. |
1) no intentionality; 2) can be positive, tolerable, an opportunity: for example, in financial markets, the risk can generate gains; 3) a risk, one manages it, one arbitrates it: For example, road traffic; 4) we extrapolate from something that does not exist in the present (statistical risk): thus turned towards a virtual future, the strength of risk thinking is to act before it happens; 5) a risk is necessarily formulated in the form of probability: probable and mathematized.
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With the logic of risk, we move from deterrence to risk management. The term "deterrence" is common to all security practices. Deterrence is before nuclear deterrence. Risk management is fundamentally different from the logic of deterrence. When risk is addressed, it has never materialized. Final results cannot be produced, for example, crime or terrorism will not disappear. We are going to do things that will prevent crime from increasing. Thus, the goal of managers is to keep the situation under control by managing risks according to the resources they have and allocate. It is therefore necessary to act in a preventive way based on scenarios, because it will be too late if we act in a reactive way, we will not have enough resources. The challenge is to manage an unpredictable environment and govern the future. We're gonna have to figure out what can happen so we can be effective.
Is the question raised as to whether there is a questioning of instrumental rationality at the heart of bureaucratisation? The ends become the means. This rationality was widely accepted in modern times. From the seventeenth century onwards, with Clausewitz, the army was rationalised in an instrumental way leading to the creation of efficient bureaucracies. In a war, in a bureaucratized state, the end is military victory, the way is to have absolute war in order to mobilize the population and its resources in order to be able to lead this war. That would no longer be possible today. To go to war, we would have to secure victory as much as their own people. This is the height of bureaucratization. By wanting to be rational, by wanting to quantify everything and evaluate everything in terms of risk, we no longer really distinguish between the end of the means and the end becomes the means.
The aim is now to secure populations by minimizing risks. Before, during the Cold War and before, when we talked about security, things were pretty easy. It is interesting to look at how risk is a rationality that enters different spheres of practice at different times and what risk thinking is not new. In the European welfare states, citizens were already turning to the state and asking them to behave in a way.
Where security becomes interesting is that security, at the base, is the use of force. The prerogative of security is the use of force. If the concept of security that already exists within States is beginning to differ, it is that security is no longer simply the use of force. Thinking in terms of risk is linked to this contemporary movement where security is increasingly becoming the preservation of life. Security is no longer limited to the use of force. The best example is social security. Thinking in terms of risk will make it possible to secure populations. The threat is calculable, from a risk point of view, the best one can hope for is to manage or prevent a risk. You can never achieve "perfect security". Managing one risk can generate another.
In military matters, the advent of these rationalities is also made possible by technological advances through the "politics of the great number". This opens the field of possibilities and the emergence of new actors. There are quite different security universes that have evolved in a distinguished way for some time. When we are going to question the adaptation or transformation of the rationality of the world of security through a logic of risk, we can observe in an interesting way a gap between the military strategy and the control of the crime sustained by the Cold War. In The Risk Society at War published in 2007, Rasmussen shows how countries are in a predictable environment where one operates quite independently of internal security, which is in the process of moving towards a rationality of risk revolving around precaution and the notion of future governance. Police methods are increasingly oriented towards this type of rationality while military logic and locked in a Clausewitzian approach until the end of the Cold War.
Risk, security and globalisation (flows, etc.)
We must try to see globalisation as a point of contact between two security worlds where we see a strong influence of risk strategy on military strategy from the end of the Cold War onwards. From the point of view of risk, globalization is above all a reduction in transaction costs in order to communicate, do business or circulate. This is both positive and mixed, with those who will take advantage of globalisation to achieve their goals. Globalization influences the thinking of risk since it can be seen as a scenario and will be widely accepted as credible. Globalisation has a dark side.
The idea that the dark side of globalisation must absolutely be managed has been brought up to date by the attacks of 11 September. What's interesting is how 9/11 accelerated this way of thinking. It was on 11 September that this scenario was given credibility. In a globalised world, individuals will take advantage of opportunities such as committing a crime and therefore represent a risk. Globalisation can be seen as a scenario that has become credible, not only because there are probabilities, but also because events take place. In this vision of globalization, it is not only the dark side thesis, but also the thesis that everyone else will benefit from globalization.
Thus, managing risks, in a globalised world, has set up efficient filters so that transaction costs remain low for those who do not represent a risk. With the example of the airport, the goal is to put systems in place to prevent those who pose a potential risk from passing through. The problem is how to set up filters and who is at risk. We cannot be satisfied with the fact that people who are going to commit crimes are in databases, we need systems that make it possible to profile. The question is how to set up filters, but also how to profile dangerous people. Risks are flows to be managed and require the installation of filters. Security practices will, among other things, redeploy around this idea.
We are not only going to talk about the military, but it affects all the aircraft, security agencies and security actors, if we take the idea of globalisation as a scenario further in a world that we will be able to manage. In an interconnected world, the object to be secured is no longer the State, but the future.
Why are we going to intervene in local conflicts? We will therefore intervene in local conflicts that could potentially have consequences "here". This comes with the war in Kosovo, we will intervene in "distant" countries so that national interests are not threatened, and we will intervene so that these countries do not generate dangers for us. Behind the concept of nation-building arises the idea that rebuilding a state after invading it is the idea of changing the values of a state so that it is no longer a threat. In the American strategy, a failed country is a potentially dangerous country that can generate terrorism, migration and ecological risks. The idea is that going upstream to take care of a country is one way to avoid it becoming dangerous for "us" one day and thus to manage a risk. With the metaphor of "meteorologists" who give probabilities, we have a similar reflection that could illustrate the intervention in Iraq. Going to Iraq is not when you have put together a dossier and think that you should go, it is rather than when you are in a scenario. The question of seeking the truth was not central, the idea was to set up a scenario since it was felt that going to Iraq was a way of managing a risk.
La propagation du risque dans les pratiques de sécurité
Guerre préemptive et principe de précaution : la Guerre en Iraq de 2003
Quelle est la rationalité qui a mené à la décision d’aller en Irak comparée avec la notion de « principe de précaution ». La question ici n’est pas de savoir pourquoi les États-Unis ont envahi l’Iraq en 2003, mais plutôt pourquoi l’administration Bush a estimé que cette opération allait rendre les États-Unis plus sûr. Gérer ce type d’affaires était dans une logique de containment lié à une stratégie de dissuasion. On a quitté cette rationalité. Juste avant l’intervention, il y a eu un article de Mearsheimer et Walt intitulé An Unnecessary war publié en 2003 critiquant la doctrine préemptive choisie par l’administration Bush pour envahir l’Irak. Selon eux, on est face à un changement. Pour montrer la nouveauté de ce conflit, le débat entre ceux qui étaient « pour » et les détracteurs était un peu impossible. Les critiques étaient amenées à dire que l’administration Bush cachait ses véritables motivations. Pour les soutiens de l’administration, l’idée était d’aller en Irak pour gérer un risque, mais ce n’était pas une logique de causalité traditionnelle « moyens – fins ». L’argument de la préemption était qu’il fallait y aller pour gérer une menace. La dimension préemptive de l‘approche n’était pas forcement ce qui était remis en question. Pour Cheney, dans un discours de 2002, « the risk of inaction is far greater than the risk of action ». Le fait de faire tomber le régime et de le remodeler en fonction de valeurs qui seraient plus proches de celles qui sont les nôtres pour qu’on soit à terme plus « sûr » a sa cohérence propre. C’est la doctrine de la préemption, à savoir attaquer de manière préemptive. Faire du state-building amène à gérer des risques, c’est une façon d’avoir des partenaires qui ne seront pas une menace dans le futur. La pensée préemptive est déjà présente avant 2001.
Pour Rasmussen, il est étonnant que l’argument de Bush et Blair n’ait pas convaincu alors qu’il était proche du discours de précaution dans le domaine environnemental. Il est étonnant que le discours ne soit pas passé et peut être que si il n’est pas passé, cela était du point de vue diplomatique rendant l’administration Bush implacable de former une coalition. Le principe de précaution est en fait désormais partie intégrante des doctrines de sécurité des deux côtés de l’Atlantique.
La catégorie du principe de précaution en termes de sécurité environnementale est bien établie dans notre société. Même au niveau juridique, depuis le sommet sur la terre de Rio en 1992, il a une valeur juridique, un soutien populaire assez élevé. La doctrine de la préemption et le principe de précaution sont plus qu’une analogie, on est dans le même type de rationalité ayant notamment en commun la politique de l’urgence. Avec la doctrine préemptive, on ne va pas prendre le risque de courir un risque encore plus grand. Le principe de précaution est basé sur des scénarios qui prévoient le futur. Les climato-septiques demandent toujours des preuves sur le réchauffement climatique et critiquent le principe de précaution dans le domaine de l’environnement tant qu’un lien de causalité́ entre pollution humaine et réchauffement climatique n’est pas empiriquement établi. Le principe de précaution est le contraire, leur discours rejette le principe de précaution. Du moment où on génère nos propres menaces, on risque de nous même nous détruire et on ne peut pas attendre que ça arrive pour réagir. Lomborg parle de « Preventive trap ». Mais l’établissement d’un tel lien est exactement ce que rejette la logique du principe de précaution.
Lutte contre le crime et intelligence-led policing
La logique de prévention existe depuis la création des bases du droit pénal moderne. Déjà au XVIIIème siècle, Cesare Beccaria, en 1764, plaide pour une approche préventive des crises. Pour lui, il vaut mieux prévenir les crimes que les punir. La prévention était donc très tôt un concept clé dans la lutte contre la criminalité. C’est un argument utilitariste par rapport au risque. Si on dissuade le criminel d’agir, le coût du crime sera trop élevé et il ne commettra pas de crime. Le criminel étant considéré comme rationnel, on va le dissuader de commettre un crime. Très tôt va se poser la question du dosage entre prévention et punition. Avec l’État-providence et la logique d’assurance solidariste, tout comme le montre Ewald, on s’est attaqué ensuite aux conditions socio-économiques qui rendaient le crime possible avec comme horizon la réhabilitation. On prévenait donc le crime autrement.
À partir du moment où se mettent en place ces logiques préventives, il y a comme un retour en arrière dans les années 1970. Dès les années 1970, cette approche est remise en question suite à une augmentation de la criminalité. Avec l’échec de la réhabilitation, on abandonne l’idée d’éradication du crime. Cela représente un changement important, car il s’agit d’une rupture avec la croyance selon laquelle on pouvait atteindre une société idéale par l’ingénierie sociale. Le crime était dès lors accepté comme faisant partie de la vie sociale. Le crime fait partie de la vie sociale et le crime devient donc un risque à gérer.
La société du risque permet un rapprochement et un mélange des pratiques. À la fin des années 1970, principalement aux États-Unis, s’est mise en place une volonté de prédire le crime d’une façon de plus en plus efficace.
Le intelligence-led policing est ce qu’on appelle en français le « renseignement criminel de sécurité ». L’ILP a pour origine les plans de renseignement policier mis en œuvre au Royaume-Uni au milieu des années 1990 suite à une démarche initiée par la Kent Constabulary. Le postulat de base est que la police perd trop de temps à répondre à des situations d’urgence et donc il faut reprendre une initiative en visant préventivement les délinquants connus en ayant assez de renseignement sur qui cibler afin d’avoir une politique de gestion des risques plus efficaces. En ce qui concerne la logique criminelle, il s’agit de faire du bon profilage alors que dans une logique de risque on agit avec des filtres.
Le ILP s’est étendu à partir des années 1990 en Australie et en Nouvelle-Zélande notamment, avant de connaître un succès aux États-Unis après les attentats du 11 Septembre 2001. Ce nouvel intérêt pour le renseignement s’explique par le manque de coordination prévalant entre les agences spécialisées américaines. La CIA avait des informations sur des informations sur ce qui se passait à l’extérieur du territoire et le FBI des informations sur ce qui se passait à l’intérieur et il y a eu un mauvais partage des informations.
Actuellement ont lieu des débats sur de jeunes européens qui partent combattre en Syrie et en Irak, et la plupart des gouvernements européens tentent de mettre en place de nouveaux moyens de pouvoir gérer le risque que représentent ces djihadistes notamment en ce qui concerne leur retour. On est dans une logique de gestion du risque puisqu’on leur reproche de représenter une potentielle menace à leur retour en Europe. Il y a différentes solutions pour gérer la radicalisation les amenant à utiliser la violence. Par rapport aux différentes réponses possibles, il y en a certaines plus coercitives que d’autres et notamment une qui est de retirer passeports de potentiels djihadistes. Ces personnes n’ont rien fait au profit d’une logique proactive. On va prendre des décisions politiques par rapport à des choses qui pourraient arriver et on peut constater l’importance que cette rationalité prend dans la gestion des affaires sécuritaires. Concernant la radicalisation, il y a des stratégies différentes notamment de déradicalisation comme au Danemark pour ne pas les considérer comme criminels.
Conclusion
The rationality of risk allows several spaces to communicate with each other around a common vision of the world. Rather, the logic of risk was rather the prerogative of the public policies of the welfare state extended to the world of external security and in particular to the military world through counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism strategies in order to increase the security of each individual. There is the idea of a boomerang effect, which is that risk management creates new risks. Risk is also seen as an opportunity, a rationality of risk creates a distinction between two types of people: risk-averseness and risk-takers. In a society where the rationality of risk has become increasingly important, this raises questions about how to have a democratic debate in the risk society. Risk management is the colonization of the future, so how can we have a democratic, informed debate about events that have not even taken place? There is a parallel with the management of environmental issues. There is the precautionary principle where we are talking about an event that has not happened and that must be prevented. As the rationality of a debate on terrorism issues is being transposed, the rules of the game have changed somewhat. In Europe, in the 1970s and 1980s, the years of terrorism, we will ask ourselves how to deal with the terrorist threat. We are talking about a phenomenon where we are trying to prevent events from happening when they have not even happened. This is a fundamental principle of democratic functioning and accountability, and in democratic regimes it is increasingly difficult to control regimes that want to prevent.